Narrative:

On may/wed/92 I was on an IFR flight from chicago-meigs to nashville international. Before reaching bowling green ATC directed that I proceed direct nashville and cross 40 DME at 4000. I complied. I was next told to head 220 degrees and to expect runway 2L. Next I was told to head 180 degrees and change expected runway to 2R. I was next told to head 140 degrees to allow for takeoff traffic. I was next told to expect 2C. I was turned back west and told to go between 2 jets 1 heading for 2L and 1 heading for 2R. I was told to keep the one going to 2L in sight. I reported that I had lost contact (due to haze and intermittent glare from west). Before got to final for 2C told to head 360 degrees which put me in line to land 2R -- not possible to land either 2C or 2L without another heading. About 2 mi out told to contact tower. At this point I lost communications. I tried to go back to approach and then again back to tower, then back to approach and again back to tower. I was unable to transmit or receive. Removed head phone and tried hand held microphone and speakers, but unable to receive or transmit. Started to reach for handheld but decided no time. Looked for light signal but with glare and practically no time to configure plane, do pre-landing checklist, think about wake turbulence from 2 jets, could not spend lot of time concentrating on tower that was somewhat to rear on left. Did not see a red signal -- wasn't sure about green but assumed I had it since I was now on half mi final, but more importantly I believed in the interest of safety I had an emergency situation for these reasons: I was in an arsa with heavy early evening traffic, I was concerned about wake turbulence, I was concerned about the danger and distraction to everyone with a climb out to above pattern altitude to confirm clearance to land. I would be operating without communications in an arsa with haze and intermittent sunlight, by the time I realized I could not reestablish communications I was nearing short final, I did not think it safe to reach for and set 7700 code with transponder on far right of panel while on short final, I knew there was no aircraft close behind me for 2R and I was sure the tower knew my predicament since approach had handed me off to tower. I looked quickly again for light signal, not sure of green but saw no red. I landed and pulled off runway and stopped. I still had no communication but set up handheld for ground control. Unable to reach them but was able to hear ground talking to another aircraft and then heard call to me to turn off beacon if I heard. I did so and followed instructions with use of beacon to ramp. I was asked to call tower. I complied and mr. X answered. He was friendly and asked me if I saw green light before I landed. I said I looked for it but not sure. He said you understand you should not land without green. I said I understood but that I had no time and wanted to declare an emergency due to concern about wake turbulence, etc. -- Before I could explain further he said 'say you saw the green and you're cleared to land.' I said 'I think so but before I could qualify he said 'just say you saw the green' -- based on not seeing a red signal and light conditions I said ok I saw the green -- but since I didn't think it was relevant due to being on short final I wanted to explain further -- he said ok get the radios fixed and have a good flight home. I had the impression that he didn't consider the matter to be of any further importance and that he thought I really had little choice but to land. I was upset about the incident because I consider myself to be a very good pilot. I have had no violations and attend a lot of safety seminars. I stay current and take regular recurrent training. I would never deliberately mislead anyone. On reflection later I believe I should have insisted that I had the right to land under the circumstances on the basis of what I reasonably regarded as an emergency due to all the circumstances and should not have concluded the discussion of the light signals without making it clear that under the visibility conditions and time constraints I was on mr. X's insistence relying largely on not picking up a red signal althoughi can't say I was being absolutely sure of the green signal. I still believe that under the particular circumstances the only sensible thing to do at the time was to land as soon as possible and stay out of heavy arsa traffic with no communications. I believe that in the case of lost communications on final the rules should allow a pilot to use discretion to continue to land if clearly safe to do so especially if in an arsa or TCA and with complex aircraft involved and where climb out in high density traffic could present a hazard.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA PLT VECTORED FOR VISUAL APCH LOSES SIGHT OF PRECEDING TFC, LOSES RADIO CONTACT AFTER ATTEMPT TO AFFECT FREQ CHANGE TO TWR, LANDS WITHOUT CLRNC ON WRONG RWY.

Narrative: ON MAY/WED/92 I WAS ON AN IFR FLT FROM CHICAGO-MEIGS TO NASHVILLE INTL. BEFORE REACHING BOWLING GREEN ATC DIRECTED THAT I PROCEED DIRECT NASHVILLE AND CROSS 40 DME AT 4000. I COMPLIED. I WAS NEXT TOLD TO HEAD 220 DEGS AND TO EXPECT RWY 2L. NEXT I WAS TOLD TO HEAD 180 DEGS AND CHANGE EXPECTED RWY TO 2R. I WAS NEXT TOLD TO HEAD 140 DEGS TO ALLOW FOR TKOF TFC. I WAS NEXT TOLD TO EXPECT 2C. I WAS TURNED BACK W AND TOLD TO GO BTWN 2 JETS 1 HDG FOR 2L AND 1 HDG FOR 2R. I WAS TOLD TO KEEP THE ONE GOING TO 2L IN SIGHT. I RPTED THAT I HAD LOST CONTACT (DUE TO HAZE AND INTERMITTENT GLARE FROM W). BEFORE GOT TO FINAL FOR 2C TOLD TO HEAD 360 DEGS WHICH PUT ME IN LINE TO LAND 2R -- NOT POSSIBLE TO LAND EITHER 2C OR 2L WITHOUT ANOTHER HDG. ABOUT 2 MI OUT TOLD TO CONTACT TWR. AT THIS POINT I LOST COMS. I TRIED TO GO BACK TO APCH AND THEN AGAIN BACK TO TWR, THEN BACK TO APCH AND AGAIN BACK TO TWR. I WAS UNABLE TO XMIT OR RECEIVE. REMOVED HEAD PHONE AND TRIED HAND HELD MIKE AND SPEAKERS, BUT UNABLE TO RECEIVE OR XMIT. STARTED TO REACH FOR HANDHELD BUT DECIDED NO TIME. LOOKED FOR LIGHT SIGNAL BUT WITH GLARE AND PRACTICALLY NO TIME TO CONFIGURE PLANE, DO PRE-LNDG CHKLIST, THINK ABOUT WAKE TURB FROM 2 JETS, COULD NOT SPEND LOT OF TIME CONCENTRATING ON TWR THAT WAS SOMEWHAT TO REAR ON L. DID NOT SEE A RED SIGNAL -- WASN'T SURE ABOUT GREEN BUT ASSUMED I HAD IT SINCE I WAS NOW ON HALF MI FINAL, BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY I BELIEVED IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY I HAD AN EMER SITUATION FOR THESE REASONS: I WAS IN AN ARSA WITH HVY EARLY EVENING TFC, I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT WAKE TURB, I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGER AND DISTR TO EVERYONE WITH A CLB OUT TO ABOVE PATTERN ALT TO CONFIRM CLRNC TO LAND. I WOULD BE OPERATING WITHOUT COMS IN AN ARSA WITH HAZE AND INTERMITTENT SUNLIGHT, BY THE TIME I REALIZED I COULD NOT REESTABLISH COMS I WAS NEARING SHORT FINAL, I DID NOT THINK IT SAFE TO REACH FOR AND SET 7700 CODE WITH TRANSPONDER ON FAR R OF PANEL WHILE ON SHORT FINAL, I KNEW THERE WAS NO ACFT CLOSE BEHIND ME FOR 2R AND I WAS SURE THE TWR KNEW MY PREDICAMENT SINCE APCH HAD HANDED ME OFF TO TWR. I LOOKED QUICKLY AGAIN FOR LIGHT SIGNAL, NOT SURE OF GREEN BUT SAW NO RED. I LANDED AND PULLED OFF RWY AND STOPPED. I STILL HAD NO COM BUT SET UP HANDHELD FOR GND CTL. UNABLE TO REACH THEM BUT WAS ABLE TO HEAR GND TALKING TO ANOTHER ACFT AND THEN HEARD CALL TO ME TO TURN OFF BEACON IF I HEARD. I DID SO AND FOLLOWED INSTRUCTIONS WITH USE OF BEACON TO RAMP. I WAS ASKED TO CALL TWR. I COMPLIED AND MR. X ANSWERED. HE WAS FRIENDLY AND ASKED ME IF I SAW GREEN LIGHT BEFORE I LANDED. I SAID I LOOKED FOR IT BUT NOT SURE. HE SAID YOU UNDERSTAND YOU SHOULD NOT LAND WITHOUT GREEN. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD BUT THAT I HAD NO TIME AND WANTED TO DECLARE AN EMER DUE TO CONCERN ABOUT WAKE TURB, ETC. -- BEFORE I COULD EXPLAIN FURTHER HE SAID 'SAY YOU SAW THE GREEN AND YOU'RE CLRED TO LAND.' I SAID 'I THINK SO BUT BEFORE I COULD QUALIFY HE SAID 'JUST SAY YOU SAW THE GREEN' -- BASED ON NOT SEEING A RED SIGNAL AND LIGHT CONDITIONS I SAID OK I SAW THE GREEN -- BUT SINCE I DIDN'T THINK IT WAS RELEVANT DUE TO BEING ON SHORT FINAL I WANTED TO EXPLAIN FURTHER -- HE SAID OK GET THE RADIOS FIXED AND HAVE A GOOD FLT HOME. I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT HE DIDN'T CONSIDER THE MATTER TO BE OF ANY FURTHER IMPORTANCE AND THAT HE THOUGHT I REALLY HAD LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO LAND. I WAS UPSET ABOUT THE INCIDENT BECAUSE I CONSIDER MYSELF TO BE A VERY GOOD PLT. I HAVE HAD NO VIOLATIONS AND ATTEND A LOT OF SAFETY SEMINARS. I STAY CURRENT AND TAKE REGULAR RECURRENT TRAINING. I WOULD NEVER DELIBERATELY MISLEAD ANYONE. ON REFLECTION LATER I BELIEVE I SHOULD HAVE INSISTED THAT I HAD THE RIGHT TO LAND UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES ON THE BASIS OF WHAT I REASONABLY REGARDED AS AN EMER DUE TO ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND SHOULD NOT HAVE CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION OF THE LIGHT SIGNALS WITHOUT MAKING IT CLR THAT UNDER THE VISIBILITY CONDITIONS AND TIME CONSTRAINTS I WAS ON MR. X'S INSISTENCE RELYING LARGELY ON NOT PICKING UP A RED SIGNAL ALTHOUGHI CAN'T SAY I WAS BEING ABSOLUTELY SURE OF THE GREEN SIGNAL. I STILL BELIEVE THAT UNDER THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES THE ONLY SENSIBLE THING TO DO AT THE TIME WAS TO LAND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND STAY OUT OF HVY ARSA TFC WITH NO COMS. I BELIEVE THAT IN THE CASE OF LOST COMS ON FINAL THE RULES SHOULD ALLOW A PLT TO USE DISCRETION TO CONTINUE TO LAND IF CLRLY SAFE TO DO SO ESPECIALLY IF IN AN ARSA OR TCA AND WITH COMPLEX ACFT INVOLVED AND WHERE CLBOUT IN HIGH DENSITY TFC COULD PRESENT A HAZARD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.