Narrative:

On approach to washington national airport on bucko 4 arrival at 15000 ft. Dulles approach cleared us to maintain 15000 ft until trixy intersection, then cross armel at 8000 ft. I acknowledged clearance. First officer, who was flying, seemed to understand. A moment later, first officer began his descent, exclaiming that he was high. He was descending to cross trixy at 8000 ft. By the time I realized we weren't to trixy yet, we were at 14000 ft. We corrected and went back to 15000 ft. The controller didn't say anything. Once handed off to national approach, a cessna conquest was right below us so we were unable to descend. Approach vectored us around and we were finally cleared to descend and then cleared the river visual approach to runway 18 at dca. We were a little high, but not unreasonably so, the same cessna conquest was landing on runway 15. The first officer was maneuvering along the river which lines up to runway 15. Before I knew what was happening we were low and lined up for a runway 15 landing. I pointed this out to the first officer and he maneuvered for a runway 18 landing. We were not wings level and on centerline until 150 ft AGL. After landing, the controller instructed us to turn right on 'a' cross runway 21 and contact ground. I saw the 'a' taxiway designator and turned right. The problem was I made a hard right when I should have made a 90 degree right, I didn't realize this mistake until committed to taxiway 'J.' I stopped immediately and asked the first officer to ask tower if taxiway 'J' was ok. I had already passed the hold short lines, but we were still clear of the runway. A business jet was turning a close final. The tower was talking non stop and we couldn't get a word in. I finally managed to break in and said we were encroaching the runway. Tower said to hold short. Then he had the bizjet go around. Then we were cleared to the gate. No one said another word. I don't know how many times I've told myself to just slow down when things start happening. It's so easy to let one mistake snowball into another. I was rattled by the altitude excursion. I was concerned when we were high. I was really rattled with maneuvering down low on short final - I was still very rattled turning off the runway and letting my defenses down thinking it was all over. A personal opinion: if mr. FAA wants zero accidents, he needs to eliminate approachs such as the river visual to dca. Supplemental information from acn 302440: during the rollout the tower issued taxi instructions which included a turn off which we were unable to make because of our speed at that point. The controller then issued another set of instructions which included a 'turn at 'alpha', another right turn on 'charlie,' cross runway 21 to the ramp, contact ground on 121.xx.' while these instructions were being given the aircraft was in reverse thrust and braking was being applied. It was my landing so my primary attention was focused on directional control and slowing the aircraft. The captain was monitoring and giving the specified speed callouts. We made the right turn off of runway 18 at 'alpha' and then, perhaps because of a misunderstood clearance coupled with an unfamiliarity with the airport, the captain made another right turn - as per clearance - but turned northbound on 'juliet.' he immediately realized his error and brought the aircraft to a stop. As an aside, the cockpit of a B-737 can be very noisy when you have both engines in reverse and the crew workload can be very high with both pilots concentrating on directional control and braking. This is a very poor time for controllers to issue taxi clearance/instructions. Why do they feel compelled to do it??

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTH RWY ENTRY OP.

Narrative: ON APCH TO WASHINGTON NATIONAL ARPT ON BUCKO 4 ARR AT 15000 FT. DULLES APCH CLRED US TO MAINTAIN 15000 FT UNTIL TRIXY INTXN, THEN CROSS ARMEL AT 8000 FT. I ACKNOWLEDGED CLRNC. FO, WHO WAS FLYING, SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND. A MOMENT LATER, FO BEGAN HIS DSCNT, EXCLAIMING THAT HE WAS HIGH. HE WAS DSNDING TO CROSS TRIXY AT 8000 FT. BY THE TIME I REALIZED WE WEREN'T TO TRIXY YET, WE WERE AT 14000 FT. WE CORRECTED AND WENT BACK TO 15000 FT. THE CTLR DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING. ONCE HANDED OFF TO NATIONAL APCH, A CESSNA CONQUEST WAS RIGHT BELOW US SO WE WERE UNABLE TO DSND. APCH VECTORED US AROUND AND WE WERE FINALLY CLRED TO DSND AND THEN CLRED THE RIVER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 18 AT DCA. WE WERE A LITTLE HIGH, BUT NOT UNREASONABLY SO, THE SAME CESSNA CONQUEST WAS LNDG ON RWY 15. THE FO WAS MANEUVERING ALONG THE RIVER WHICH LINES UP TO RWY 15. BEFORE I KNEW WHAT WAS HAPPENING WE WERE LOW AND LINED UP FOR A RWY 15 LNDG. I POINTED THIS OUT TO THE FO AND HE MANEUVERED FOR A RWY 18 LNDG. WE WERE NOT WINGS LEVEL AND ON CTRLINE UNTIL 150 FT AGL. AFTER LNDG, THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO TURN R ON 'A' CROSS RWY 21 AND CONTACT GND. I SAW THE 'A' TXWY DESIGNATOR AND TURNED R. THE PROB WAS I MADE A HARD R WHEN I SHOULD HAVE MADE A 90 DEG R, I DIDN'T REALIZE THIS MISTAKE UNTIL COMMITTED TO TXWY 'J.' I STOPPED IMMEDIATELY AND ASKED THE FO TO ASK TWR IF TXWY 'J' WAS OK. I HAD ALREADY PASSED THE HOLD SHORT LINES, BUT WE WERE STILL CLR OF THE RWY. A BUSINESS JET WAS TURNING A CLOSE FINAL. THE TWR WAS TALKING NON STOP AND WE COULDN'T GET A WORD IN. I FINALLY MANAGED TO BREAK IN AND SAID WE WERE ENCROACHING THE RWY. TWR SAID TO HOLD SHORT. THEN HE HAD THE BIZJET GAR. THEN WE WERE CLRED TO THE GATE. NO ONE SAID ANOTHER WORD. I DON'T KNOW HOW MANY TIMES I'VE TOLD MYSELF TO JUST SLOW DOWN WHEN THINGS START HAPPENING. IT'S SO EASY TO LET ONE MISTAKE SNOWBALL INTO ANOTHER. I WAS RATTLED BY THE ALT EXCURSION. I WAS CONCERNED WHEN WE WERE HIGH. I WAS REALLY RATTLED WITH MANEUVERING DOWN LOW ON SHORT FINAL - I WAS STILL VERY RATTLED TURNING OFF THE RWY AND LETTING MY DEFENSES DOWN THINKING IT WAS ALL OVER. A PERSONAL OPINION: IF MR. FAA WANTS ZERO ACCIDENTS, HE NEEDS TO ELIMINATE APCHS SUCH AS THE RIVER VISUAL TO DCA. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 302440: DURING THE ROLLOUT THE TWR ISSUED TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WHICH INCLUDED A TURN OFF WHICH WE WERE UNABLE TO MAKE BECAUSE OF OUR SPD AT THAT POINT. THE CTLR THEN ISSUED ANOTHER SET OF INSTRUCTIONS WHICH INCLUDED A 'TURN AT 'ALPHA', ANOTHER R TURN ON 'CHARLIE,' CROSS RWY 21 TO THE RAMP, CONTACT GND ON 121.XX.' WHILE THESE INSTRUCTIONS WERE BEING GIVEN THE ACFT WAS IN REVERSE THRUST AND BRAKING WAS BEING APPLIED. IT WAS MY LNDG SO MY PRIMARY ATTN WAS FOCUSED ON DIRECTIONAL CTL AND SLOWING THE ACFT. THE CAPT WAS MONITORING AND GIVING THE SPECIFIED SPD CALLOUTS. WE MADE THE R TURN OFF OF RWY 18 AT 'ALPHA' AND THEN, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF A MISUNDERSTOOD CLRNC COUPLED WITH AN UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE ARPT, THE CAPT MADE ANOTHER R TURN - AS PER CLRNC - BUT TURNED NBOUND ON 'JULIET.' HE IMMEDIATELY REALIZED HIS ERROR AND BROUGHT THE ACFT TO A STOP. AS AN ASIDE, THE COCKPIT OF A B-737 CAN BE VERY NOISY WHEN YOU HAVE BOTH ENGS IN REVERSE AND THE CREW WORKLOAD CAN BE VERY HIGH WITH BOTH PLTS CONCENTRATING ON DIRECTIONAL CTL AND BRAKING. THIS IS A VERY POOR TIME FOR CTLRS TO ISSUE TAXI CLRNC/INSTRUCTIONS. WHY DO THEY FEEL COMPELLED TO DO IT??

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.