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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 306130 |
Time | |
Date | 199505 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : mem |
State Reference | TN |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | Other Other |
Flight Phase | ground other : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : commercial pilot : instrument pilot : private pilot : flight engineer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 120 flight time total : 8500 flight time type : 200 |
ASRS Report | 306130 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | incursion : runway non adherence : clearance |
Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Preflight was uneventful and cargo loading was on time. The captain, 55 yrs old, began to complain about the irus not aligning right. This was our last flight of the month together for may and he generally complained about something in each of our previous flts. I have had several hours of cockpit resource management training and felt comfortable asserting professional remarks/advice when needed. My motto is 'when in doubt, shout.' the captain, prior to may's schedule, had been off for 3.5 months for some medical care. I have been in this type aircraft for 10 full months. We had clearance to push back from air carrier ramp/tower. We taxied to our exit point where we contacted mem ground. All appropriate checklists were called for and completed up to the final portion of the takeoff checklist. It was my leg to fly from mem-ont. Normally runway 27 is not always available and we use runway 18R. I asked ground control if we could expect runway 27, and the reply was 'yes, taxi to runway 27, I have an aircraft on final for runway 18L.' since it was my leg, I looked down to see if the FMS, flap, departure frequency, transponder code were right. When I looked up, the captain had already begun to take runway 27. I told him I don't believe we have clearance to position and hold. I immediately called tower and they replied we were not given position and hold. At this point, not sure myself, I said I thought we were. Upset at what happened, I collected myself to ensure all checklists were in fact completed. We were then given clearance to takeoff. I know now not to get so involved with the FMS until arriving at the next hold short point. Once airborne, I administered some cockpit resource management and asked if he thought we might get a violation. He said no, 'because other pilots have done worse and never received one.' I personally find that not true. Mem controllers have always been professional and, yes we all make mistakes. I feel my air carrier has a great rapport with mem and the entire industry. What I don't like is the captain's attitude. No, I am not reporting this because of him, I am just as responsible and feel bad I allowed him to take the runway. I still remember the accident in lax. I have reported this to my flight manager and safety department.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: RWY INCURSION, FLC TOOK THE RWY WITHOUT CLRNC.
Narrative: PREFLT WAS UNEVENTFUL AND CARGO LOADING WAS ON TIME. THE CAPT, 55 YRS OLD, BEGAN TO COMPLAIN ABOUT THE IRUS NOT ALIGNING RIGHT. THIS WAS OUR LAST FLT OF THE MONTH TOGETHER FOR MAY AND HE GENERALLY COMPLAINED ABOUT SOMETHING IN EACH OF OUR PREVIOUS FLTS. I HAVE HAD SEVERAL HRS OF COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT TRAINING AND FELT COMFORTABLE ASSERTING PROFESSIONAL REMARKS/ADVICE WHEN NEEDED. MY MOTTO IS 'WHEN IN DOUBT, SHOUT.' THE CAPT, PRIOR TO MAY'S SCHEDULE, HAD BEEN OFF FOR 3.5 MONTHS FOR SOME MEDICAL CARE. I HAVE BEEN IN THIS TYPE ACFT FOR 10 FULL MONTHS. WE HAD CLRNC TO PUSH BACK FROM ACR RAMP/TWR. WE TAXIED TO OUR EXIT POINT WHERE WE CONTACTED MEM GND. ALL APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS WERE CALLED FOR AND COMPLETED UP TO THE FINAL PORTION OF THE TKOF CHKLIST. IT WAS MY LEG TO FLY FROM MEM-ONT. NORMALLY RWY 27 IS NOT ALWAYS AVAILABLE AND WE USE RWY 18R. I ASKED GND CTL IF WE COULD EXPECT RWY 27, AND THE REPLY WAS 'YES, TAXI TO RWY 27, I HAVE AN ACFT ON FINAL FOR RWY 18L.' SINCE IT WAS MY LEG, I LOOKED DOWN TO SEE IF THE FMS, FLAP, DEP FREQ, XPONDER CODE WERE RIGHT. WHEN I LOOKED UP, THE CAPT HAD ALREADY BEGUN TO TAKE RWY 27. I TOLD HIM I DON'T BELIEVE WE HAVE CLRNC TO POS AND HOLD. I IMMEDIATELY CALLED TWR AND THEY REPLIED WE WERE NOT GIVEN POS AND HOLD. AT THIS POINT, NOT SURE MYSELF, I SAID I THOUGHT WE WERE. UPSET AT WHAT HAPPENED, I COLLECTED MYSELF TO ENSURE ALL CHKLISTS WERE IN FACT COMPLETED. WE WERE THEN GIVEN CLRNC TO TKOF. I KNOW NOW NOT TO GET SO INVOLVED WITH THE FMS UNTIL ARRIVING AT THE NEXT HOLD SHORT POINT. ONCE AIRBORNE, I ADMINISTERED SOME COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT AND ASKED IF HE THOUGHT WE MIGHT GET A VIOLATION. HE SAID NO, 'BECAUSE OTHER PLTS HAVE DONE WORSE AND NEVER RECEIVED ONE.' I PERSONALLY FIND THAT NOT TRUE. MEM CTLRS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN PROFESSIONAL AND, YES WE ALL MAKE MISTAKES. I FEEL MY ACR HAS A GREAT RAPPORT WITH MEM AND THE ENTIRE INDUSTRY. WHAT I DON'T LIKE IS THE CAPT'S ATTITUDE. NO, I AM NOT RPTING THIS BECAUSE OF HIM, I AM JUST AS RESPONSIBLE AND FEEL BAD I ALLOWED HIM TO TAKE THE RWY. I STILL REMEMBER THE ACCIDENT IN LAX. I HAVE RPTED THIS TO MY FLT MGR AND SAFETY DEPT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.