Narrative:

This heavy transport was equipped with electronic flight instruments (EFIS) and a modern autoplt. The company encourages its use at all times but doesn't require its use. I don't always use it but decided to use it this night for practice. I hand flew the airplane to 1000 ft AGL, nosed the airplane over, called for the flaps to 10 degrees (from the takeoff setting of 25 degrees), and started pushing buttons to set the flight director and engaging the autoplt. At this time we were switched from local control to departure control which issued an altitude change and a routing change. At the point I should have called for flaps up I was pushing buttons and the first officer was busy talking on the radio. At 3000 ft AGL I called for the after takeoff checklist. The first officer should have checked the flaps up before he checked the gear uplatch. The so should have verified flaps up in accordance with the after takeoff checklist. The heavy transport has no lights to indicate flaps down like other manufacturer aircraft. The flap gauge is down by the first officer's left knee and the flap handle is hard to see in a dark cockpit. Somewhere above 20000 ft at 300 KTS I noticed the airplane's climb performance below norms. I looked at the flap gauge and saw the flaps were still at 10 degrees. Maximum speed for the flaps at 10 degrees is 230 KTS. There was no damage found during the required maintenance inspection. Contributing factors: 1) PF engrossed in EFIS and autoplt. 2) PNF busy talking on radio during critical phase of flight. 3) heavy transport design.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HVT FLC NEGLECTS TO RETRACT FLAPS COMPLETELY. FLAP OVERSPD.

Narrative: THIS HVT WAS EQUIPPED WITH ELECTRONIC FLT INSTS (EFIS) AND A MODERN AUTOPLT. THE COMPANY ENCOURAGES ITS USE AT ALL TIMES BUT DOESN'T REQUIRE ITS USE. I DON'T ALWAYS USE IT BUT DECIDED TO USE IT THIS NIGHT FOR PRACTICE. I HAND FLEW THE AIRPLANE TO 1000 FT AGL, NOSED THE AIRPLANE OVER, CALLED FOR THE FLAPS TO 10 DEGS (FROM THE TKOF SETTING OF 25 DEGS), AND STARTED PUSHING BUTTONS TO SET THE FLT DIRECTOR AND ENGAGING THE AUTOPLT. AT THIS TIME WE WERE SWITCHED FROM LCL CTL TO DEP CTL WHICH ISSUED AN ALT CHANGE AND A ROUTING CHANGE. AT THE POINT I SHOULD HAVE CALLED FOR FLAPS UP I WAS PUSHING BUTTONS AND THE FO WAS BUSY TALKING ON THE RADIO. AT 3000 FT AGL I CALLED FOR THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST. THE FO SHOULD HAVE CHKED THE FLAPS UP BEFORE HE CHKED THE GEAR UPLATCH. THE SO SHOULD HAVE VERIFIED FLAPS UP IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST. THE HVT HAS NO LIGHTS TO INDICATE FLAPS DOWN LIKE OTHER MANUFACTURER ACFT. THE FLAP GAUGE IS DOWN BY THE FO'S L KNEE AND THE FLAP HANDLE IS HARD TO SEE IN A DARK COCKPIT. SOMEWHERE ABOVE 20000 FT AT 300 KTS I NOTICED THE AIRPLANE'S CLB PERFORMANCE BELOW NORMS. I LOOKED AT THE FLAP GAUGE AND SAW THE FLAPS WERE STILL AT 10 DEGS. MAX SPD FOR THE FLAPS AT 10 DEGS IS 230 KTS. THERE WAS NO DAMAGE FOUND DURING THE REQUIRED MAINT INSPECTION. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) PF ENGROSSED IN EFIS AND AUTOPLT. 2) PNF BUSY TALKING ON RADIO DURING CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. 3) HVT DESIGN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.