Narrative:

It was a short leg from idaho falls to salt lake city, filed at a relatively high altitude of FL290. We had been cleared to FL290 and direct to bearr intersection upon first contact with the center. I remember thinking that we may have to start our descent before reaching cruise altitude if slc was landing to the south. While I was making the normal PA announcement in conjunction with turning off the seat belt sign we had been cleared to cross bearr at 17000 ft. My first officer informed me of this and I noted that the altitude alert was still set at FL290 as we were still climbing. It was at this time that our attention was diverted by a problem with a hydraulic low pressure warning light. The light had come on with all other pressure and quantity indications normal. We decided it was an indication problem only and my first officer started checking to find the appropriate ACARS code to send to alert maintenance to the nature of the problem. Just as I started my descent, center called and requested our altitude. My first officer responded, 'leaving 290.' center replied that they showed us at 32.3 (not certain of the exact altitude they showed, but believe he said 32.3) and requested that we check our transponder and switch to another if possible. We verified our altitude, checked the transponder switch settings and then switched to the #2 transponder. Center then quickly asked, 'are you going to make bearr at 17000 ft?' I glanced at the DME which indicated 54.7 and told my first officer, 'sure, we'll make it.' it hit me almost immediately as I uttered the words, I had looked at the DME from the ogden VOR which was on the navigation display and not at the distance to bearr which was on the omega. I put the aircraft into a maximum descent knowing I was in trouble but still thinking I had a chance to make the restr until another glance at the omega showed that the less than 40 KT wind I had noted earlier was now 116 KTS and almost directly on the tail. We crossed bearr at 22600 ft, nearly 6000 ft high and dropping at better than 4000 FPM. It was the most acute feeling of humiliation I have experienced since junior high school. I believe we were, fortunately, the only traffic in the area and there was no safety hazard -- just an awkward handoff between ATC facilities. Fault: mine completely. Lesson learned -- when there is any doubt, especially in unfamiliar territory (first time in and out of ida for both of us), and the little voice in the back of your mind says, 'maybe you should level at 250,' do it. Be super conservative. Contributing factors: crew fatigue. We had been delayed 1 hour and 10 mins by WX at the hub on our first leg of the trip and ended up with a 12 hour duty day and a short layover of 9 plus 15.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN MLG ACR ACFT UNDERSHOT DSCNT ALT RESULTING IN NOT MEETING AN ASSIGNED XING RESTR.

Narrative: IT WAS A SHORT LEG FROM IDAHO FALLS TO SALT LAKE CITY, FILED AT A RELATIVELY HIGH ALT OF FL290. WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO FL290 AND DIRECT TO BEARR INTXN UPON FIRST CONTACT WITH THE CTR. I REMEMBER THINKING THAT WE MAY HAVE TO START OUR DSCNT BEFORE REACHING CRUISE ALT IF SLC WAS LNDG TO THE S. WHILE I WAS MAKING THE NORMAL PA ANNOUNCEMENT IN CONJUNCTION WITH TURNING OFF THE SEAT BELT SIGN WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO CROSS BEARR AT 17000 FT. MY FO INFORMED ME OF THIS AND I NOTED THAT THE ALT ALERT WAS STILL SET AT FL290 AS WE WERE STILL CLBING. IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT OUR ATTN WAS DIVERTED BY A PROB WITH A HYD LOW PRESSURE WARNING LIGHT. THE LIGHT HAD COME ON WITH ALL OTHER PRESSURE AND QUANTITY INDICATIONS NORMAL. WE DECIDED IT WAS AN INDICATION PROB ONLY AND MY FO STARTED CHKING TO FIND THE APPROPRIATE ACARS CODE TO SEND TO ALERT MAINT TO THE NATURE OF THE PROB. JUST AS I STARTED MY DSCNT, CTR CALLED AND REQUESTED OUR ALT. MY FO RESPONDED, 'LEAVING 290.' CTR REPLIED THAT THEY SHOWED US AT 32.3 (NOT CERTAIN OF THE EXACT ALT THEY SHOWED, BUT BELIEVE HE SAID 32.3) AND REQUESTED THAT WE CHK OUR XPONDER AND SWITCH TO ANOTHER IF POSSIBLE. WE VERIFIED OUR ALT, CHKED THE XPONDER SWITCH SETTINGS AND THEN SWITCHED TO THE #2 XPONDER. CTR THEN QUICKLY ASKED, 'ARE YOU GOING TO MAKE BEARR AT 17000 FT?' I GLANCED AT THE DME WHICH INDICATED 54.7 AND TOLD MY FO, 'SURE, WE'LL MAKE IT.' IT HIT ME ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AS I UTTERED THE WORDS, I HAD LOOKED AT THE DME FROM THE OGDEN VOR WHICH WAS ON THE NAV DISPLAY AND NOT AT THE DISTANCE TO BEARR WHICH WAS ON THE OMEGA. I PUT THE AIRCRAFT INTO A MAX DSCNT KNOWING I WAS IN TROUBLE BUT STILL THINKING I HAD A CHANCE TO MAKE THE RESTR UNTIL ANOTHER GLANCE AT THE OMEGA SHOWED THAT THE LESS THAN 40 KT WIND I HAD NOTED EARLIER WAS NOW 116 KTS AND ALMOST DIRECTLY ON THE TAIL. WE CROSSED BEARR AT 22600 FT, NEARLY 6000 FT HIGH AND DROPPING AT BETTER THAN 4000 FPM. IT WAS THE MOST ACUTE FEELING OF HUMILIATION I HAVE EXPERIENCED SINCE JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOL. I BELIEVE WE WERE, FORTUNATELY, THE ONLY TFC IN THE AREA AND THERE WAS NO SAFETY HAZARD -- JUST AN AWKWARD HDOF BTWN ATC FACILITIES. FAULT: MINE COMPLETELY. LESSON LEARNED -- WHEN THERE IS ANY DOUBT, ESPECIALLY IN UNFAMILIAR TERRITORY (FIRST TIME IN AND OUT OF IDA FOR BOTH OF US), AND THE LITTLE VOICE IN THE BACK OF YOUR MIND SAYS, 'MAYBE YOU SHOULD LEVEL AT 250,' DO IT. BE SUPER CONSERVATIVE. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: CREW FATIGUE. WE HAD BEEN DELAYED 1 HR AND 10 MINS BY WX AT THE HUB ON OUR FIRST LEG OF THE TRIP AND ENDED UP WITH A 12 HR DUTY DAY AND A SHORT LAYOVER OF 9 PLUS 15.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.