Narrative:

Our position at the time of the near miss put us approximately 6.5 DME southwest of the cyn VOR. We were just handed off by ny departure on 137.95 after being told to climb to 16000 ft MSL from our current 12000 ft. During en route climb from 12000 ft passing through 14500 ft we contacted dca center on 127.7. Dca responded to us by acknowledging our call sign, along with a caution that numerous threats were in the restr areas right 5002 areas a, B, C, D, east. We concurred with dca center and looked visually for those aircraft. Our TCASII showed (2) proximate targets at our 10 and 11 O'clock positions. A third aircraft was at our 12 O'clock position, although we didn't see him visually but only on TCASII. Our TCASII told us to reduce climb then to descend. We complied with the TCASII directive and that precluded us from a mid-air collision with the A-10. The A-10 aircraft at 12 O'clock came within 200 ft of our aircraft with no sign of deviation from his flight path. Our flight was established on V-1 southwest of cyn. The A-10 was apparently out of his airspace. The A-10 flight might have 'spilled-out' to the northwest of the airspace. Dca never advised us that this is what they were doing. 'I told dca center that the A-10 was too close to us.' he said that the A-10's were out of willow grove, PA (NAS) and that he would pass along the word to the commanding officer of that squadron. Our evasive action was smooth and didn't pose any discomfort to our passenger, only to us the crewmembers. The flight concluded without any further events. I spoke with someone of dca center and explained the situation to him and also that a copy of this NASA report would be kept in our chief pilot's office as well as the original report sent to NASA. A description of the TCASII resolution as well as the corrective measures taken were put in the aircraft logbook. (Dca) center. I would hope that future incidents of this nature could be prevented by the military and center communicating more efficiently to safe guard the aircraft on IFR flight plans operating on federal airways and especially these airways near restr areas.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC CAUSED BY MIL SPILLOUT.

Narrative: OUR POS AT THE TIME OF THE NEAR MISS PUT US APPROX 6.5 DME SW OF THE CYN VOR. WE WERE JUST HANDED OFF BY NY DEP ON 137.95 AFTER BEING TOLD TO CLB TO 16000 FT MSL FROM OUR CURRENT 12000 FT. DURING ENRTE CLB FROM 12000 FT PASSING THROUGH 14500 FT WE CONTACTED DCA CTR ON 127.7. DCA RESPONDED TO US BY ACKNOWLEDGING OUR CALL SIGN, ALONG WITH A CAUTION THAT NUMEROUS THREATS WERE IN THE RESTR AREAS R 5002 AREAS A, B, C, D, E. WE CONCURRED WITH DCA CTR AND LOOKED VISUALLY FOR THOSE ACFT. OUR TCASII SHOWED (2) PROXIMATE TARGETS AT OUR 10 AND 11 O'CLOCK POSITIONS. A THIRD ACFT WAS AT OUR 12 O'CLOCK POS, ALTHOUGH WE DIDN'T SEE HIM VISUALLY BUT ONLY ON TCASII. OUR TCASII TOLD US TO REDUCE CLB THEN TO DSND. WE COMPLIED WITH THE TCASII DIRECTIVE AND THAT PRECLUDED US FROM A MID-AIR COLLISION WITH THE A-10. THE A-10 ACFT AT 12 O'CLOCK CAME WITHIN 200 FT OF OUR ACFT WITH NO SIGN OF DEV FROM HIS FLT PATH. OUR FLT WAS ESTABLISHED ON V-1 SW OF CYN. THE A-10 WAS APPARENTLY OUT OF HIS AIRSPACE. THE A-10 FLT MIGHT HAVE 'SPILLED-OUT' TO THE NW OF THE AIRSPACE. DCA NEVER ADVISED US THAT THIS IS WHAT THEY WERE DOING. 'I TOLD DCA CTR THAT THE A-10 WAS TOO CLOSE TO US.' HE SAID THAT THE A-10'S WERE OUT OF WILLOW GROVE, PA (NAS) AND THAT HE WOULD PASS ALONG THE WORD TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THAT SQUADRON. OUR EVASIVE ACTION WAS SMOOTH AND DIDN'T POSE ANY DISCOMFORT TO OUR PAX, ONLY TO US THE CREWMEMBERS. THE FLT CONCLUDED WITHOUT ANY FURTHER EVENTS. I SPOKE WITH SOMEONE OF DCA CTR AND EXPLAINED THE SIT TO HIM AND ALSO THAT A COPY OF THIS NASA RPT WOULD BE KEPT IN OUR CHIEF PLT'S OFFICE AS WELL AS THE ORIGINAL RPT SENT TO NASA. A DESCRIPTION OF THE TCASII RESOLUTION AS WELL AS THE CORRECTIVE MEASURES TAKEN WERE PUT IN THE ACFT LOGBOOK. (DCA) CTR. I WOULD HOPE THAT FUTURE INCIDENTS OF THIS NATURE COULD BE PREVENTED BY THE MIL AND CTR COMMUNICATING MORE EFFICIENTLY TO SAFE GUARD THE ACFT ON IFR FLT PLANS OPERATING ON FEDERAL AIRWAYS AND ESPECIALLY THESE AIRWAYS NEAR RESTR AREAS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.