Narrative:

During the approach, air carrier X told several times of aircraft landing on 22L that would hold short of our runway. During rollout, after a normal landing on runway 27 in boston, our aircraft started sliding and the anti-skid cycling when we reached the normal turn off area. The runway was wet and a moderate crosswind, plus the rubber laid down by prior lndgs and aircraft making the turn off, contributed to the situation. The result was that our aircraft penetrated the 1770 ft stopway by about 1 aircraft length or 100 ft. The tower was telling us to turn off at X or south, but we were unable to due to our sliding. After we stopped, the tower said to turn left on south or S1, but these taxiways were slightly behind us. Also, the left turn direction confused me because virtually the entire airport was to our right, and I thought the controller had said left by mistake. Therefore, I remained stopped in the stopway until the radio traffic died down and we could get specific and clear instructions. While stopped, I observed an aircraft takeoff from 22R and pass over and in front of us at about a 30 degree up angle and 300 ft away. Then the tower told us to proceed ahead and turn right on B. When I turned off, I saw an air carrier Y on landing roll, about half way down runway 27 with spray flying from his reversing. He must have landed while we were in the stopway. Several human performance factors are highlighted by this incident: I should have taken control of the aircraft sooner, but I was reluctant to do so, since I considered my first officer to be extremely competent. Tower controllers should understand that pilots operate into numerous airports, and consequently cannot be expected to know every taxiway at every airport by name, like the controller who work the same airport everyday. Additionally, during landing rollout and trying to clear a runway expeditiously is not the time to go heads down in the cockpit to look at an airport diagram. A better call would be 'turn right at the second taxiway if able.' pilots should be encouraged not to answer these calls until taxi speed (10-15 KTS) has been achieved. Until that time, the pilot should have full use of the runway to include any stopway. No aircraft should be allowed to land behind an aircraft that is in a stopway in case the landing aircraft also needs the stopway. No aircraft should be given takeoff clearance when his runway including stopway, intersects a landing aircraft's runway including stopway, until the landing aircraft is at taxi speed. In this case, had the air carrier Y on runway 27 gone around, he may have conflicted with the aircraft taking off on runway 22R. In their pragmatic approach to launch and recover aircraft as judiciously as possible, no controling agency should allow a situation to develop, whereby an unanticipated occurrence causes any other aircraft to not have a safe escape route. Supplemental information from acn 190017. Flight was uneventful through approach and touchdown. Until approximately 50 KIAS, traction and deceleration were normal despite moderately heavy weight due to passenger load and fuel tankering. With approximately 1000-1200 ft remaining before the 1770 ft stopway, the anti-skid system began cycling. With the anti-skid cycling, the rate of deceleration was still satisfactory to turn on taxiway south as directed by the tower. With less than 1000 ft remaining, the rate of deceleration decreased significantly. When wheel brake traction became very low, the aircraft began weathervaning to the left. Wind was reported as 230 degree at 11 KTS. With the nose of the aircraft beginning to drift left, I had 2 choices: I could either continue with the same brake, rudder, and NWS inputs and hope the traction returned before the nose drifted too far left, or I could release the left brake (further slowing the aircraft's overall deceleration) and straighten out the nose. With the stopway area presenting a safe, weight bearing 1770 ft surface directly in front of the aircraft, I chose the second option. Immediately after releasing the left brake and straightening the nose, the captain took control of the aircraft and came to a stop approximately 100 ft into the stopway. Contributing factors were wet runway, moderate crosswind, gross weight, rubber deposits on the runway at the end of runway 27, and runway length. But the primary factor was a lack of cognizance on my part that use of the stopway would be treated as a 'runway overrun' versus being treated as use of an available area similar to a displaced threshold which is designed to be used if needed. The situation would have been prevented if slick runway advisories had been given or if runway markings had not been similar to displaced threshold markings (yellow chevrons). Also with the tower advising us multiple times that other aircraft would hold short of our runway, it further indicated that all available rollout area was free for our use.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR Y HAD LTSS FROM ACR X DURING LNDG ON OCCUPIED RWY. SYS ERROR.

Narrative: DURING THE APCH, ACR X TOLD SEVERAL TIMES OF ACFT LNDG ON 22L THAT WOULD HOLD SHORT OF OUR RWY. DURING ROLLOUT, AFTER A NORMAL LNDG ON RWY 27 IN BOSTON, OUR ACFT STARTED SLIDING AND THE ANTI-SKID CYCLING WHEN WE REACHED THE NORMAL TURN OFF AREA. THE RWY WAS WET AND A MODERATE XWIND, PLUS THE RUBBER LAID DOWN BY PRIOR LNDGS AND ACFT MAKING THE TURN OFF, CONTRIBUTED TO THE SITUATION. THE RESULT WAS THAT OUR ACFT PENETRATED THE 1770 FT STOPWAY BY ABOUT 1 ACFT LENGTH OR 100 FT. THE TWR WAS TELLING US TO TURN OFF AT X OR S, BUT WE WERE UNABLE TO DUE TO OUR SLIDING. AFTER WE STOPPED, THE TWR SAID TO TURN L ON S OR S1, BUT THESE TAXIWAYS WERE SLIGHTLY BEHIND US. ALSO, THE L TURN DIRECTION CONFUSED ME BECAUSE VIRTUALLY THE ENTIRE ARPT WAS TO OUR R, AND I THOUGHT THE CTLR HAD SAID L BY MISTAKE. THEREFORE, I REMAINED STOPPED IN THE STOPWAY UNTIL THE RADIO TFC DIED DOWN AND WE COULD GET SPECIFIC AND CLR INSTRUCTIONS. WHILE STOPPED, I OBSERVED AN ACFT TKOF FROM 22R AND PASS OVER AND IN FRONT OF US AT ABOUT A 30 DEG UP ANGLE AND 300 FT AWAY. THEN THE TWR TOLD US TO PROCEED AHEAD AND TURN R ON B. WHEN I TURNED OFF, I SAW AN ACR Y ON LNDG ROLL, ABOUT HALF WAY DOWN RWY 27 WITH SPRAY FLYING FROM HIS REVERSING. HE MUST HAVE LANDED WHILE WE WERE IN THE STOPWAY. SEVERAL HUMAN PERFORMANCE FACTORS ARE HIGHLIGHTED BY THIS INCIDENT: I SHOULD HAVE TAKEN CTL OF THE ACFT SOONER, BUT I WAS RELUCTANT TO DO SO, SINCE I CONSIDERED MY FO TO BE EXTREMELY COMPETENT. TWR CTLRS SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT PLTS OPERATE INTO NUMEROUS ARPTS, AND CONSEQUENTLY CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO KNOW EVERY TAXIWAY AT EVERY ARPT BY NAME, LIKE THE CTLR WHO WORK THE SAME ARPT EVERYDAY. ADDITIONALLY, DURING LNDG ROLLOUT AND TRYING TO CLR A RWY EXPEDITIOUSLY IS NOT THE TIME TO GO HEADS DOWN IN THE COCKPIT TO LOOK AT AN ARPT DIAGRAM. A BETTER CALL WOULD BE 'TURN R AT THE SECOND TAXIWAY IF ABLE.' PLTS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED NOT TO ANSWER THESE CALLS UNTIL TAXI SPD (10-15 KTS) HAS BEEN ACHIEVED. UNTIL THAT TIME, THE PLT SHOULD HAVE FULL USE OF THE RWY TO INCLUDE ANY STOPWAY. NO ACFT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO LAND BEHIND AN ACFT THAT IS IN A STOPWAY IN CASE THE LNDG ACFT ALSO NEEDS THE STOPWAY. NO ACFT SHOULD BE GIVEN TKOF CLRNC WHEN HIS RWY INCLUDING STOPWAY, INTERSECTS A LNDG ACFT'S RWY INCLUDING STOPWAY, UNTIL THE LNDG ACFT IS AT TAXI SPD. IN THIS CASE, HAD THE ACR Y ON RWY 27 GONE AROUND, HE MAY HAVE CONFLICTED WITH THE ACFT TAKING OFF ON RWY 22R. IN THEIR PRAGMATIC APCH TO LAUNCH AND RECOVER ACFT AS JUDICIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE, NO CTLING AGENCY SHOULD ALLOW A SITUATION TO DEVELOP, WHEREBY AN UNANTICIPATED OCCURRENCE CAUSES ANY OTHER ACFT TO NOT HAVE A SAFE ESCAPE RTE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 190017. FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL THROUGH APCH AND TOUCHDOWN. UNTIL APPROX 50 KIAS, TRACTION AND DECELERATION WERE NORMAL DESPITE MODERATELY HVY WT DUE TO PAX LOAD AND FUEL TANKERING. WITH APPROX 1000-1200 FT REMAINING BEFORE THE 1770 FT STOPWAY, THE ANTI-SKID SYS BEGAN CYCLING. WITH THE ANTI-SKID CYCLING, THE RATE OF DECELERATION WAS STILL SATISFACTORY TO TURN ON TAXIWAY S AS DIRECTED BY THE TWR. WITH LESS THAN 1000 FT REMAINING, THE RATE OF DECELERATION DECREASED SIGNIFICANTLY. WHEN WHEEL BRAKE TRACTION BECAME VERY LOW, THE ACFT BEGAN WEATHERVANING TO THE L. WIND WAS RPTED AS 230 DEG AT 11 KTS. WITH THE NOSE OF THE ACFT BEGINNING TO DRIFT L, I HAD 2 CHOICES: I COULD EITHER CONTINUE WITH THE SAME BRAKE, RUDDER, AND NWS INPUTS AND HOPE THE TRACTION RETURNED BEFORE THE NOSE DRIFTED TOO FAR L, OR I COULD RELEASE THE L BRAKE (FURTHER SLOWING THE ACFT'S OVERALL DECELERATION) AND STRAIGHTEN OUT THE NOSE. WITH THE STOPWAY AREA PRESENTING A SAFE, WT BEARING 1770 FT SURFACE DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF THE ACFT, I CHOSE THE SECOND OPTION. IMMEDIATELY AFTER RELEASING THE L BRAKE AND STRAIGHTENING THE NOSE, THE CAPT TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND CAME TO A STOP APPROX 100 FT INTO THE STOPWAY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE WET RWY, MODERATE XWIND, GROSS WT, RUBBER DEPOSITS ON THE RWY AT THE END OF RWY 27, AND RWY LENGTH. BUT THE PRIMARY FACTOR WAS A LACK OF COGNIZANCE ON MY PART THAT USE OF THE STOPWAY WOULD BE TREATED AS A 'RWY OVERRUN' VERSUS BEING TREATED AS USE OF AN AVAILABLE AREA SIMILAR TO A DISPLACED THRESHOLD WHICH IS DESIGNED TO BE USED IF NEEDED. THE SITUATION WOULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED IF SLICK RWY ADVISORIES HAD BEEN GIVEN OR IF RWY MARKINGS HAD NOT BEEN SIMILAR TO DISPLACED THRESHOLD MARKINGS (YELLOW CHEVRONS). ALSO WITH THE TWR ADVISING US MULTIPLE TIMES THAT OTHER ACFT WOULD HOLD SHORT OF OUR RWY, IT FURTHER INDICATED THAT ALL AVAILABLE ROLLOUT AREA WAS FREE FOR OUR USE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.