Narrative:

During preflight, captain discovered an inoperative oxygen mask. Maintenance/flight control brings strong pressure to bear on me to accept release under MEL 35-1B. This clearly only relates to making cockpit observer position inoperative due to an inoperative observer mask. This mask is not identical to captain/first officer position masks because it has a hand operated switch at the mid position on the oxygen mask hose to operate its oxygen mask microphone. Maintenance/flight control had FBO's mechanic tape the switch to a 'hot' position and switched the observer's mask and the captain's mask. Logbook was signed off under MEL 35-1B. I would not depart until I had teletype message from someone in a policy making position with my company saying I could depart with the equipment in this condition. En route ACARS message was received nearing vuz that crew was totally reassigned for the remainder of the day, adding an additional 6 hours of duty to what was assigned. This requested confirmation via ACARS to crew schedules. First officer was talking to ZTL, talking on PA to passenger and then getting mem ATIS. I was flying to vuz and then to intercept hollysprings arrival to mem, trying to fly the aircraft and trying to send crew schedules our acknowledgement was too much to do. I overshot vuz by 15 NM before starting turn to intercept outbound radial for arrival. Flying arrival radial was sloppy at best. Fortunately we were in the clear and no aircraft was in our area. I was upset with the company's handling of our MEL item, late and with a potential conflict with training the next day. Self pressured to communicate with crew schedules allowed me to violate the most important dictate for pilots -- fly the aircraft first! I embarrassed myself in front of a very professional and conscientious first officer. I pointed out to him that this should never be allowed to happen. Because of his professionalism, he felt bad that he had not backed me up, but I pointed out that I was the one who should have been flying the aircraft and should not have compromised our route of flight. Hopefully, next time we will call crew schedules on the ground. Nothing could be done about being upset about the handling of our MEL, but that fact should have made me concentrate even more about my flying to suppress my concern about the MEL.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR FLYING ACFT FAILED TO TURN AT TURNING FIX.

Narrative: DURING PREFLT, CAPT DISCOVERED AN INOP OXYGEN MASK. MAINT/FLT CTL BRINGS STRONG PRESSURE TO BEAR ON ME TO ACCEPT RELEASE UNDER MEL 35-1B. THIS CLRLY ONLY RELATES TO MAKING COCKPIT OBSERVER POS INOP DUE TO AN INOP OBSERVER MASK. THIS MASK IS NOT IDENTICAL TO CAPT/FO POS MASKS BECAUSE IT HAS A HAND OPERATED SWITCH AT THE MID POS ON THE OXYGEN MASK HOSE TO OPERATE ITS OXYGEN MASK MIKE. MAINT/FLT CTL HAD FBO'S MECH TAPE THE SWITCH TO A 'HOT' POS AND SWITCHED THE OBSERVER'S MASK AND THE CAPT'S MASK. LOGBOOK WAS SIGNED OFF UNDER MEL 35-1B. I WOULD NOT DEPART UNTIL I HAD TELETYPE MESSAGE FROM SOMEONE IN A POLICY MAKING POS WITH MY COMPANY SAYING I COULD DEPART WITH THE EQUIP IN THIS CONDITION. ENRTE ACARS MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED NEARING VUZ THAT CREW WAS TOTALLY REASSIGNED FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE DAY, ADDING AN ADDITIONAL 6 HRS OF DUTY TO WHAT WAS ASSIGNED. THIS REQUESTED CONFIRMATION VIA ACARS TO CREW SCHEDULES. FO WAS TALKING TO ZTL, TALKING ON PA TO PAX AND THEN GETTING MEM ATIS. I WAS FLYING TO VUZ AND THEN TO INTERCEPT HOLLYSPRINGS ARR TO MEM, TRYING TO FLY THE ACFT AND TRYING TO SEND CREW SCHEDULES OUR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WAS TOO MUCH TO DO. I OVERSHOT VUZ BY 15 NM BEFORE STARTING TURN TO INTERCEPT OUTBOUND RADIAL FOR ARR. FLYING ARR RADIAL WAS SLOPPY AT BEST. FORTUNATELY WE WERE IN THE CLR AND NO ACFT WAS IN OUR AREA. I WAS UPSET WITH THE COMPANY'S HANDLING OF OUR MEL ITEM, LATE AND WITH A POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH TRAINING THE NEXT DAY. SELF PRESSURED TO COMMUNICATE WITH CREW SCHEDULES ALLOWED ME TO VIOLATE THE MOST IMPORTANT DICTATE FOR PLTS -- FLY THE ACFT FIRST! I EMBARRASSED MYSELF IN FRONT OF A VERY PROFESSIONAL AND CONSCIENTIOUS FO. I POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT THIS SHOULD NEVER BE ALLOWED TO HAPPEN. BECAUSE OF HIS PROFESSIONALISM, HE FELT BAD THAT HE HAD NOT BACKED ME UP, BUT I POINTED OUT THAT I WAS THE ONE WHO SHOULD HAVE BEEN FLYING THE ACFT AND SHOULD NOT HAVE COMPROMISED OUR RTE OF FLT. HOPEFULLY, NEXT TIME WE WILL CALL CREW SCHEDULES ON THE GND. NOTHING COULD BE DONE ABOUT BEING UPSET ABOUT THE HANDLING OF OUR MEL, BUT THAT FACT SHOULD HAVE MADE ME CONCENTRATE EVEN MORE ABOUT MY FLYING TO SUPPRESS MY CONCERN ABOUT THE MEL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.