Narrative:

An small aircraft a floatplane, was inbound to the ipt VOR at 3400 MSL, course 010 magnetic. Small aircraft a called the tower at ipt 8.1 DME from the VOR, indicating the intention to continue inbound to the VOR and depart northeast to N27. The ipt tower responded in the affirmative, requesting a report when north of the runway centerline if visible. Immediately thereafter, the ipt tower cleared an small aircraft B to fly a localizer approach into ipt. The small aircraft B reported 4000 MSL, descending. Upon hearing the small aircraft B reporting its position at 'picture rocks', a town marked on the VFR sectional, small aircraft a queried the small aircraft B directly for altitude. The small aircraft B replied 3700 descending. Small aircraft a immediately began circling to hold a position south of the localizer until the small aircraft B had passed, notifying the tower of 'evasive action'. After turning approximately 110 degree to the right, small aircraft a observed the small aircraft B passing about 100 ft below and 300 ft north. Small aircraft a then resumed its progress toward the VOR and was notified by the ipt tower that there was no traffic to report. The main contributing factor was the action of the ipt tower clearing 2 aircraft within its control onto a collision course. Small aircraft a was cleared to cross the localizer at 3400 ft at the same time the small aircraft B was cleared to conduct a localizer approach starting at 4000 ft. The reporter feels that the small aircraft B location was as much as a mi south of the localizer approach, negating the effectiveness of his holding action. The discussion of the 'picture rocks' inbound localizer waypoint, which was on the VFR sectional, alerted small aircraft a to the imminent potential for a collision. Evasive action by small aircraft a prevented a very near miss or a possible collision. The human performance of the ipt air traffic area controller failed to enhance the aircraft separation within the bounds of the air traffic area. The reporter feels that the tower controller at ipt did not have a picture of the traffic within the air traffic area. The controller's judgement and subsequent inaction, created a very hazardous circumstance. I feel that the controller should have directed some action to create positive vertical or horizontal separation rather than simply leaving it up to the aircrews involves to provide separation via see-and- avoid. I recognize that see-and-avoid is a continuing aircrew responsibility, but when under positive control in an air traffic area, the controller is expected to help by positive actions enhancing separation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA CLRED TO VOR AS SECOND ACFT CLRED FOR ILS APCH. NMAC.

Narrative: AN SMA A FLOATPLANE, WAS INBOUND TO THE IPT VOR AT 3400 MSL, COURSE 010 MAGNETIC. SMA A CALLED THE TWR AT IPT 8.1 DME FROM THE VOR, INDICATING THE INTENTION TO CONTINUE INBOUND TO THE VOR AND DEPART NE TO N27. THE IPT TWR RESPONDED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, REQUESTING A RPT WHEN N OF THE RWY CENTERLINE IF VISIBLE. IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER, THE IPT TWR CLRED AN SMA B TO FLY A LOC APCH INTO IPT. THE SMA B RPTED 4000 MSL, DSNDING. UPON HEARING THE SMA B RPTING ITS POS AT 'PICTURE ROCKS', A TOWN MARKED ON THE VFR SECTIONAL, SMA A QUERIED THE SMA B DIRECTLY FOR ALT. THE SMA B REPLIED 3700 DSNDING. SMA A IMMEDIATELY BEGAN CIRCLING TO HOLD A POS S OF THE LOC UNTIL THE SMA B HAD PASSED, NOTIFYING THE TWR OF 'EVASIVE ACTION'. AFTER TURNING APPROX 110 DEG TO THE R, SMA A OBSERVED THE SMA B PASSING ABOUT 100 FT BELOW AND 300 FT N. SMA A THEN RESUMED ITS PROGRESS TOWARD THE VOR AND WAS NOTIFIED BY THE IPT TWR THAT THERE WAS NO TFC TO RPT. THE MAIN CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE ACTION OF THE IPT TWR CLRING 2 ACFT WITHIN ITS CTL ONTO A COLLISION COURSE. SMA A WAS CLRED TO CROSS THE LOC AT 3400 FT AT THE SAME TIME THE SMA B WAS CLRED TO CONDUCT A LOC APCH STARTING AT 4000 FT. THE RPTR FEELS THAT THE SMA B LOCATION WAS AS MUCH AS A MI S OF THE LOC APCH, NEGATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HIS HOLDING ACTION. THE DISCUSSION OF THE 'PICTURE ROCKS' INBOUND LOC WAYPOINT, WHICH WAS ON THE VFR SECTIONAL, ALERTED SMA A TO THE IMMINENT POTENTIAL FOR A COLLISION. EVASIVE ACTION BY SMA A PREVENTED A VERY NEAR MISS OR A POSSIBLE COLLISION. THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE OF THE IPT ATA CTLR FAILED TO ENHANCE THE ACFT SEPARATION WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE ATA. THE RPTR FEELS THAT THE TWR CTLR AT IPT DID NOT HAVE A PICTURE OF THE TFC WITHIN THE ATA. THE CTLR'S JUDGEMENT AND SUBSEQUENT INACTION, CREATED A VERY HAZARDOUS CIRCUMSTANCE. I FEEL THAT THE CTLR SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED SOME ACTION TO CREATE POSITIVE VERT OR HORIZ SEPARATION RATHER THAN SIMPLY LEAVING IT UP TO THE AIRCREWS INVOLVES TO PROVIDE SEPARATION VIA SEE-AND- AVOID. I RECOGNIZE THAT SEE-AND-AVOID IS A CONTINUING AIRCREW RESPONSIBILITY, BUT WHEN UNDER POSITIVE CTL IN AN ATA, THE CTLR IS EXPECTED TO HELP BY POSITIVE ACTIONS ENHANCING SEPARATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.