Narrative:

The problem arose when I heard the controller say 'taxi to 5R via south route.' since I did not hear the word 'standard', I thought I was cleared to 5R via echo and alpha, and not the 'standard' taxi procedure, which requires you to hold short of alpha. The problem was discovered when we switched to tower frequency on alpha. They asked if we had contacted ground on 121.9. We had missed the frequency change and had gone directly from wside ground control to tower frequency. Contributing factors -- unfamiliarity with 5R standard taxi via south route procedure. Also, the wording of the procedure 'runway 5R, taxi via south route' does not warn that it is only clearance to a point short of the runway. Corrective actions: make the clearance only to the specific 'hold short' point, not the runway. If we are cleared via echo, hold short of alpha, we will know we are going to depart on 5R. Also, a clearly visible sign on the taxiway stating contact ground on XXX now should be in place. Perceptions -- I was lulled into a false sense of security because I was sure of where I was going. There was no conflicting traffic, so I had no cause for alarm. Human performance factors -- fatigue was a contributing factor. This was the fourth leg of a 12 hour duty day. The system must be designed to catch mistakes before they become a problem. Ground controllers should contact the aircraft if it hasn't contacted them by a certain point. Both ground controllers and aircrew have a responsibility to prevent incidents.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF MLG ACR ACFT FAILED TO ADHERE TO THE STANDARD TAXI INSTRUCTIONS RESULTING IN NOT OBTAINING A CLRNC AT AN INTXN LIMIT.

Narrative: THE PROBLEM AROSE WHEN I HEARD THE CTLR SAY 'TAXI TO 5R VIA S RTE.' SINCE I DID NOT HEAR THE WORD 'STANDARD', I THOUGHT I WAS CLRED TO 5R VIA ECHO AND ALPHA, AND NOT THE 'STANDARD' TAXI PROC, WHICH REQUIRES YOU TO HOLD SHORT OF ALPHA. THE PROBLEM WAS DISCOVERED WHEN WE SWITCHED TO TWR FREQ ON ALPHA. THEY ASKED IF WE HAD CONTACTED GND ON 121.9. WE HAD MISSED THE FREQ CHANGE AND HAD GONE DIRECTLY FROM WSIDE GND CTL TO TWR FREQ. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS -- UNFAMILIARITY WITH 5R STANDARD TAXI VIA S RTE PROC. ALSO, THE WORDING OF THE PROC 'RWY 5R, TAXI VIA S RTE' DOES NOT WARN THAT IT IS ONLY CLRNC TO A POINT SHORT OF THE RWY. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: MAKE THE CLRNC ONLY TO THE SPECIFIC 'HOLD SHORT' POINT, NOT THE RWY. IF WE ARE CLRED VIA ECHO, HOLD SHORT OF ALPHA, WE WILL KNOW WE ARE GOING TO DEPART ON 5R. ALSO, A CLRLY VISIBLE SIGN ON THE TAXIWAY STATING CONTACT GND ON XXX NOW SHOULD BE IN PLACE. PERCEPTIONS -- I WAS LULLED INTO A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY BECAUSE I WAS SURE OF WHERE I WAS GOING. THERE WAS NO CONFLICTING TFC, SO I HAD NO CAUSE FOR ALARM. HUMAN PERFORMANCE FACTORS -- FATIGUE WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. THIS WAS THE FOURTH LEG OF A 12 HR DUTY DAY. THE SYS MUST BE DESIGNED TO CATCH MISTAKES BEFORE THEY BECOME A PROBLEM. GND CTLRS SHOULD CONTACT THE ACFT IF IT HASN'T CONTACTED THEM BY A CERTAIN POINT. BOTH GND CTLRS AND AIRCREW HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT INCIDENTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.