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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1753421 |
Time | |
Date | 202007 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Marginal |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B767-300 and 300 ER |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Instrument |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural FAR Deviation - Procedural Hazardous Material Violation Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
We were operating aircraft X at ZZZ. The sort was listed as running approximately 90 minutes late; however the flight was not loaded and ready to push until 2 hrs; 30 minutes after our scheduled departure time. We would later recall the ramp agent remarking as he closed us out that he had been called out to work this flight; and that it was not his normal flight. As we received pushback clearance; we also received an ACARS message indicating 'fom 10.37 dry ice supplemental procedures in effect.' I was asked to acknowledge the message via ACARS; which I did (as I understand it) to modify the fpr and make the flight legal to dispatch. I held the push as the first officer got out of his seat; pulled out the monitors; and powered them up. I verbalized that the APU was already running with the packs on; that we would perform a 2-engine taxi; and we would need to start the APU after landing at ZZZ1. I assumed (wrongly) that I had missed the fom 10.37 reference in the dg paperwork I had signed; and that the first officer had already provided a copy to the ramp agent while closing; and had retained a folded copy of in his back pocket. We continued the push; now 2 hrs; 34 min late for an uneventful departure. When we leveled off; we reviewed the dg paperwork again and pulled out the 10.37 procedures in the fom. It was then I discovered that the paperwork did not have more than 1000 KG of dry ice; that it did not have a reference to fom 10.37 and that the fom procedure also prohibited lives onboard; which we had (chicks). I felt relieved for our safety that we had air on the aircraft while conducting our preflight and waiting on the load for well over 90 minutes; although we had no knowledge of the dry ice during that timeframe; and the hot weather conditions were the only thing driving us to maintain airflow on the aircraft. While I am confident that we did not willingly break any fars; I am not confident that we received dry ice updates in a timely manner; that we were dispatched with the right paperwork; nor that we met company policy prohibiting live animals while traveling with more than 1000 KG of dry ice per fom 10.37. Excessive delays and ground crew changes likely drove some of these issues; and we should have pulled the paperwork and recalled the 'lives prohibited' part of the exemption; however I do believe receiving a 10.37 exemption while conducting a push was excessively late in the game and was not a recipe for successful compliance for this flight. Late notification during a push.ground personnel ensure checklists are followed to generate 10.37 supplemental paperwork early on. Lives are considered in this equation. Crew notified in time to mitigate safety issues with airflow while preflighting. If notified this late; crew would be best served to stay at or get towed back to gate; review fom and dg paperwork. If in error; obtain new paperwork.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B767 flight crew reported Hazmat documentation errors due to late flight crew notification of 'Dry Ice Supplemental Procedures'.
Narrative: We were operating Aircraft X at ZZZ. The sort was listed as running approximately 90 minutes late; however the flight was not loaded and ready to push until 2 hrs; 30 minutes after our scheduled departure time. We would later recall the ramp agent remarking as he closed us out that he had been called out to work this flight; and that it was not his normal flight. As we received pushback clearance; we also received an ACARS message indicating 'FOM 10.37 Dry Ice Supplemental Procedures in Effect.' I was asked to acknowledge the message via ACARS; which I did (as I understand it) to modify the FPR and make the flight legal to dispatch. I held the push as the First Officer got out of his seat; pulled out the monitors; and powered them up. I verbalized that the APU was already running with the packs on; that we would perform a 2-engine taxi; and we would need to start the APU after landing at ZZZ1. I assumed (wrongly) that I had missed the FOM 10.37 reference in the DG paperwork I had signed; AND that the FO had already provided a copy to the ramp agent while closing; and had RETAINED a folded copy of in his back pocket. We continued the push; now 2 hrs; 34 min late for an uneventful departure. When we leveled off; we reviewed the DG paperwork again and pulled out the 10.37 procedures in the FOM. It was then I discovered that the paperwork did not have more than 1000 KG of dry ice; that it did not have a reference to FOM 10.37 and that the FOM procedure also prohibited lives onboard; which we had (chicks). I felt relieved for our safety that we had air on the aircraft while conducting our preflight and waiting on the load for well over 90 minutes; although we had no knowledge of the dry ice during that timeframe; and the hot weather conditions were the only thing driving us to maintain airflow on the aircraft. While I am confident that we did not willingly break any FARs; I am not confident that we received dry ice updates in a timely manner; that we were dispatched with the right paperwork; nor that we met company policy prohibiting live animals while traveling with more than 1000 KG of dry ice per FOM 10.37. Excessive delays and ground crew changes likely drove some of these issues; and we should have pulled the paperwork and recalled the 'lives prohibited' part of the exemption; however I do believe receiving a 10.37 exemption while conducting a push was excessively late in the game and was not a recipe for successful compliance for this flight. Late notification during a push.Ground personnel ensure checklists are followed to generate 10.37 Supplemental paperwork early on. Lives are considered in this equation. Crew notified in time to mitigate safety issues with airflow while preflighting. If notified this late; crew would be best served to stay at or get towed back to gate; review FOM and DG paperwork. If in error; obtain new paperwork.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.