Narrative:

During a routine trip pairing from cle-mbs-cle, an aborted takeoff occurred at mbs attributed to automatic feather aural warning on takeoff roll. We, the crew, inspected the aircraft, discussed what had occurred and completed pairing segment mbs-cle west/O further incident. No corrective action was necessary. Company was not notified by crew. Mbs tower apparently called company demanding explanation as to what corrective action was necessary. The aircraft was an mdt. The eel (electrical engine control) was on MEL. The automatic feather system operates properly when automatic feather switch is selected on. Power lever angle reaches 62 degrees and torque reaches 62%. However, when eel is on (MEL), the power level reaches 62% pla before engines reach 62% torque. Even when eel is on MEL, however, if a power throw is slow, 8 seconds might be exceeded between 62 degrees pla and 62% torque. Therefore I, as captain, was not aware of what had occurred, felt no corrective action was necessary as aircraft was functioning properly. Safety was not compromised. Furthermore, it is not written anywhere I'm aware of that a return to the gate is necessary after an aborted takeoff. Unless individual circumstances dictate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TKOF ABORT ACCOUNT AUTO FEATHER AURAL WARNING.

Narrative: DURING A ROUTINE TRIP PAIRING FROM CLE-MBS-CLE, AN ABORTED TKOF OCCURRED AT MBS ATTRIBUTED TO AUTO FEATHER AURAL WARNING ON TKOF ROLL. WE, THE CREW, INSPECTED THE ACFT, DISCUSSED WHAT HAD OCCURRED AND COMPLETED PAIRING SEGMENT MBS-CLE W/O FURTHER INCIDENT. NO CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS NECESSARY. COMPANY WAS NOT NOTIFIED BY CREW. MBS TWR APPARENTLY CALLED COMPANY DEMANDING EXPLANATION AS TO WHAT CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS NECESSARY. THE ACFT WAS AN MDT. THE EEL (ELECTRICAL ENG CTL) WAS ON MEL. THE AUTO FEATHER SYS OPERATES PROPERLY WHEN AUTO FEATHER SWITCH IS SELECTED ON. PWR LEVER ANGLE REACHES 62 DEGS AND TORQUE REACHES 62%. HOWEVER, WHEN EEL IS ON (MEL), THE PWR LEVEL REACHES 62% PLA BEFORE ENGS REACH 62% TORQUE. EVEN WHEN EEL IS ON MEL, HOWEVER, IF A PWR THROW IS SLOW, 8 SECS MIGHT BE EXCEEDED BTWN 62 DEGS PLA AND 62% TORQUE. THEREFORE I, AS CAPT, WAS NOT AWARE OF WHAT HAD OCCURRED, FELT NO CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS NECESSARY AS ACFT WAS FUNCTIONING PROPERLY. SAFETY WAS NOT COMPROMISED. FURTHERMORE, IT IS NOT WRITTEN ANYWHERE I'M AWARE OF THAT A RETURN TO THE GATE IS NECESSARY AFTER AN ABORTED TKOF. UNLESS INDIVIDUAL CIRCUMSTANCES DICTATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.