37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1617336 |
Time | |
Date | 201902 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | VNY.Airport |
State Reference | CA |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Light Transport |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Altitude Undershoot Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Track / Heading All Types |
Narrative:
Vny 16R HARYS2 departure from shortened runway in light rain; 12F temperature; closed runways and busy airport operations. All performance parameters planned for in preflight and departure briefed. This issue was complicated by a heated and somewhat unprofessional discussion socal departure was having with another aircraft on frequency change to them from tower. Takeoff was nice and smooth with a shallow climb rate to make the 1.5 DME restriction at 1750. The autopilot was switched on at 600 ft AGL with VNAV enraged in vsi mode. It was around 1000 feet that I noticed there was no altitude in magenta being considered by the system for the level off if needed until the 1.5 DME fix 'wait... What fix?' it wasn't in the flight plan. New plan. I disengaged the autopilot and leveled at 1750 feet until we started to at least make the turn at pprry and then I would continue climb to 4000. Our TCAS was deferred as well so not being able to conform the 1.5 DME fix and climbing blindly wasn't something I wanted to do. Staying too low and risking a low altitude scenario was also the other extreme I considered. At frequency change to socal; we weren't quite to pprry and there was some argument ensuing between a [GA aircraft] and the controller. The controller was basically yelling at the pilot and making everyone on frequency; including us feel uncomfortable. About the time we checked on I initiated the continued climb to 4000. The controller responded by issuing an unprofessional and flippant low altitude alert for us and a chastising explanation of how the departure was supposed to go. The controller was immediately replaced by another after that exchange. I've flown out of vny for many years and it's just my experience that all of these south departures that are put out have long been laden with too many 'gotchas' and special issues that lend to pilot deviations and unsafe situations. Always vny. Always 16R. No ground prox alerts ever activated on the garmin system and while we likely were below where they would like us on the departure; we were above the 1303 foot restriction and at the 1750 feet for a bit longer than desired. Given the late catch of the 1.5 DME fix not being in the flight plan; this compromise (with no TCAS) seemed to be a good common sense plan. Additionally; during the dual route verification; we missed that the 1.5 DME fix was a real DME hold instead of a built in fix to the departure. This is a fatal flaw in this departure as pilots expect that all fixes in a RNAV departure will be in the flight plan. Add notes on this departure to specifically DME hold vny to identify the 1.5 DME fix on the HARYS2. We expect that the fix will be in the garmin if an RNAV procedure is issued. If the note cannot be added; we should discontinue the use of this departure as a company and request a vector and altitude departure. There's too much going on with this departure alone. Add traffic; mad controllers; weather; airport construction and all the added ingredients present today and a worse outcome could happen next time.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Air Taxi Captain reported a departure fix was not programed in the FMS for the SID; a communication issue with the ATC controller and possibly flying an incorrect altitude.
Narrative: VNY 16R HARYS2 Departure from shortened runway in light rain; 12F temperature; closed runways and busy airport operations. All performance parameters planned for in preflight and departure briefed. This issue was complicated by a heated and somewhat unprofessional discussion SoCal Departure was having with another aircraft on frequency change to them from tower. Takeoff was nice and smooth with a shallow climb rate to make the 1.5 DME restriction at 1750. The autopilot was switched on at 600 ft AGL with VNAV enraged in VSI mode. It was around 1000 feet that I noticed there was no altitude in magenta being considered by the system for the level off if needed until the 1.5 DME fix 'wait... what fix?' It wasn't in the flight plan. New plan. I disengaged the autopilot and leveled at 1750 feet until we started to at least make the turn at PPRRY and then I would continue climb to 4000. Our TCAS was deferred as well so not being able to conform the 1.5 DME fix and climbing blindly wasn't something I wanted to do. Staying too low and risking a low altitude scenario was also the other extreme I considered. At frequency change to SoCal; we weren't quite to PPRRY and there was some argument ensuing between a [GA aircraft] and the controller. The controller was basically yelling at the pilot and making everyone on frequency; including us feel uncomfortable. About the time we checked on I initiated the continued climb to 4000. The controller responded by issuing an unprofessional and flippant low altitude alert for us and a chastising explanation of how the departure was supposed to go. The controller was immediately replaced by another after that exchange. I've flown out of VNY for many years and it's just my experience that all of these south departures that are put out have long been laden with too many 'gotchas' and special issues that lend to pilot deviations and unsafe situations. Always VNY. Always 16R. No Ground Prox alerts ever activated on the Garmin system and while we likely were below where they would like us on the departure; we were above the 1303 foot restriction and at the 1750 feet for a bit longer than desired. Given the late catch of the 1.5 DME fix not being in the flight plan; this compromise (with no TCAS) seemed to be a good common sense plan. Additionally; during the dual route verification; we missed that the 1.5 DME fix was a real DME hold instead of a built in fix to the departure. This is a fatal flaw in this departure as pilots expect that ALL fixes in a RNAV departure will be in the flight plan. Add notes on this departure to specifically DME hold VNY to identify the 1.5 DME fix on the HARYS2. We expect that the fix will be in the Garmin if an RNAV procedure is issued. If the note cannot be added; we should discontinue the use of this departure as a company and request a vector and altitude departure. There's too much going on with this departure alone. Add traffic; mad controllers; weather; airport construction and all the added ingredients present today and a worse outcome could happen next time.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.