Narrative:

We were issued taxi instructions to the active runway which was 27L. The taxi clearance was to utilize taxiway xray hold short of 27R for takeoff on 27L. The preceding clearance was only partially heard by me (the captain). As we were taxiing along xray and approaching 27R, I asked my first officer if we were cleared 'all the way out.' he responded 'yes.' I looked both directions before crossing 27R. There was 1 aircraft on an extended right base for 27R which I considered no factor so we proceeded to cross 27R en route to 27L. After we crossed 27R, ground control said we were not cleared to cross 27R. I looked at my first officer in disbelief. How could he let me cross without being certain? At this point I realized we both made crucial mistakes and we're very fortunate danger was not a factor. My first officer made 2 critical errors. First he did not remember the issued clearance and readback and second, he gave an affirmative answer to a direct question 'are we cleared all the way out?' as captain, my mistakes were not hearing the taxi instruction and readback, and secondly, when I had doubt on xray I should have keyed the microphone and queried ground control myself eliminating possibility for human error.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG FLC TAXIES ACROSS RWY FOR WHICH CLRED TO HOLD SHORT.

Narrative: WE WERE ISSUED TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO THE ACTIVE RWY WHICH WAS 27L. THE TAXI CLRNC WAS TO UTILIZE TAXIWAY XRAY HOLD SHORT OF 27R FOR TKOF ON 27L. THE PRECEDING CLRNC WAS ONLY PARTIALLY HEARD BY ME (THE CAPT). AS WE WERE TAXIING ALONG XRAY AND APCHING 27R, I ASKED MY FO IF WE WERE CLRED 'ALL THE WAY OUT.' HE RESPONDED 'YES.' I LOOKED BOTH DIRECTIONS BEFORE XING 27R. THERE WAS 1 ACFT ON AN EXTENDED R BASE FOR 27R WHICH I CONSIDERED NO FACTOR SO WE PROCEEDED TO CROSS 27R ENRTE TO 27L. AFTER WE CROSSED 27R, GND CTL SAID WE WERE NOT CLRED TO CROSS 27R. I LOOKED AT MY FO IN DISBELIEF. HOW COULD HE LET ME CROSS WITHOUT BEING CERTAIN? AT THIS POINT I REALIZED WE BOTH MADE CRUCIAL MISTAKES AND WE'RE VERY FORTUNATE DANGER WAS NOT A FACTOR. MY FO MADE 2 CRITICAL ERRORS. FIRST HE DID NOT REMEMBER THE ISSUED CLRNC AND READBACK AND SECOND, HE GAVE AN AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER TO A DIRECT QUESTION 'ARE WE CLRED ALL THE WAY OUT?' AS CAPT, MY MISTAKES WERE NOT HEARING THE TAXI INSTRUCTION AND READBACK, AND SECONDLY, WHEN I HAD DOUBT ON XRAY I SHOULD HAVE KEYED THE MIKE AND QUERIED GND CTL MYSELF ELIMINATING POSSIBILITY FOR HUMAN ERROR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.