Narrative:

I was the captain of flight, a widebody transport X, bdl-atl on apr/xx/93. The flight was uneventful. We landed on runway 9R at approximately XA50 local. As we approached ramp 1 from the south, we contacted ramp tower and were instructed to taxi on the left (west) side to gate. The entire taxi in was on 2 engines. As I approached gate, the ramp area was dark and there were no parking lights illuminated. I also observed no wing walkers or marshall. I stopped the aircraft outside of the gate area and waited. Shortly thereafter a baggage tug arrived with 3 persons. One proceeded to the parking light controls by the jetway and the other 2 went to their respective position to serve as wing walkers. When all 3 individuals were in place and the green parking light was illuminated, I proceeded slowly, following the yellow line and the neon guide lights, which indicated that I was on centerline. As my cockpit window approached the jetway, I was instructed by ramp tower to stop my taxi. I did this immediately, even though the parking light was still green. Ramp tower then told us that we had apparently made contact with the wing tip of the widebody transport Y parked on gate next to us. I remained stopped and shut down the left engine awaiting ground power. Shortly thereafter I shut down the right engine. Upon exiting the aircraft, I personally inspected my aircraft and the widebody transport for possible damage. I observed a broken strobe light lens cover on the left wing of my aircraft and no apparent damage to the widebody transport. It is my belief that this incident was avoidable for the following reasons: 1) the left wing walker should have had ample time to warn the lead-in marshall so the red stop light could be illuminated, warning the cockpit crew to stop the aircraft. 2) the lead-in marshall should have realized the spacing might be minimal and paid particular attention to the left wing walker for a possible stop signal. 3) the 2 wing walkers and the lead-in marshall were not trained in parking aircraft at the international concourse and thus were unaware that they should have directed the aircraft to park on the angled line and not the straight-in line as was done. 4) had the 2 yellow parking lines been shown on the atl 10-9B plate for gate with a reference that 1 line was for parking narrow body aircraft only and the angled line for either wide or narrow body aircraft, the cockpit crew would have been alerted not to park where they did. 5) contributing factors were the dark ramp area with very little backlighting due to the late hour and the international concourse at gate being closed at that time. This may have made it difficult for the ground crew to see each other's signals. Also it is impossible for the cockpit crew to see the wing tips of a widebody transport X unless the sliding windows are opened and the observer sticks his head out the window. Recommendations: 1) need for domestic ground crews to be qualified in parking aircraft at international gates. 2) stress importance of lead-in marshall to pay close attention to wing walkers at all times and especially at night. 3) the atl 10-9B plate should have parking lines drawn at gates with more than 1 direction for parking aircraft and a warning note to indicate if parking of widebody transport aircraft on any lines may provide insufficient wing tip clearance. Supplemental information from acn 238699: factors that contributed to the incident: 1) nighttime -- contributes to poor depth perception. A poorly lit ramp area combined with a very bright wing tip light makes it difficult to determine clearance. Currently, wing walkers remain in view of the flight crew. This causes them to be a considerable distance from the wings themselves. Providing 4 wing walkers at night, where 2 remain under the wings themselves and 2 remain in the view of the cockpit crew members would more accurately determine clearance. 2) at many gates throughout the system, there are 2 sets of lead-in lines, either for use by different aircraft types or simply the old set of lines hasn't been blacked out or removed. There must be no mistake on which line to use. They must be clearly marked. 3) taxi in even slower than we currently do, to allow more time for ground crews to ascertain clearance and communicate through hand signals the need to stop the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB WING TIP STRIKE IN RAMP NIGHT OP ACFT PARKING PROC.

Narrative: I WAS THE CAPT OF FLT, A WDB X, BDL-ATL ON APR/XX/93. THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. WE LANDED ON RWY 9R AT APPROX XA50 LCL. AS WE APCHED RAMP 1 FROM THE S, WE CONTACTED RAMP TWR AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO TAXI ON THE L (W) SIDE TO GATE. THE ENTIRE TAXI IN WAS ON 2 ENGS. AS I APCHED GATE, THE RAMP AREA WAS DARK AND THERE WERE NO PARKING LIGHTS ILLUMINATED. I ALSO OBSERVED NO WING WALKERS OR MARSHALL. I STOPPED THE ACFT OUTSIDE OF THE GATE AREA AND WAITED. SHORTLY THEREAFTER A BAGGAGE TUG ARRIVED WITH 3 PERSONS. ONE PROCEEDED TO THE PARKING LIGHT CTLS BY THE JETWAY AND THE OTHER 2 WENT TO THEIR RESPECTIVE POS TO SERVE AS WING WALKERS. WHEN ALL 3 INDIVIDUALS WERE IN PLACE AND THE GREEN PARKING LIGHT WAS ILLUMINATED, I PROCEEDED SLOWLY, FOLLOWING THE YELLOW LINE AND THE NEON GUIDE LIGHTS, WHICH INDICATED THAT I WAS ON CTRLINE. AS MY COCKPIT WINDOW APCHED THE JETWAY, I WAS INSTRUCTED BY RAMP TWR TO STOP MY TAXI. I DID THIS IMMEDIATELY, EVEN THOUGH THE PARKING LIGHT WAS STILL GREEN. RAMP TWR THEN TOLD US THAT WE HAD APPARENTLY MADE CONTACT WITH THE WING TIP OF THE WDB Y PARKED ON GATE NEXT TO US. I REMAINED STOPPED AND SHUT DOWN THE L ENG AWAITING GND PWR. SHORTLY THEREAFTER I SHUT DOWN THE R ENG. UPON EXITING THE ACFT, I PERSONALLY INSPECTED MY ACFT AND THE WDB FOR POSSIBLE DAMAGE. I OBSERVED A BROKEN STROBE LIGHT LENS COVER ON THE L WING OF MY ACFT AND NO APPARENT DAMAGE TO THE WDB. IT IS MY BELIEF THAT THIS INCIDENT WAS AVOIDABLE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 1) THE LEFT WING WALKER SHOULD HAVE HAD AMPLE TIME TO WARN THE LEAD-IN MARSHALL SO THE RED STOP LIGHT COULD BE ILLUMINATED, WARNING THE COCKPIT CREW TO STOP THE ACFT. 2) THE LEAD-IN MARSHALL SHOULD HAVE REALIZED THE SPACING MIGHT BE MINIMAL AND PAID PARTICULAR ATTN TO THE L WING WALKER FOR A POSSIBLE STOP SIGNAL. 3) THE 2 WING WALKERS AND THE LEAD-IN MARSHALL WERE NOT TRAINED IN PARKING ACFT AT THE INTL CONCOURSE AND THUS WERE UNAWARE THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED THE ACFT TO PARK ON THE ANGLED LINE AND NOT THE STRAIGHT-IN LINE AS WAS DONE. 4) HAD THE 2 YELLOW PARKING LINES BEEN SHOWN ON THE ATL 10-9B PLATE FOR GATE WITH A REF THAT 1 LINE WAS FOR PARKING NARROW BODY ACFT ONLY AND THE ANGLED LINE FOR EITHER WIDE OR NARROW BODY ACFT, THE COCKPIT CREW WOULD HAVE BEEN ALERTED NOT TO PARK WHERE THEY DID. 5) CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE THE DARK RAMP AREA WITH VERY LITTLE BACKLIGHTING DUE TO THE LATE HR AND THE INTL CONCOURSE AT GATE BEING CLOSED AT THAT TIME. THIS MAY HAVE MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE GND CREW TO SEE EACH OTHER'S SIGNALS. ALSO IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE COCKPIT CREW TO SEE THE WING TIPS OF A WDB X UNLESS THE SLIDING WINDOWS ARE OPENED AND THE OBSERVER STICKS HIS HEAD OUT THE WINDOW. RECOMMENDATIONS: 1) NEED FOR DOMESTIC GND CREWS TO BE QUALIFIED IN PARKING ACFT AT INTL GATES. 2) STRESS IMPORTANCE OF LEAD-IN MARSHALL TO PAY CLOSE ATTN TO WING WALKERS AT ALL TIMES AND ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT. 3) THE ATL 10-9B PLATE SHOULD HAVE PARKING LINES DRAWN AT GATES WITH MORE THAN 1 DIRECTION FOR PARKING ACFT AND A WARNING NOTE TO INDICATE IF PARKING OF WDB ACFT ON ANY LINES MAY PROVIDE INSUFFICIENT WING TIP CLRNC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 238699: FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCIDENT: 1) NIGHTTIME -- CONTRIBUTES TO POOR DEPTH PERCEPTION. A POORLY LIT RAMP AREA COMBINED WITH A VERY BRIGHT WING TIP LIGHT MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE CLRNC. CURRENTLY, WING WALKERS REMAIN IN VIEW OF THE FLC. THIS CAUSES THEM TO BE A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE FROM THE WINGS THEMSELVES. PROVIDING 4 WING WALKERS AT NIGHT, WHERE 2 REMAIN UNDER THE WINGS THEMSELVES AND 2 REMAIN IN THE VIEW OF THE COCKPIT CREW MEMBERS WOULD MORE ACCURATELY DETERMINE CLRNC. 2) AT MANY GATES THROUGHOUT THE SYS, THERE ARE 2 SETS OF LEAD-IN LINES, EITHER FOR USE BY DIFFERENT ACFT TYPES OR SIMPLY THE OLD SET OF LINES HASN'T BEEN BLACKED OUT OR REMOVED. THERE MUST BE NO MISTAKE ON WHICH LINE TO USE. THEY MUST BE CLRLY MARKED. 3) TAXI IN EVEN SLOWER THAN WE CURRENTLY DO, TO ALLOW MORE TIME FOR GND CREWS TO ASCERTAIN CLRNC AND COMMUNICATE THROUGH HAND SIGNALS THE NEED TO STOP THE ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.