37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 253377 |
Time | |
Date | 199310 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : tpa airport : tpf |
State Reference | FL |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 1000 msl bound upper : 1000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : tpa |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | Small Aircraft |
Flight Phase | cruise other landing other other |
Flight Plan | None |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Qualification | pilot : private |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 30 flight time total : 445 flight time type : 41 |
ASRS Report | 253377 |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : declared emergency flight crew : overcame equipment problem other |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
Was practicing solo aerobatic flight in an area between 2000- 5000 ft AGL, greater than 4 NM off of the nearest airway just outside the ese boundary of the tampa class B airspace. While in the process of recovering from a normal spin (approximately 2000 ft AGL) noticed a pungent aroma in cockpit and looked down at the radio stack (mounted near the floor between rear pilot's legs). The wiring harness (running from under the rear panel down to the radio stack) was smoking badly, an obvious malfunction. I immediately turned off the master and alternator fields and attempted to vent the cabin. Because I was able to vent the cabin and because the engine was running normally I decided against an emergency landing below. But my biggest concern was the possibility of shorting behind the panel and subsequent aircraft fire. (This is of extreme significance in a cotton fabric covered aircraft.) I quickly decided to land either at lakeland airport or return to peter O. Knight. I decided on peter O. Knight for the following reasons: 1) I was familiar with the route and knew I could avoid any populated areas going back, also the last 5-6 NM could be flown over tampa bay in case of emergency bailout (was wearing chute). 2) peter O. Knight is far less busy, is uncontrolled, and accessible without penetrating class B or class D airspace, unlike lakeland. In short, I was totally unfamiliar with lakeland and its surrounding suburban areas. I was aware of the returning route to peter O. Knight, of several potential emergency fields en route, and felt that I could safety stay below class B airspace, avoid any possible aircraft in the pattern, while without radio/transponder/electrical system. As PIC I decided I could more safely return to O. Knight and that route would offer more contingencies to minimize danger to me or anybody on the ground, and that safe resolution of my emergency far outweighed violating the mode C veil, especially since I would not have to enter class B airspace. I decided that turning on the master to try and see if I could raise tpa approach and declare an emergency would increase the risk of fire in the aircraft. I descended to 1000 ft and flew back to peter O. Knight and made a normal approach and landing. Since a safe resolution and safe landing is the most important goal in an emergency, I believe I acted responsibly, especially where the chosen route offered more contingency support and a greater chance for safe resolution. Subsequent repair examination showed that in the past 5 yrs the wire bundle had started chafing against the top edge of the radio panel and had finally chafed through the insulation, shorting 120 to ground. The shorting took place between the battery and the breaker, mounted in the radio panel.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: PLT DISTR SMOKE IN COCKPIT. RETURN LAND. UNAUTH PENETRATION OF AIRSPACE, PROX OF TCA.
Narrative: WAS PRACTICING SOLO AEROBATIC FLT IN AN AREA BTWN 2000- 5000 FT AGL, GREATER THAN 4 NM OFF OF THE NEAREST AIRWAY JUST OUTSIDE THE ESE BOUNDARY OF THE TAMPA CLASS B AIRSPACE. WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF RECOVERING FROM A NORMAL SPIN (APPROX 2000 FT AGL) NOTICED A PUNGENT AROMA IN COCKPIT AND LOOKED DOWN AT THE RADIO STACK (MOUNTED NEAR THE FLOOR BTWN REAR PLT'S LEGS). THE WIRING HARNESS (RUNNING FROM UNDER THE REAR PANEL DOWN TO THE RADIO STACK) WAS SMOKING BADLY, AN OBVIOUS MALFUNCTION. I IMMEDIATELY TURNED OFF THE MASTER AND ALTERNATOR FIELDS AND ATTEMPTED TO VENT THE CABIN. BECAUSE I WAS ABLE TO VENT THE CABIN AND BECAUSE THE ENG WAS RUNNING NORMALLY I DECIDED AGAINST AN EMER LNDG BELOW. BUT MY BIGGEST CONCERN WAS THE POSSIBILITY OF SHORTING BEHIND THE PANEL AND SUBSEQUENT ACFT FIRE. (THIS IS OF EXTREME SIGNIFICANCE IN A COTTON FABRIC COVERED ACFT.) I QUICKLY DECIDED TO LAND EITHER AT LAKELAND ARPT OR RETURN TO PETER O. KNIGHT. I DECIDED ON PETER O. KNIGHT FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 1) I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE RTE AND KNEW I COULD AVOID ANY POPULATED AREAS GOING BACK, ALSO THE LAST 5-6 NM COULD BE FLOWN OVER TAMPA BAY IN CASE OF EMER BAILOUT (WAS WEARING CHUTE). 2) PETER O. KNIGHT IS FAR LESS BUSY, IS UNCTLED, AND ACCESSIBLE WITHOUT PENETRATING CLASS B OR CLASS D AIRSPACE, UNLIKE LAKELAND. IN SHORT, I WAS TOTALLY UNFAMILIAR WITH LAKELAND AND ITS SURROUNDING SUBURBAN AREAS. I WAS AWARE OF THE RETURNING RTE TO PETER O. KNIGHT, OF SEVERAL POTENTIAL EMER FIELDS ENRTE, AND FELT THAT I COULD SAFETY STAY BELOW CLASS B AIRSPACE, AVOID ANY POSSIBLE ACFT IN THE PATTERN, WHILE WITHOUT RADIO/XPONDER/ELECTRICAL SYS. AS PIC I DECIDED I COULD MORE SAFELY RETURN TO O. KNIGHT AND THAT RTE WOULD OFFER MORE CONTINGENCIES TO MINIMIZE DANGER TO ME OR ANYBODY ON THE GND, AND THAT SAFE RESOLUTION OF MY EMER FAR OUTWEIGHED VIOLATING THE MODE C VEIL, ESPECIALLY SINCE I WOULD NOT HAVE TO ENTER CLASS B AIRSPACE. I DECIDED THAT TURNING ON THE MASTER TO TRY AND SEE IF I COULD RAISE TPA APCH AND DECLARE AN EMER WOULD INCREASE THE RISK OF FIRE IN THE ACFT. I DSNDED TO 1000 FT AND FLEW BACK TO PETER O. KNIGHT AND MADE A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG. SINCE A SAFE RESOLUTION AND SAFE LNDG IS THE MOST IMPORTANT GOAL IN AN EMER, I BELIEVE I ACTED RESPONSIBLY, ESPECIALLY WHERE THE CHOSEN RTE OFFERED MORE CONTINGENCY SUPPORT AND A GREATER CHANCE FOR SAFE RESOLUTION. SUBSEQUENT REPAIR EXAMINATION SHOWED THAT IN THE PAST 5 YRS THE WIRE BUNDLE HAD STARTED CHAFING AGAINST THE TOP EDGE OF THE RADIO PANEL AND HAD FINALLY CHAFED THROUGH THE INSULATION, SHORTING 120 TO GND. THE SHORTING TOOK PLACE BTWN THE BATTERY AND THE BREAKER, MOUNTED IN THE RADIO PANEL.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.