Narrative:

As PF landed, I think without hearing, cleared to land from tower. PNF was working radios. We do not know if tower gave a clearance to land and we were not on frequency or if tower even gave the clearance. Problem was discovered after landing and calling clear of runway to tower. The PNF then told me, the PF, I don't think I talked to tower for landing clearance. I am still on approach frequency. Contributing factors: I had been flying all month long. The PNF was a captain on a different type aircraft and had been displaced back to an first officer. He was very experienced and did not miss much at all and a very professional pilot. We had flown together to some very high traffic airports during this month and he, the first officer, performed his job with very high standards. I had no reason to think he wouldn't receive the landing clearance. I think I had gotten a little complacent with this first officer. Also, the WX was VFR, smooth air, and visibility 15 plus mi. Approach was busy with parallel runways and had aircraft 3 mi in trail and approach control cleared us for the visual approach but did not remind us to call tower. I, the PF, was busy flying '1/2 DOT' high on GS behind a 727 for wake turbulence and also watching the traffic on my left, landing on the parallel runway. When the 727 cleared the high speed taxiway I said runway is clear, 'are we cleared?' the PNF said 'you are clear.' so, I think there was some misunderstanding of what I was asking. I was referring to, cleared to land. The PNF was talking about cleared for the visual. All of this was inside the OM. I do admit to being fixated on the landing and should have had more cockpit awareness during this phase. I now have added to the completion of the before landing checklist 'are we cleared to land.' supplemental information from acn 300421: 2 things I feel contributed to this occurrence. First, the approach controller never told us to contact the tower. Second, the captain I'm flying with is a check airman who has spent a lot of time instructing in the simulator. He is known for overbriefing. This visual approach was briefed for every possibility. After flying with him for almost a month, I am still distracted by this. It is hard to disagree with his view that he is being 'safer' by having the crew thoroughly briefed about every possibility. However, his rigid approach to the briefings harms, I believe, the cockpit resource management concept. I believe I was distracted just enough to overlook the switchover to the tower.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LNDG WITHOUT CLRNC FROM THE TWR.

Narrative: AS PF LANDED, I THINK WITHOUT HEARING, CLRED TO LAND FROM TWR. PNF WAS WORKING RADIOS. WE DO NOT KNOW IF TWR GAVE A CLRNC TO LAND AND WE WERE NOT ON FREQ OR IF TWR EVEN GAVE THE CLRNC. PROB WAS DISCOVERED AFTER LNDG AND CALLING CLR OF RWY TO TWR. THE PNF THEN TOLD ME, THE PF, I DON'T THINK I TALKED TO TWR FOR LNDG CLRNC. I AM STILL ON APCH FREQ. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: I HAD BEEN FLYING ALL MONTH LONG. THE PNF WAS A CAPT ON A DIFFERENT TYPE ACFT AND HAD BEEN DISPLACED BACK TO AN FO. HE WAS VERY EXPERIENCED AND DID NOT MISS MUCH AT ALL AND A VERY PROFESSIONAL PLT. WE HAD FLOWN TOGETHER TO SOME VERY HIGH TFC ARPTS DURING THIS MONTH AND HE, THE FO, PERFORMED HIS JOB WITH VERY HIGH STANDARDS. I HAD NO REASON TO THINK HE WOULDN'T RECEIVE THE LNDG CLRNC. I THINK I HAD GOTTEN A LITTLE COMPLACENT WITH THIS FO. ALSO, THE WX WAS VFR, SMOOTH AIR, AND VISIBILITY 15 PLUS MI. APCH WAS BUSY WITH PARALLEL RWYS AND HAD ACFT 3 MI IN TRAIL AND APCH CTL CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL APCH BUT DID NOT REMIND US TO CALL TWR. I, THE PF, WAS BUSY FLYING '1/2 DOT' HIGH ON GS BEHIND A 727 FOR WAKE TURB AND ALSO WATCHING THE TFC ON MY L, LNDG ON THE PARALLEL RWY. WHEN THE 727 CLRED THE HIGH SPD TXWY I SAID RWY IS CLR, 'ARE WE CLRED?' THE PNF SAID 'YOU ARE CLR.' SO, I THINK THERE WAS SOME MISUNDERSTANDING OF WHAT I WAS ASKING. I WAS REFERRING TO, CLRED TO LAND. THE PNF WAS TALKING ABOUT CLRED FOR THE VISUAL. ALL OF THIS WAS INSIDE THE OM. I DO ADMIT TO BEING FIXATED ON THE LNDG AND SHOULD HAVE HAD MORE COCKPIT AWARENESS DURING THIS PHASE. I NOW HAVE ADDED TO THE COMPLETION OF THE BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST 'ARE WE CLRED TO LAND.' SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 300421: 2 THINGS I FEEL CONTRIBUTED TO THIS OCCURRENCE. FIRST, THE APCH CTLR NEVER TOLD US TO CONTACT THE TWR. SECOND, THE CAPT I'M FLYING WITH IS A CHK AIRMAN WHO HAS SPENT A LOT OF TIME INSTRUCTING IN THE SIMULATOR. HE IS KNOWN FOR OVERBRIEFING. THIS VISUAL APCH WAS BRIEFED FOR EVERY POSSIBILITY. AFTER FLYING WITH HIM FOR ALMOST A MONTH, I AM STILL DISTRACTED BY THIS. IT IS HARD TO DISAGREE WITH HIS VIEW THAT HE IS BEING 'SAFER' BY HAVING THE CREW THOROUGHLY BRIEFED ABOUT EVERY POSSIBILITY. HOWEVER, HIS RIGID APCH TO THE BRIEFINGS HARMS, I BELIEVE, THE COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT CONCEPT. I BELIEVE I WAS DISTRACTED JUST ENOUGH TO OVERLOOK THE SWITCHOVER TO THE TWR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.