Narrative:

While shooting an approach to uls 12R at stl copilot heard controller say 'expect 12L.' the captain did not hear this or confirm this as copilot had asked. After much discussion the crew determined that stl was shooting approachs to 12R. There was a lot of switching of navigation radios because of the confusion over the runway. The captain was on localizer/DME for distance information from the field. I intercepted what I believed to be the 12R localizer and was cleared for the approach. I noticed a slight correction to the right to maintain course. The captain now wanted to use my radio for his #1 radio and we hooked up the autoplt to shoot a coupled approach. The only problem is 108.9 is the localizer to 12L and we were cleared for 12R. I noticed the needle about 1/2 DOT to the left and the captain mentioned to be aware that we are correcting left and we should have a crosswind from the right. He was still on the VOR getting a crossing fix on the coplts #2 radio. When he finally put the #2 on the ILS frequency he matched the one in #1 navigation which was wrong. We broke out at 500 ft saw that we were lined up for 12L and told tower that we were executing a missed approach. We came around and shot the approach and landed. The problem arose when the 1 controller said expect 12L. I asked the captain to confirm that and I thought he was ignoring that as a bad idea when in retrospect I believe he didn't hear me. Also the captain's need to get superfluous information such as distance from the field and crossing information created unneeded confusion. I believe some of the crew was fatigued from working other jobs because of the uncertainty of the airlines future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT IAP ILS APCH TO THE WRONG RWY FOLLOWED BY GAR AND SECOND APCH TO THE CORRECT RWY.

Narrative: WHILE SHOOTING AN APCH TO ULS 12R AT STL COPLT HEARD CTLR SAY 'EXPECT 12L.' THE CAPT DID NOT HEAR THIS OR CONFIRM THIS AS COPLT HAD ASKED. AFTER MUCH DISCUSSION THE CREW DETERMINED THAT STL WAS SHOOTING APCHS TO 12R. THERE WAS A LOT OF SWITCHING OF NAV RADIOS BECAUSE OF THE CONFUSION OVER THE RWY. THE CAPT WAS ON LOC/DME FOR DISTANCE INFO FROM THE FIELD. I INTERCEPTED WHAT I BELIEVED TO BE THE 12R LOC AND WAS CLRED FOR THE APCH. I NOTICED A SLIGHT CORRECTION TO THE R TO MAINTAIN COURSE. THE CAPT NOW WANTED TO USE MY RADIO FOR HIS #1 RADIO AND WE HOOKED UP THE AUTOPLT TO SHOOT A COUPLED APCH. THE ONLY PROBLEM IS 108.9 IS THE LOC TO 12L AND WE WERE CLRED FOR 12R. I NOTICED THE NEEDLE ABOUT 1/2 DOT TO THE L AND THE CAPT MENTIONED TO BE AWARE THAT WE ARE CORRECTING L AND WE SHOULD HAVE A XWIND FROM THE R. HE WAS STILL ON THE VOR GETTING A XING FIX ON THE COPLTS #2 RADIO. WHEN HE FINALLY PUT THE #2 ON THE ILS FREQ HE MATCHED THE ONE IN #1 NAV WHICH WAS WRONG. WE BROKE OUT AT 500 FT SAW THAT WE WERE LINED UP FOR 12L AND TOLD TWR THAT WE WERE EXECUTING A MISSED APCH. WE CAME AROUND AND SHOT THE APCH AND LANDED. THE PROBLEM AROSE WHEN THE 1 CTLR SAID EXPECT 12L. I ASKED THE CAPT TO CONFIRM THAT AND I THOUGHT HE WAS IGNORING THAT AS A BAD IDEA WHEN IN RETROSPECT I BELIEVE HE DIDN'T HEAR ME. ALSO THE CAPT'S NEED TO GET SUPERFLUOUS INFO SUCH AS DISTANCE FROM THE FIELD AND XING INFO CREATED UNNEEDED CONFUSION. I BELIEVE SOME OF THE CREW WAS FATIGUED FROM WORKING OTHER JOBS BECAUSE OF THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE AIRLINES FUTURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.