Narrative:

I was the captain of air carrier medium large transport yyz-phl on feb/fri/93. About 12 mi out we were cleared for the ILS 27R approach. Winds were from the northwest at about 12-16 KTS. Simultaneous approachs were being conducted to runway 27R and runway 35 (however, I did not know this since the first officer listened to the ATIS, even if I had known, I doubt it would have made a difference). We were following another medium large transport which we had visually about 4 mi in front of us. Approach was normal until we were about 150 ft AGL when tower issued a go around. The call sign was blocked, stepped on, whatever. I thought we were the only aircraft approaching the airport at this time and, therefore, the only aircraft in position to be issued a go around. However, since I saw that the preceding aircraft had landed and was well clear of runway 27R, there was no apparent reason to go around. Since we did not hear the call sign, I looked over at the first officer and asked him 'who was that for?' as I looked back to the runway, I heard tower again issue a go around for a call sign I did not recognize. Also, about the same time, I saw a blue and white single engine aircraft slightly right of us and a few hundred ft above us, apparently on the go from an approach to runway 35. This aircraft then responded on the radio, but exactly what he said, I do not know. I continued our approach and landed. If we had decided to go around at the first mention of go around, we may have come very close to this aircraft, since neither I nor the first officer saw this aircraft until we were about 100 ft AGL, nor were we even aware there was another aircraft on approach to runway 35 since tower never advised us (or if they did, we never heard or acknowledged it). After we landed, I called the tower supervisor, mr X. I told him: we never knew there was another aircraft approaching runway 35. At the first call for a go around, there was confusion, since the call sign was stepped on, blocked, whatever. There was no response by anyone on the radio to the first go around issued, and there was a 5-6 second delay before another go around was transmitted. We talked quite a bit about runway 35/27 operations and all the problems and variables involved. Mr X said the other pilot talked to him on the phone also, and said he had engine problems. 2 points I want to make: 1) tower should never have allowed the situation to develop in the first place (mr X said the first go around was issued while the guy was still over the river. That may be true, but the first one we heard put him a lot closer to runway 27). 2) during simultaneous intersecting approachs, they have to provide better separation and give themselves some slop (margin of error) to allow for the real world and all traffic involved has to be informed. Mr X acted like 'well, these things happen.' I agree, but what are they doing to improve the operation and prevent a recurrence? My first officer has flown this trip a lot and he said he had to go around twice this month in phl for poor sequencing of runway 35 traffic. I think this operation could use some more study. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporting captain states that runway 35 and 27R are only used when there is a high wind situation with winds out of the northwest. Both the captain and the first officer called the tower regarding this incident and were impressed with how casual the tower supervisor was about the incident. They got no satisfaction at all from the supervisor. The first officer is reported to have had this a similar incident twice in 1 month, improper separation of aircraft landing on the crossing runways.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR MLG AND AN SMA HAD A CONFLICT IN THE XING RWY TFC LNDG PATTERN AT PHL.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT OF ACR MLG YYZ-PHL ON FEB/FRI/93. ABOUT 12 MI OUT WE WERE CLRED FOR THE ILS 27R APCH. WINDS WERE FROM THE NW AT ABOUT 12-16 KTS. SIMULTANEOUS APCHS WERE BEING CONDUCTED TO RWY 27R AND RWY 35 (HOWEVER, I DID NOT KNOW THIS SINCE THE FO LISTENED TO THE ATIS, EVEN IF I HAD KNOWN, I DOUBT IT WOULD HAVE MADE A DIFFERENCE). WE WERE FOLLOWING ANOTHER MLG WHICH WE HAD VISUALLY ABOUT 4 MI IN FRONT OF US. APCH WAS NORMAL UNTIL WE WERE ABOUT 150 FT AGL WHEN TWR ISSUED A GAR. THE CALL SIGN WAS BLOCKED, STEPPED ON, WHATEVER. I THOUGHT WE WERE THE ONLY ACFT APCHING THE ARPT AT THIS TIME AND, THEREFORE, THE ONLY ACFT IN POS TO BE ISSUED A GAR. HOWEVER, SINCE I SAW THAT THE PRECEDING ACFT HAD LANDED AND WAS WELL CLR OF RWY 27R, THERE WAS NO APPARENT REASON TO GAR. SINCE WE DID NOT HEAR THE CALL SIGN, I LOOKED OVER AT THE FO AND ASKED HIM 'WHO WAS THAT FOR?' AS I LOOKED BACK TO THE RWY, I HEARD TWR AGAIN ISSUE A GAR FOR A CALL SIGN I DID NOT RECOGNIZE. ALSO, ABOUT THE SAME TIME, I SAW A BLUE AND WHITE SINGLE ENG ACFT SLIGHTLY R OF US AND A FEW HUNDRED FT ABOVE US, APPARENTLY ON THE GO FROM AN APCH TO RWY 35. THIS ACFT THEN RESPONDED ON THE RADIO, BUT EXACTLY WHAT HE SAID, I DO NOT KNOW. I CONTINUED OUR APCH AND LANDED. IF WE HAD DECIDED TO GAR AT THE FIRST MENTION OF GAR, WE MAY HAVE COME VERY CLOSE TO THIS ACFT, SINCE NEITHER I NOR THE FO SAW THIS ACFT UNTIL WE WERE ABOUT 100 FT AGL, NOR WERE WE EVEN AWARE THERE WAS ANOTHER ACFT ON APCH TO RWY 35 SINCE TWR NEVER ADVISED US (OR IF THEY DID, WE NEVER HEARD OR ACKNOWLEDGED IT). AFTER WE LANDED, I CALLED THE TWR SUPVR, MR X. I TOLD HIM: WE NEVER KNEW THERE WAS ANOTHER ACFT APCHING RWY 35. AT THE FIRST CALL FOR A GAR, THERE WAS CONFUSION, SINCE THE CALL SIGN WAS STEPPED ON, BLOCKED, WHATEVER. THERE WAS NO RESPONSE BY ANYONE ON THE RADIO TO THE FIRST GAR ISSUED, AND THERE WAS A 5-6 SECOND DELAY BEFORE ANOTHER GAR WAS XMITTED. WE TALKED QUITE A BIT ABOUT RWY 35/27 OPS AND ALL THE PROBS AND VARIABLES INVOLVED. MR X SAID THE OTHER PLT TALKED TO HIM ON THE PHONE ALSO, AND SAID HE HAD ENG PROBS. 2 POINTS I WANT TO MAKE: 1) TWR SHOULD NEVER HAVE ALLOWED THE SIT TO DEVELOP IN THE FIRST PLACE (MR X SAID THE FIRST GAR WAS ISSUED WHILE THE GUY WAS STILL OVER THE RIVER. THAT MAY BE TRUE, BUT THE FIRST ONE WE HEARD PUT HIM A LOT CLOSER TO RWY 27). 2) DURING SIMULTANEOUS INTERSECTING APCHS, THEY HAVE TO PROVIDE BETTER SEPARATION AND GIVE THEMSELVES SOME SLOP (MARGIN OF ERROR) TO ALLOW FOR THE REAL WORLD AND ALL TFC INVOLVED HAS TO BE INFORMED. MR X ACTED LIKE 'WELL, THESE THINGS HAPPEN.' I AGREE, BUT WHAT ARE THEY DOING TO IMPROVE THE OP AND PREVENT A RECURRENCE? MY FO HAS FLOWN THIS TRIP A LOT AND HE SAID HE HAD TO GAR TWICE THIS MONTH IN PHL FOR POOR SEQUENCING OF RWY 35 TFC. I THINK THIS OP COULD USE SOME MORE STUDY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTING CAPT STATES THAT RWY 35 AND 27R ARE ONLY USED WHEN THERE IS A HIGH WIND SIT WITH WINDS OUT OF THE NW. BOTH THE CAPT AND THE FO CALLED THE TWR REGARDING THIS INCIDENT AND WERE IMPRESSED WITH HOW CASUAL THE TWR SUPVR WAS ABOUT THE INCIDENT. THEY GOT NO SATISFACTION AT ALL FROM THE SUPVR. THE FO IS RPTED TO HAVE HAD THIS A SIMILAR INCIDENT TWICE IN 1 MONTH, IMPROPER SEPARATION OF ACFT LNDG ON THE XING RWYS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.