Narrative:

Departing burbank on a right downwind, I was en route to whiteman 4 mi away. Burbank tower was busy. I finally asked to be released to whiteman, and was immediately released and instructed to contact whiteman tower. Establishing contact with whiteman, I was given instructions for right downwind to runway 12, report base. I made my base report in the turn and the controller told me I had a TA and had not followed his instructions. I saw the other aircraft approximately 3/4 mi away and approximately 500 ft above me and descending (he was on a left base to runway 12). I throttled up, climbed back to pattern altitude, set up for a left downwind for runway 12. All this happened in approximately 30 seconds. The controller was talking to the other aircraft, they had me in sight. The controller asked where I was and I reported left downwind for runway 12 and would turn base on his command. He instructed me to turn base and I was cleared to land runway 12. Upon landing, the tower told me his instructions were to report abeam, not base. This problem arose as a result of misunderstanding in communications between pilot and controller. Controller said he issued instructions for right downwind runway 12, report abeam, I understood report base. There were 2 other aircraft active at whiteman, one on a short final to runway 12 and the other on left downwind to runway 12. Contributing factors: whiteman's radio transmission was weak. I had my volume full up to get his transmission and hear his instructions to other aircraft. I had to turn it down when they responded. The problem was discovered immediately by controller upon my base report. I saw and was seen by the other aircraft as he turned base, confirmed by his radio report. Clear collision avoidance was in effect by both pilots supported by the controller. Evasive measures were not radical, I went to full throttle, climbed straight to pattern altitude. Other aircraft continued his landing pattern. It was my perception that since I was closer in than the other aircraft on downwind the controller was bringing me into #2 for landing. Being released tardily from burbank, by the time I had contacted whiteman and received his landing instructions, I assumed he knew where I was, and did not question what I thought was a 'base' report. In the future, I will be more cautious and not assume what the controller is doing or allow a weak transmission to allow me to presume what he is saying, even when it is repetitious. The controller was very soft spoken, and as I stayed in the pattern for several takeoffs and lndgs, he often ran his words together and released the microphone button before he was finished in xmissions to me. I took that as his irritation at me for what he believed I had done. As I left for the evening, I apologized for any tense moments created earlier and indicated it would not happen again. His response was 'roger.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THERE WAS LTSS IN THE WHP TFC PATTERN.

Narrative: DEPARTING BURBANK ON A R DOWNWIND, I WAS ENRTE TO WHITEMAN 4 MI AWAY. BURBANK TWR WAS BUSY. I FINALLY ASKED TO BE RELEASED TO WHITEMAN, AND WAS IMMEDIATELY RELEASED AND INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT WHITEMAN TWR. ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH WHITEMAN, I WAS GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS FOR R DOWNWIND TO RWY 12, RPT BASE. I MADE MY BASE RPT IN THE TURN AND THE CTLR TOLD ME I HAD A TA AND HAD NOT FOLLOWED HIS INSTRUCTIONS. I SAW THE OTHER ACFT APPROX 3/4 MI AWAY AND APPROX 500 FT ABOVE ME AND DSNDING (HE WAS ON A L BASE TO RWY 12). I THROTTLED UP, CLBED BACK TO PATTERN ALT, SET UP FOR A L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 12. ALL THIS HAPPENED IN APPROX 30 SECONDS. THE CTLR WAS TALKING TO THE OTHER ACFT, THEY HAD ME IN SIGHT. THE CTLR ASKED WHERE I WAS AND I RPTED L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 12 AND WOULD TURN BASE ON HIS COMMAND. HE INSTRUCTED ME TO TURN BASE AND I WAS CLRED TO LAND RWY 12. UPON LNDG, THE TWR TOLD ME HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO RPT ABEAM, NOT BASE. THIS PROB AROSE AS A RESULT OF MISUNDERSTANDING IN COMS BTWN PLT AND CTLR. CTLR SAID HE ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS FOR R DOWNWIND RWY 12, RPT ABEAM, I UNDERSTOOD RPT BASE. THERE WERE 2 OTHER ACFT ACTIVE AT WHITEMAN, ONE ON A SHORT FINAL TO RWY 12 AND THE OTHER ON L DOWNWIND TO RWY 12. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: WHITEMAN'S RADIO XMISSION WAS WEAK. I HAD MY VOLUME FULL UP TO GET HIS XMISSION AND HEAR HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO OTHER ACFT. I HAD TO TURN IT DOWN WHEN THEY RESPONDED. THE PROB WAS DISCOVERED IMMEDIATELY BY CTLR UPON MY BASE RPT. I SAW AND WAS SEEN BY THE OTHER ACFT AS HE TURNED BASE, CONFIRMED BY HIS RADIO RPT. CLR COLLISION AVOIDANCE WAS IN EFFECT BY BOTH PLTS SUPPORTED BY THE CTLR. EVASIVE MEASURES WERE NOT RADICAL, I WENT TO FULL THROTTLE, CLBED STRAIGHT TO PATTERN ALT. OTHER ACFT CONTINUED HIS LNDG PATTERN. IT WAS MY PERCEPTION THAT SINCE I WAS CLOSER IN THAN THE OTHER ACFT ON DOWNWIND THE CTLR WAS BRINGING ME INTO #2 FOR LNDG. BEING RELEASED TARDILY FROM BURBANK, BY THE TIME I HAD CONTACTED WHITEMAN AND RECEIVED HIS LNDG INSTRUCTIONS, I ASSUMED HE KNEW WHERE I WAS, AND DID NOT QUESTION WHAT I THOUGHT WAS A 'BASE' RPT. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL BE MORE CAUTIOUS AND NOT ASSUME WHAT THE CTLR IS DOING OR ALLOW A WEAK XMISSION TO ALLOW ME TO PRESUME WHAT HE IS SAYING, EVEN WHEN IT IS REPETITIOUS. THE CTLR WAS VERY SOFT SPOKEN, AND AS I STAYED IN THE PATTERN FOR SEVERAL TKOFS AND LNDGS, HE OFTEN RAN HIS WORDS TOGETHER AND RELEASED THE MIKE BUTTON BEFORE HE WAS FINISHED IN XMISSIONS TO ME. I TOOK THAT AS HIS IRRITATION AT ME FOR WHAT HE BELIEVED I HAD DONE. AS I LEFT FOR THE EVENING, I APOLOGIZED FOR ANY TENSE MOMENTS CREATED EARLIER AND INDICATED IT WOULD NOT HAPPEN AGAIN. HIS RESPONSE WAS 'ROGER.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.