Narrative:

On aug/xx/95 I was serving as first officer on flight from lima, peru, to miami, fl. The flight landed at mia at approximately XY00 am local. During taxi in, operations confirmed 'gate ab APU off.' approaching gate, the captain acquired the guide person and followed hand signals to the proper parking position. Upon receiving a stop signal, I observed the captain pulling the parking brake handle up and the parking brake EICAS message appear on the forward panel. The captain called for shutdown of engine #2 at which time I moved the #2 fuel control switch to cut-off. This was followed by numerous aural warnings and EICAS messages as the #2 engine began to shut down. During this time I observed the captain move his seat to the full aft position and began his shutdown flow on the overhead panel. Sometime during this time frame the captain switched on the cockpit flood lights and the cockpit interior was illuminated with bright lights. During the next few moments, I was monitoring the external power available light when the captain began to quickly move his seat back to the forward position and commented, 'I think we are moving.' at this point I observed the captain apply the brakes and again pull the parking brake handle up. I looked out the forward cockpit window and it appeared that we were closer to the concourse than when the captain had first set the parking brake. Within a short period of time, a ground personnel made contact to us via the interphone and informed us that the aircraft was beyond the proper stop line and would have to be pushed back before the jetway could be moved. The captain started the APU and once it was available he called for the shutdown of engine #1. Several mins later, the ground personnel once again via interphone informed us that the tug was in place and requested us to release our brakes at which time we were pushed back several ft. Upon setting the parking brake at the ground personnel's request, the parking checklist was completed. We then began to pack up our flight kits and exited the cockpit. While passing the forward galley, a ground personnel informed me that the right engine cowling had come in contact with a belt loader and the aircraft would be taken OTS. The cause of this event is under study by our company's safety department. This particular aircraft fleet has had several such occurrences in which the aircraft continued to move after the parking brake was set. Manufacturer should look into this problem further. In addition, a new procedure should be implemented to have a ground personnel place chocks under the aircraft wheels and notify the cockpit crew that they are in place before any parking checklist is started or any ground vehicles are allowed to approach the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NIGHT RAMP OP ACFT PARKING PROC. ACFT DAMAGED.

Narrative: ON AUG/XX/95 I WAS SERVING AS FO ON FLT FROM LIMA, PERU, TO MIAMI, FL. THE FLT LANDED AT MIA AT APPROX XY00 AM LCL. DURING TAXI IN, OPS CONFIRMED 'GATE AB APU OFF.' APCHING GATE, THE CAPT ACQUIRED THE GUIDE PERSON AND FOLLOWED HAND SIGNALS TO THE PROPER PARKING POS. UPON RECEIVING A STOP SIGNAL, I OBSERVED THE CAPT PULLING THE PARKING BRAKE HANDLE UP AND THE PARKING BRAKE EICAS MESSAGE APPEAR ON THE FORWARD PANEL. THE CAPT CALLED FOR SHUTDOWN OF ENG #2 AT WHICH TIME I MOVED THE #2 FUEL CTL SWITCH TO CUT-OFF. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY NUMEROUS AURAL WARNINGS AND EICAS MESSAGES AS THE #2 ENG BEGAN TO SHUT DOWN. DURING THIS TIME I OBSERVED THE CAPT MOVE HIS SEAT TO THE FULL AFT POS AND BEGAN HIS SHUTDOWN FLOW ON THE OVERHEAD PANEL. SOMETIME DURING THIS TIME FRAME THE CAPT SWITCHED ON THE COCKPIT FLOOD LIGHTS AND THE COCKPIT INTERIOR WAS ILLUMINATED WITH BRIGHT LIGHTS. DURING THE NEXT FEW MOMENTS, I WAS MONITORING THE EXTERNAL PWR AVAILABLE LIGHT WHEN THE CAPT BEGAN TO QUICKLY MOVE HIS SEAT BACK TO THE FORWARD POS AND COMMENTED, 'I THINK WE ARE MOVING.' AT THIS POINT I OBSERVED THE CAPT APPLY THE BRAKES AND AGAIN PULL THE PARKING BRAKE HANDLE UP. I LOOKED OUT THE FORWARD COCKPIT WINDOW AND IT APPEARED THAT WE WERE CLOSER TO THE CONCOURSE THAN WHEN THE CAPT HAD FIRST SET THE PARKING BRAKE. WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, A GND PERSONNEL MADE CONTACT TO US VIA THE INTERPHONE AND INFORMED US THAT THE ACFT WAS BEYOND THE PROPER STOP LINE AND WOULD HAVE TO BE PUSHED BACK BEFORE THE JETWAY COULD BE MOVED. THE CAPT STARTED THE APU AND ONCE IT WAS AVAILABLE HE CALLED FOR THE SHUTDOWN OF ENG #1. SEVERAL MINS LATER, THE GND PERSONNEL ONCE AGAIN VIA INTERPHONE INFORMED US THAT THE TUG WAS IN PLACE AND REQUESTED US TO RELEASE OUR BRAKES AT WHICH TIME WE WERE PUSHED BACK SEVERAL FT. UPON SETTING THE PARKING BRAKE AT THE GND PERSONNEL'S REQUEST, THE PARKING CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED. WE THEN BEGAN TO PACK UP OUR FLT KITS AND EXITED THE COCKPIT. WHILE PASSING THE FORWARD GALLEY, A GND PERSONNEL INFORMED ME THAT THE R ENG COWLING HAD COME IN CONTACT WITH A BELT LOADER AND THE ACFT WOULD BE TAKEN OTS. THE CAUSE OF THIS EVENT IS UNDER STUDY BY OUR COMPANY'S SAFETY DEPT. THIS PARTICULAR ACFT FLEET HAS HAD SEVERAL SUCH OCCURRENCES IN WHICH THE ACFT CONTINUED TO MOVE AFTER THE PARKING BRAKE WAS SET. MANUFACTURER SHOULD LOOK INTO THIS PROB FURTHER. IN ADDITION, A NEW PROC SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED TO HAVE A GND PERSONNEL PLACE CHOCKS UNDER THE ACFT WHEELS AND NOTIFY THE COCKPIT CREW THAT THEY ARE IN PLACE BEFORE ANY PARKING CHKLIST IS STARTED OR ANY GND VEHICLES ARE ALLOWED TO APCH THE ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.