Narrative:

We were in contact with jax approach when we encountered a heavy thunderstorm approximately 7 mi southwest of jax. We told jax approach we wanted to divert our course for WX and land at jax. During our WX briefing before the flight we had not asked for any NOTAMS on jax, because obviously, we had no way of knowing we would need to divert there. We also did not have time to copy ATIS during our diversion because of our already close proximity to the field. The approach controller handed us off to the tower without verifying if we had received ATIS, or any other airport information of importance. After we landed on 31, we cleared the runway onto taxiway F, and contacted ground control. The controller gave us taxiway instructions for which we requested clarification on several times. Ground control then gave us additional instructions to hold short of runway 07/25. We concluded that an en route taxiway such as 'hotel' or 'alpha' was closed, thus making taxiing on the runway a necessity to reach our destination. We came to the red runway sign for 07/25 that indicated we were nearing the runway we indented on the diagram as 07/25. We stopped momentarily at what appeared to be a hold short line that was not applicable since it was so far from runway 25/07. Because we were coming to the conclusion that some changes and construction on the field had been made in the recent past, we believed the line to be old. I then reached to the back of the plane for my own set of charts to compare with the pilot's and make sure they were the same. Meanwhile, the pilot began to continue across what was thought to be taxiway H or a. I felt the plane suddenly stop and heard the pilot say, 'it is a runway!' we then saw a light twin engine aircraft departing on 'new' 25, clearing us by a minimum of 200 ft vertically. It was now obvious to us that a taxiway had been turned into a temporary runway 07/25. Checking ATIS after arriving at the ramp, there was a notice of runway 07/25 being closed and temporary runway 07/25 being used for aircraft under 12000 pounds only. I believe the following events are cause factors that led to the incident: pilot failed to request progressive taxi when there was conflicting information evident within the airport environment. Controller failed to give progressive taxi when it was evident from the pilot's inquisitiveness that he was unfamiliar with the airport. According the airman's information manual (aim) paragraph 4-68b, 'if the pilot is unfamiliar with the airport or confusion exists as to the correct taxi routing,...progressive instructions may also be issued if the controller deems it necessary due to traffic or field conditions, i.e., construction or closed txwys.' contrary to aim paragraph 4-12f, which states, 'controllers will issue pertinent information to pilots who do not acknowledge receipt of a broadcast...or who acknowledge receipt of a broadcast which is not current.' the controller did not verify we had the ATIS, which contained the important NOTAM. Pilot unable to copy ATIS because of cockpit duties (in accordance with aim paragraph 4-12b, 'pilots can receive the continuous ATIS at times when cockpit duties are least pressing'). Ground controller did not advise us as to the reason for holding short, thus, we did not know where to scan for any traffic we should avoid. During our scanning for suspected traffic in the area of closed 07/25, as well as scanning for other taxiing aircraft at the intxns we arrived at, the small departing aircraft on the temporary 07/25 was invisible to us. This was because the aircraft was nearly 4000 ft away from us in a completely different direction than where we thought we should be looking for landing or departing aircraft. Also note that had we had time to check the chart NOTAMS, it only stated that runway 25/07 was closed, and nothing about a taxiway being designated a temporary 25/07. I believe that the omitted information was even more important than what was printed. Within these 'cause factors' lie the solutions. But, I have some additional suggestions. Ground controllers, especially in such an environment, should verify with arriving aircraft that are clearing the runway that they have ATIS, just as they do on initial call up with departing aircraft. I think this would only be necessary if the ATIS contains information that is critical to safe ground operations. Pilot should query ground controllers as to the reason for any 'hold short' instructions received for the benefit of proper scanning. 'Hold short' by definition implies an impending situation, and sufficient information is therefore necessary.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTH RWY ENTRY.

Narrative: WE WERE IN CONTACT WITH JAX APCH WHEN WE ENCOUNTERED A HVY TSTM APPROX 7 MI SW OF JAX. WE TOLD JAX APCH WE WANTED TO DIVERT OUR COURSE FOR WX AND LAND AT JAX. DURING OUR WX BRIEFING BEFORE THE FLT WE HAD NOT ASKED FOR ANY NOTAMS ON JAX, BECAUSE OBVIOUSLY, WE HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING WE WOULD NEED TO DIVERT THERE. WE ALSO DID NOT HAVE TIME TO COPY ATIS DURING OUR DIVERSION BECAUSE OF OUR ALREADY CLOSE PROX TO THE FIELD. THE APCH CTLR HANDED US OFF TO THE TWR WITHOUT VERIFYING IF WE HAD RECEIVED ATIS, OR ANY OTHER ARPT INFO OF IMPORTANCE. AFTER WE LANDED ON 31, WE CLRED THE RWY ONTO TXWY F, AND CONTACTED GND CTL. THE CTLR GAVE US TXWY INSTRUCTIONS FOR WHICH WE REQUESTED CLARIFICATION ON SEVERAL TIMES. GND CTL THEN GAVE US ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 07/25. WE CONCLUDED THAT AN ENRTE TXWY SUCH AS 'HOTEL' OR 'ALPHA' WAS CLOSED, THUS MAKING TAXIING ON THE RWY A NECESSITY TO REACH OUR DEST. WE CAME TO THE RED RWY SIGN FOR 07/25 THAT INDICATED WE WERE NEARING THE RWY WE INDENTED ON THE DIAGRAM AS 07/25. WE STOPPED MOMENTARILY AT WHAT APPEARED TO BE A HOLD SHORT LINE THAT WAS NOT APPLICABLE SINCE IT WAS SO FAR FROM RWY 25/07. BECAUSE WE WERE COMING TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SOME CHANGES AND CONSTRUCTION ON THE FIELD HAD BEEN MADE IN THE RECENT PAST, WE BELIEVED THE LINE TO BE OLD. I THEN REACHED TO THE BACK OF THE PLANE FOR MY OWN SET OF CHARTS TO COMPARE WITH THE PLT'S AND MAKE SURE THEY WERE THE SAME. MEANWHILE, THE PLT BEGAN TO CONTINUE ACROSS WHAT WAS THOUGHT TO BE TXWY H OR A. I FELT THE PLANE SUDDENLY STOP AND HEARD THE PLT SAY, 'IT IS A RWY!' WE THEN SAW A LIGHT TWIN ENG ACFT DEPARTING ON 'NEW' 25, CLRING US BY A MINIMUM OF 200 FT VERTICALLY. IT WAS NOW OBVIOUS TO US THAT A TXWY HAD BEEN TURNED INTO A TEMPORARY RWY 07/25. CHKING ATIS AFTER ARRIVING AT THE RAMP, THERE WAS A NOTICE OF RWY 07/25 BEING CLOSED AND TEMPORARY RWY 07/25 BEING USED FOR ACFT UNDER 12000 LBS ONLY. I BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING EVENTS ARE CAUSE FACTORS THAT LED TO THE INCIDENT: PLT FAILED TO REQUEST PROGRESSIVE TAXI WHEN THERE WAS CONFLICTING INFO EVIDENT WITHIN THE ARPT ENVIRONMENT. CTLR FAILED TO GIVE PROGRESSIVE TAXI WHEN IT WAS EVIDENT FROM THE PLT'S INQUISITIVENESS THAT HE WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT. ACCORDING THE AIRMAN'S INFO MANUAL (AIM) PARAGRAPH 4-68B, 'IF THE PLT IS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT OR CONFUSION EXISTS AS TO THE CORRECT TAXI ROUTING,...PROGRESSIVE INSTRUCTIONS MAY ALSO BE ISSUED IF THE CTLR DEEMS IT NECESSARY DUE TO TFC OR FIELD CONDITIONS, I.E., CONSTRUCTION OR CLOSED TXWYS.' CONTRARY TO AIM PARAGRAPH 4-12F, WHICH STATES, 'CTLRS WILL ISSUE PERTINENT INFO TO PLTS WHO DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF A BROADCAST...OR WHO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF A BROADCAST WHICH IS NOT CURRENT.' THE CTLR DID NOT VERIFY WE HAD THE ATIS, WHICH CONTAINED THE IMPORTANT NOTAM. PLT UNABLE TO COPY ATIS BECAUSE OF COCKPIT DUTIES (IN ACCORDANCE WITH AIM PARAGRAPH 4-12B, 'PLTS CAN RECEIVE THE CONTINUOUS ATIS AT TIMES WHEN COCKPIT DUTIES ARE LEAST PRESSING'). GND CTLR DID NOT ADVISE US AS TO THE REASON FOR HOLDING SHORT, THUS, WE DID NOT KNOW WHERE TO SCAN FOR ANY TFC WE SHOULD AVOID. DURING OUR SCANNING FOR SUSPECTED TFC IN THE AREA OF CLOSED 07/25, AS WELL AS SCANNING FOR OTHER TAXIING ACFT AT THE INTXNS WE ARRIVED AT, THE SMALL DEPARTING ACFT ON THE TEMPORARY 07/25 WAS INVISIBLE TO US. THIS WAS BECAUSE THE ACFT WAS NEARLY 4000 FT AWAY FROM US IN A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT DIRECTION THAN WHERE WE THOUGHT WE SHOULD BE LOOKING FOR LNDG OR DEPARTING ACFT. ALSO NOTE THAT HAD WE HAD TIME TO CHK THE CHART NOTAMS, IT ONLY STATED THAT RWY 25/07 WAS CLOSED, AND NOTHING ABOUT A TXWY BEING DESIGNATED A TEMPORARY 25/07. I BELIEVE THAT THE OMITTED INFO WAS EVEN MORE IMPORTANT THAN WHAT WAS PRINTED. WITHIN THESE 'CAUSE FACTORS' LIE THE SOLUTIONS. BUT, I HAVE SOME ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS. GND CTLRS, ESPECIALLY IN SUCH AN ENVIRONMENT, SHOULD VERIFY WITH ARRIVING ACFT THAT ARE CLRING THE RWY THAT THEY HAVE ATIS, JUST AS THEY DO ON INITIAL CALL UP WITH DEPARTING ACFT. I THINK THIS WOULD ONLY BE NECESSARY IF THE ATIS CONTAINS INFO THAT IS CRITICAL TO SAFE GND OPS. PLT SHOULD QUERY GND CTLRS AS TO THE REASON FOR ANY 'HOLD SHORT' INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED FOR THE BENEFIT OF PROPER SCANNING. 'HOLD SHORT' BY DEFINITION IMPLIES AN IMPENDING SIT, AND SUFFICIENT INFO IS THEREFORE NECESSARY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.