Narrative:

I was first officer on flight from phl to clt. We were utilizing the TCAS system in the medium large transport. We were being handled by charlotte approach control. There were thunderstorms in the immediate area, one on the northern boundary of the airport. We were being vectored by approach to the south (180 degree heading) for an arrival on runway 36R in charlotte. The captain was flying and I was working the radios. Roughly 10 mi ene of clt, we were level at 9000' when our TCAS sounded off with a TA, calling, 'traffic, traffic.' the visibility depiction on our radar screen showed numerous targets but only one yellow DOT with a climb trend arrow at our one O'clock position roughly 3-5 mi out. The call was followed almost immediately by a RA of, 'climb, climb, climb.' the radar screen tag had gone to the red square, now at one O'clock and virtually under us. The captain responded to the commands and took the aircraft to 10000'. I advised the controller we were responding to our TCAS RA and climbing to 10000'. Once reaching 10000' the TCAS responded, 'clear of conflict,' and we descended back to 9000'. The approach controller advised us the traffic was a clt departure climbing to 8000'. Thus there should have been no conflict. Our suspicion was that either the aircraft violated his altitude or the aircraft had a rapid climb rate followed by a quick level-off which the TCAS was unable to interpret and assumed was a continued climb. Charlotte approach then passed us to the next frequency. The new controller hurried our descent and turned us toward the airport. The visibility approach that followed once we cleared the eastern edges of the thunderstorm was unstable. The captain was forced to extend the gear, flaps, and spdbrake to expedite the descent. The controller had turned us in much too close to the airport at an excessively high altitude, probably in an attempt to get us in before the thunderstorm xed the airport. We were queried by approach once on final whether we could make the visibility approach, and the captain responded yes. To the north on the border of the airport was the thunderstorm, and he apparently believed it better to proceed with the approach than to attempt a go around that would possibly take us into the thunderstorm. We landed and taxied in. Responding to a TCAS RA is disconcerting and stressful. This coupled with inclement WX, I believe, led to our unstable approach as the captain appeared distraction in the post-RA phase and I suspect was concerned by the TCAS maneuver. In addition, the controller, in an attempt to hurry our approach, set us up for a potentially hazardous situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR HAS TCASII RA. REPONDS.

Narrative: I WAS F/O ON FLT FROM PHL TO CLT. WE WERE UTILIZING THE TCAS SYS IN THE MLG. WE WERE BEING HANDLED BY CHARLOTTE APCH CTL. THERE WERE TSTMS IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA, ONE ON THE NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF THE ARPT. WE WERE BEING VECTORED BY APCH TO THE S (180 DEG HDG) FOR AN ARR ON RWY 36R IN CHARLOTTE. THE CAPT WAS FLYING AND I WAS WORKING THE RADIOS. ROUGHLY 10 MI ENE OF CLT, WE WERE LEVEL AT 9000' WHEN OUR TCAS SOUNDED OFF WITH A TA, CALLING, 'TFC, TFC.' THE VIS DEPICTION ON OUR RADAR SCREEN SHOWED NUMEROUS TARGETS BUT ONLY ONE YELLOW DOT WITH A CLB TREND ARROW AT OUR ONE O'CLOCK POS ROUGHLY 3-5 MI OUT. THE CALL WAS FOLLOWED ALMOST IMMEDIATELY BY A RA OF, 'CLB, CLB, CLB.' THE RADAR SCREEN TAG HAD GONE TO THE RED SQUARE, NOW AT ONE O'CLOCK AND VIRTUALLY UNDER US. THE CAPT RESPONDED TO THE COMMANDS AND TOOK THE ACFT TO 10000'. I ADVISED THE CTLR WE WERE RESPONDING TO OUR TCAS RA AND CLBING TO 10000'. ONCE REACHING 10000' THE TCAS RESPONDED, 'CLR OF CONFLICT,' AND WE DSNDED BACK TO 9000'. THE APCH CTLR ADVISED US THE TFC WAS A CLT DEP CLBING TO 8000'. THUS THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN NO CONFLICT. OUR SUSPICION WAS THAT EITHER THE ACFT VIOLATED HIS ALT OR THE ACFT HAD A RAPID CLB RATE FOLLOWED BY A QUICK LEVEL-OFF WHICH THE TCAS WAS UNABLE TO INTERPRET AND ASSUMED WAS A CONTINUED CLB. CHARLOTTE APCH THEN PASSED US TO THE NEXT FREQ. THE NEW CTLR HURRIED OUR DSNT AND TURNED US TOWARD THE ARPT. THE VIS APCH THAT FOLLOWED ONCE WE CLRED THE EASTERN EDGES OF THE TSTM WAS UNSTABLE. THE CAPT WAS FORCED TO EXTEND THE GEAR, FLAPS, AND SPDBRAKE TO EXPEDITE THE DSNT. THE CTLR HAD TURNED US IN MUCH TOO CLOSE TO THE ARPT AT AN EXCESSIVELY HIGH ALT, PROBABLY IN AN ATTEMPT TO GET US IN BEFORE THE TSTM XED THE ARPT. WE WERE QUERIED BY APCH ONCE ON FINAL WHETHER WE COULD MAKE THE VIS APCH, AND THE CAPT RESPONDED YES. TO THE N ON THE BORDER OF THE ARPT WAS THE TSTM, AND HE APPARENTLY BELIEVED IT BETTER TO PROCEED WITH THE APCH THAN TO ATTEMPT A GAR THAT WOULD POSSIBLY TAKE US INTO THE TSTM. WE LANDED AND TAXIED IN. RESPONDING TO A TCAS RA IS DISCONCERTING AND STRESSFUL. THIS COUPLED WITH INCLEMENT WX, I BELIEVE, LED TO OUR UNSTABLE APCH AS THE CAPT APPEARED DISTR IN THE POST-RA PHASE AND I SUSPECT WAS CONCERNED BY THE TCAS MANEUVER. IN ADDITION, THE CTLR, IN AN ATTEMPT TO HURRY OUR APCH, SET US UP FOR A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS SITUATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.