Narrative:

My crew was given notice of an unscheduled aircraft change approximately 30 min before departure. The aircraft arrived late and an effort was made to minimize any delay. I received the dispatch release at the gate and noted an unidentified MEL. Upon boarding the aircraft, I referenced the MEL manual in the cockpit and maintenance log and found an inoperative fuel pump existed. I reviewed the MEL which stated that a minimum of 4800 pounds in each tank (9600 pounds total) was required at all times. Our release contained 1500 pounds 'extra' fuel and we were scheduled to land with 11700 pounds. The MEL referred to a special procedure -- in another part of the manual which I reviewed. After leaving the gate. Dispatch notified us that the fuel load was incorrect since the 9600 pounds requirement meant that amount was not useable for flight planning purposes and that it was not properly considered by the original dispatcher. Due to a shift change, a new dispatcher took control of our flight and noticed the discrepancy. We returned to the gate and were re- released with an amended fuel load. This problem was a combination of factors: fatigue -- it was the last leg of my 5TH consecutive day of flying. Workload management -- because we issue releases at the gate, MEL's must be dealt with during a very busy phase of flight and when there are many distrs. My assumption that dispatch had correctly compensated for the MEL. The numbers 'added up.' an ambiguous MEL procedure which states that there is a 9600 pounds minimum fuel requirement, but the reference to 'unusable' fuel is in a footnote to the procedure. Because of the serious implications. The reference to unusable fuel should be explicitly stated and should appear in the body of the MEL -- not as a note. Due to this format, it is possible to misinterpret the intent of the MEL. This is what lead me to believe that we would be in compliance by landing with more than 9600 pounds. Recommendations: make MEL verbiage more explicit when dealing with flight planning implications -- also, make written or verbal communication with dispatcher mandatory when accepting an aircraft with existing MEL(south). Finally, consider programming software to automatically add required fuel when certain MEL's are entered on the release. Supplemental information from acn 291567: the flight release showed that extra fuel was on board. Captain was satisfied with fuel load and I did not personally review MEL book. I would normally do so but time constraints coupled with the fact the PIC's performance and attitude was by far the best I have flown with in many yrs. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter revealed that this was a main fuel tank pump that was inoperative. Aircraft was a 737-300. Reporter sent in a report of this incident to his chief pilot. The report was turned over to the training and quality assurance departments for their review and comments. To this date nothing has been heard on the subject. Captain remarked that this is a 'symptom of the system.' pressed to explain he added that it is an MEL that was produced by maintenance personnel and the format does not assist a flight crew in their need for decision making and situational awareness. He was referring to the footnote that bears such relevance to proper fuel flight planning information as needed by the flight crew. The operational aspects are easily overlooked with the current publication presentation. Reporter felt that this ease of observation is most important because the flcs are having to deal more frequency with MEL's than they used to. The reason the second dispatcher caught the mistake was that he had had experience with this type situation before.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR B-737-300 DEPARTS GATE WITH LESS THAN FUEL REQUIRED FOR FLT. DISPATCH RELEASE DOES NOT REFLECT CORRECT AMOUNT OF FUEL REQUIRED EITHER.

Narrative: MY CREW WAS GIVEN NOTICE OF AN UNSCHEDULED ACFT CHANGE APPROX 30 MIN BEFORE DEP. THE ACFT ARRIVED LATE AND AN EFFORT WAS MADE TO MINIMIZE ANY DELAY. I RECEIVED THE DISPATCH RELEASE AT THE GATE AND NOTED AN UNIDENTIFIED MEL. UPON BOARDING THE ACFT, I REFERENCED THE MEL MANUAL IN THE COCKPIT AND MAINT LOG AND FOUND AN INOP FUEL PUMP EXISTED. I REVIEWED THE MEL WHICH STATED THAT A MINIMUM OF 4800 LBS IN EACH TANK (9600 LBS TOTAL) WAS REQUIRED AT ALL TIMES. OUR RELEASE CONTAINED 1500 LBS 'EXTRA' FUEL AND WE WERE SCHEDULED TO LAND WITH 11700 LBS. THE MEL REFERRED TO A SPECIAL PROC -- IN ANOTHER PART OF THE MANUAL WHICH I REVIEWED. AFTER LEAVING THE GATE. DISPATCH NOTIFIED US THAT THE FUEL LOAD WAS INCORRECT SINCE THE 9600 LBS REQUIREMENT MEANT THAT AMOUNT WAS NOT USEABLE FOR FLT PLANNING PURPOSES AND THAT IT WAS NOT PROPERLY CONSIDERED BY THE ORIGINAL DISPATCHER. DUE TO A SHIFT CHANGE, A NEW DISPATCHER TOOK CTL OF OUR FLT AND NOTICED THE DISCREPANCY. WE RETURNED TO THE GATE AND WERE RE- RELEASED WITH AN AMENDED FUEL LOAD. THIS PROB WAS A COMBINATION OF FACTORS: FATIGUE -- IT WAS THE LAST LEG OF MY 5TH CONSECUTIVE DAY OF FLYING. WORKLOAD MGMNT -- BECAUSE WE ISSUE RELEASES AT THE GATE, MEL'S MUST BE DEALT WITH DURING A VERY BUSY PHASE OF FLT AND WHEN THERE ARE MANY DISTRS. MY ASSUMPTION THAT DISPATCH HAD CORRECTLY COMPENSATED FOR THE MEL. THE NUMBERS 'ADDED UP.' AN AMBIGUOUS MEL PROC WHICH STATES THAT THERE IS A 9600 LBS MINIMUM FUEL REQUIREMENT, BUT THE REF TO 'UNUSABLE' FUEL IS IN A FOOTNOTE TO THE PROC. BECAUSE OF THE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS. THE REF TO UNUSABLE FUEL SHOULD BE EXPLICITLY STATED AND SHOULD APPEAR IN THE BODY OF THE MEL -- NOT AS A NOTE. DUE TO THIS FORMAT, IT IS POSSIBLE TO MISINTERPRET THE INTENT OF THE MEL. THIS IS WHAT LEAD ME TO BELIEVE THAT WE WOULD BE IN COMPLIANCE BY LNDG WITH MORE THAN 9600 LBS. RECOMMENDATIONS: MAKE MEL VERBIAGE MORE EXPLICIT WHEN DEALING WITH FLT PLANNING IMPLICATIONS -- ALSO, MAKE WRITTEN OR VERBAL COM WITH DISPATCHER MANDATORY WHEN ACCEPTING AN ACFT WITH EXISTING MEL(S). FINALLY, CONSIDER PROGRAMMING SOFTWARE TO AUTOMATICALLY ADD REQUIRED FUEL WHEN CERTAIN MEL'S ARE ENTERED ON THE RELEASE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 291567: THE FLT RELEASE SHOWED THAT EXTRA FUEL WAS ON BOARD. CAPT WAS SATISFIED WITH FUEL LOAD AND I DID NOT PERSONALLY REVIEW MEL BOOK. I WOULD NORMALLY DO SO BUT TIME CONSTRAINTS COUPLED WITH THE FACT THE PIC'S PERFORMANCE AND ATTITUDE WAS BY FAR THE BEST I HAVE FLOWN WITH IN MANY YRS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR REVEALED THAT THIS WAS A MAIN FUEL TANK PUMP THAT WAS INOP. ACFT WAS A 737-300. RPTR SENT IN A RPT OF THIS INCIDENT TO HIS CHIEF PLT. THE RPT WAS TURNED OVER TO THE TRAINING AND QUALITY ASSURANCE DEPTS FOR THEIR REVIEW AND COMMENTS. TO THIS DATE NOTHING HAS BEEN HEARD ON THE SUBJECT. CAPT REMARKED THAT THIS IS A 'SYMPTOM OF THE SYS.' PRESSED TO EXPLAIN HE ADDED THAT IT IS AN MEL THAT WAS PRODUCED BY MAINT PERSONNEL AND THE FORMAT DOES NOT ASSIST A FLC IN THEIR NEED FOR DECISION MAKING AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. HE WAS REFERRING TO THE FOOTNOTE THAT BEARS SUCH RELEVANCE TO PROPER FUEL FLT PLANNING INFO AS NEEDED BY THE FLC. THE OPERATIONAL ASPECTS ARE EASILY OVERLOOKED WITH THE CURRENT PUB PRESENTATION. RPTR FELT THAT THIS EASE OF OBSERVATION IS MOST IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE FLCS ARE HAVING TO DEAL MORE FREQ WITH MEL'S THAN THEY USED TO. THE REASON THE SECOND DISPATCHER CAUGHT THE MISTAKE WAS THAT HE HAD HAD EXPERIENCE WITH THIS TYPE SIT BEFORE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.