Flight crew of an medium large transport air carrier aircraft continued climb and did not respond to...

Attributes
ACN	253563
Time
Date	199310
Day	Sun
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	airport : ric
State Reference	VA
Altitude	msl bound lower : 7000 msl bound upper : 8000
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : ric tower : lax
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng
Flight Phase	climbout : intermediate altitude
Flight Plan	IFR
Aircraft 2
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Medium Large Transport
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 22000 flight time type : 600
ASRS Report	253563
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : commercial pilot : instrument
Events
Anomaly	conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : required legal separation other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	other
Consequence	Other
Miss Distance	horizontal : 800 vertical : 500
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	other

Narrative:

It was the copilot's leg this time from a to B and the WX was clear 20 plus. About 25 mi out from our departure, departure control gave us traffic at 1 to 0130 O'clock, 8000 ft about 1 mi. We were at 7000 ft. He gave us a VFR climb with reference to the traffic to 10000 ft. I rogered that we had him in sight and at that time the copilot began to climb. Inside me, I didn't want to climb but, since the copilot started already, I let it go with apprehension on my part (mistake #1). As we closed in on the traffic, I realized that our headings were not parallel but on a converging course (I wanted to ask the controller before when we received the clearance what heading he was on, but didn't -- mistake #2). This caused our closure rate to be a lot faster than expected. I didn't like the situation, but, since I still had the traffic in sight at 1 O'clock, I didn't make a move to stop our climb. Then, I realized that the traffic's relative position wasn't changing (I wanted to tell the copilot to make a right turn away from this, but I didn't -- mistake #3). At this time we received a TA, then an RA to climb. Right before the RA, I lost sight of the traffic due to the nose high position of the aircraft. The copilot raised the nose to a higher climb rate because he realized it was going to take more than he thought to get over the traffic. The RA told us to descend, but since we were already committed to a high rate of climb, and we had each other insight (copilot at this time still had the traffic), I decided it was safer to continue the climb than not to climb. RA lasted about 3 seconds, then all clear with 1200 ft separation. The closest RA was about 400 ft. The other traffic had an RA also and had us in sight. The controller was informed of the RA but said no report will be made since it was VFR climb with both of us in sight of each other. After it was all over and had time to think what and could have happened, I was angry at myself. From the beginning I had a gut feeling not to but I did. Those mistakes told you why I shouldn't have started the climb.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN MLG ACR ACFT CONTINUED CLB AND DID NOT RESPOND TO A TCASII RA SINCE THE OTHER ACFT WAS POINTED OUT BY ATC AND WAS VISUALLY SIGHTED.

Narrative: IT WAS THE COPLT'S LEG THIS TIME FROM A TO B AND THE WX WAS CLR 20 PLUS. ABOUT 25 MI OUT FROM OUR DEP, DEP CTL GAVE US TFC AT 1 TO 0130 O'CLOCK, 8000 FT ABOUT 1 MI. WE WERE AT 7000 FT. HE GAVE US A VFR CLB WITH REF TO THE TFC TO 10000 FT. I ROGERED THAT WE HAD HIM IN SIGHT AND AT THAT TIME THE COPLT BEGAN TO CLB. INSIDE ME, I DIDN'T WANT TO CLB BUT, SINCE THE COPLT STARTED ALREADY, I LET IT GO WITH APPREHENSION ON MY PART (MISTAKE #1). AS WE CLOSED IN ON THE TFC, I REALIZED THAT OUR HDGS WERE NOT PARALLEL BUT ON A CONVERGING COURSE (I WANTED TO ASK THE CTLR BEFORE WHEN WE RECEIVED THE CLRNC WHAT HDG HE WAS ON, BUT DIDN'T -- MISTAKE #2). THIS CAUSED OUR CLOSURE RATE TO BE A LOT FASTER THAN EXPECTED. I DIDN'T LIKE THE SIT, BUT, SINCE I STILL HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT AT 1 O'CLOCK, I DIDN'T MAKE A MOVE TO STOP OUR CLB. THEN, I REALIZED THAT THE TFC'S RELATIVE POS WASN'T CHANGING (I WANTED TO TELL THE COPLT TO MAKE A R TURN AWAY FROM THIS, BUT I DIDN'T -- MISTAKE #3). AT THIS TIME WE RECEIVED A TA, THEN AN RA TO CLB. RIGHT BEFORE THE RA, I LOST SIGHT OF THE TFC DUE TO THE NOSE HIGH POS OF THE ACFT. THE COPLT RAISED THE NOSE TO A HIGHER CLB RATE BECAUSE HE REALIZED IT WAS GOING TO TAKE MORE THAN HE THOUGHT TO GET OVER THE TFC. THE RA TOLD US TO DSND, BUT SINCE WE WERE ALREADY COMMITTED TO A HIGH RATE OF CLB, AND WE HAD EACH OTHER INSIGHT (COPLT AT THIS TIME STILL HAD THE TFC), I DECIDED IT WAS SAFER TO CONTINUE THE CLB THAN NOT TO CLB. RA LASTED ABOUT 3 SECONDS, THEN ALL CLR WITH 1200 FT SEPARATION. THE CLOSEST RA WAS ABOUT 400 FT. THE OTHER TFC HAD AN RA ALSO AND HAD US IN SIGHT. THE CTLR WAS INFORMED OF THE RA BUT SAID NO RPT WILL BE MADE SINCE IT WAS VFR CLB WITH BOTH OF US IN SIGHT OF EACH OTHER. AFTER IT WAS ALL OVER AND HAD TIME TO THINK WHAT AND COULD HAVE HAPPENED, I WAS ANGRY AT MYSELF. FROM THE BEGINNING I HAD A GUT FEELING NOT TO BUT I DID. THOSE MISTAKES TOLD YOU WHY I SHOULDN'T HAVE STARTED THE CLB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Flight crew of an medium large transport air carrier aircraft continued climb and did not respond to a TCASII RA since the other aircraft was pointed out by ATC and was visually sighted.