Narrative:

Our aircraft was dispatched with some features of the PA system inoperative per MEL. After taxiing to the end of the runway, and after finishing the before takeoff checklist, we were being cleared for takeoff as the purser entered the cockpit to inform us the pre-takeoff passenger briefing had not been completed. Because of the airport confign, and our position at the runway, and aircraft behind us, as well as a 'slot' time, I elected to takeoff. I directed the purser to complete the briefing as soon as we were airborne. An election to taxi clear would have resulted in a long taxion the runway and a wait for gear and brake cooling prior to takeoff, as well as obtaining a new slot time. After takeoff, I was informed there was a great deal of confusion between front and rear cabin sections and, in at least the case of 1 section, no briefing was done at all. We later determined that at least 1 PA switch was left disarmed -- one that is in an obscure location and normally not disturbed. This, with the technical anomalies with the PA, as well as apparent lack of coordination with the purser and the flight attendants created a confusing situation for them. We were unaware of this in the cockpit until the last seconds and, in fact, were unaware of the scope of the problem. Prior to departure, we did ask the maintenance foreman (an american) to show the flight attendants how to operate the system -- we assumed this happened. I do not want to subject a heavy widebody transport to excessive taxi distances near or over limitations. I did not want to block a runway while I taxied a long distance to the first available turnoff. If I had been aware of the confusion below, I would not have taken off until all was settled regardless of having to return to the 'blocks.' all briefings were complete shortly after takeoff. Supplemental information from acn 245961: in retrospect, the purser did not prepare adequately for handling the problem with the PA system and caught the captain by surprise right before takeoff. We were facing a takeoff slot and were overly focused on meeting our takeoff slot. The purser's failure to notify the captain in a timely manner and our 'go' mentality led to us taking off without fully completing the passenger safety briefing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WDB ACFT DEPARTS WITH INCOMPLETE SAFETY BRIEFINGS.

Narrative: OUR ACFT WAS DISPATCHED WITH SOME FEATURES OF THE PA SYS INOP PER MEL. AFTER TAXIING TO THE END OF THE RWY, AND AFTER FINISHING THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST, WE WERE BEING CLRED FOR TKOF AS THE PURSER ENTERED THE COCKPIT TO INFORM US THE PRE-TKOF PAX BRIEFING HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED. BECAUSE OF THE ARPT CONFIGN, AND OUR POS AT THE RWY, AND ACFT BEHIND US, AS WELL AS A 'SLOT' TIME, I ELECTED TO TKOF. I DIRECTED THE PURSER TO COMPLETE THE BRIEFING AS SOON AS WE WERE AIRBORNE. AN ELECTION TO TAXI CLR WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN A LONG TAXION THE RWY AND A WAIT FOR GEAR AND BRAKE COOLING PRIOR TO TKOF, AS WELL AS OBTAINING A NEW SLOT TIME. AFTER TKOF, I WAS INFORMED THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF CONFUSION BTWN FRONT AND REAR CABIN SECTIONS AND, IN AT LEAST THE CASE OF 1 SECTION, NO BRIEFING WAS DONE AT ALL. WE LATER DETERMINED THAT AT LEAST 1 PA SWITCH WAS LEFT DISARMED -- ONE THAT IS IN AN OBSCURE LOCATION AND NORMALLY NOT DISTURBED. THIS, WITH THE TECHNICAL ANOMALIES WITH THE PA, AS WELL AS APPARENT LACK OF COORD WITH THE PURSER AND THE FLT ATTENDANTS CREATED A CONFUSING SIT FOR THEM. WE WERE UNAWARE OF THIS IN THE COCKPIT UNTIL THE LAST SECONDS AND, IN FACT, WERE UNAWARE OF THE SCOPE OF THE PROB. PRIOR TO DEP, WE DID ASK THE MAINT FOREMAN (AN AMERICAN) TO SHOW THE FLT ATTENDANTS HOW TO OPERATE THE SYS -- WE ASSUMED THIS HAPPENED. I DO NOT WANT TO SUBJECT A HVY WDB TO EXCESSIVE TAXI DISTANCES NEAR OR OVER LIMITATIONS. I DID NOT WANT TO BLOCK A RWY WHILE I TAXIED A LONG DISTANCE TO THE FIRST AVAILABLE TURNOFF. IF I HAD BEEN AWARE OF THE CONFUSION BELOW, I WOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN OFF UNTIL ALL WAS SETTLED REGARDLESS OF HAVING TO RETURN TO THE 'BLOCKS.' ALL BRIEFINGS WERE COMPLETE SHORTLY AFTER TKOF. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 245961: IN RETROSPECT, THE PURSER DID NOT PREPARE ADEQUATELY FOR HANDLING THE PROB WITH THE PA SYS AND CAUGHT THE CAPT BY SURPRISE RIGHT BEFORE TKOF. WE WERE FACING A TKOF SLOT AND WERE OVERLY FOCUSED ON MEETING OUR TKOF SLOT. THE PURSER'S FAILURE TO NOTIFY THE CAPT IN A TIMELY MANNER AND OUR 'GO' MENTALITY LED TO US TAKING OFF WITHOUT FULLY COMPLETING THE PAX SAFETY BRIEFING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.