Narrative:

On oct/xx/95, I boarded my flight at XA00 local, for a scheduled departure of XA40. I introduced myself to the crew, and informed them that the purpose of my travel was to attend my 6 month recurrent ground school. I was not acquainted with either the captain or first officer, nor the newly hired so. After presenting my completed jumpseat documentation, I promptly occupied the rear jumpseat on this B727 aircraft. The so inquired as to my familiarity with aircraft, and as I confirmed that I had indeed been on board a B727, this was the extent of my briefing by any crew member on this flight. While awaiting our departure time and load complete papers, I queried the captain as to where he was from. The pilot occupying the right seat promptly replied, which one, we are both capts! You are in good hands.' one of them resided on the east coast, the other on the west. They informed me that this was their last flight of the day, and would both be going into days off upon its completion. This was our only conversation prior to the forthcoming 'conflict.' as we taxied out to the active runway, the so pressurized the aircraft. The gasper fan was on, and the cabin distribution lever was in the full overhead position, making the cockpit extremely noisy (especially in the aft jumpseat location). The aircraft was stopped approximately 500 ft prior to the hold short line of the active departure runway. The total distance from where we were parked to the brakes set position was less than 2/10 of a mi. The captain seated in the left seat was facing forward and was delivering in a low tone to the other 2 crew members what sounded like a crenormal briefing. The bits and pieces that I could hear sounded familiar, indicating a normal briefing and a routine/normal takeoff and flight. Then, he leaned his head back towards the overhead panel, and I thought I heard him tell the flight engineer to turn off the hydraulic power to the rudders after flap retraction. He further illustrated by stating 'it's these 3 switches.' they were mumbling and clumsily discussing the procedure, with no clear reference or procedure understood by all. I reacted by stating that 'no, you don't want to do that.' they all 3 promptly turned to stare at me, as if noticing my presence for the first time. I continued, 'by doing this, you will unpower the rudders for flight.' they responded by informing me that this aircraft had been operated in this manner for several preceding flts, and that this was in accordance with approved company procedures. I responded that 'no fool in their right mind would intentionally initiate an emergency situation,' and further inquired as to the type of flight that was being conducted (ie, ferry flight, test flight, maintenance, etc). I inquired of the captain located in the right seat as to his present pilot status, was he a management pilot? As I did not receive a response as to the type of flight being conducted, I again questioned them on this. The only crew member that I had direct eye contact with was the captain located in the right seat. I noticed that he was becoming angry, as the blood vessels were raised on the side of his neck. I was told to situation down and shut up! Following this directive, I informed them that I would appreciate being allowed to exit the aircraft. As this situation was escalating and totally incomprehensible to me, I felt that it was not worth the potential cost to reach my destination. I was then informed that the captain in the right seat was performing IOE for the newly upgraded 'captain' in the left seat, and that I obviously was incapable of comprehending what was going on. I responded to this statement by informing the IOE captain that I indeed was familiar with this type of training, as I myself had been a check airman on the B727 10 yrs prior. By this time the flight engineer had located the appropriate MEL reference for crew review, to which he directed my attention. It briefly stated that normal power to the lower rudder was to be replaced with standby hydraulics. They then asked me whether or not this company approved procedure met with my satisfaction? I responded to this question by affirming that I did indeed see that there was a company procedure for this action, but was unsure as to whetheror not it was completely understood or being enacted by any of the crew. I additionally added that I felt that this procedure was in direct opposition to the manufacturer's operating manual. It was difficult for me to comprehend their actions, as the boeing procedure is less restrictive, and normally utilized for test flight operations (ie, not intended for normal far part 121 operations). I have performed many of these such test flts with boeing company personnel, and feel confident that this would not be an approved procedure for normal/extended use. A standby system should be just that, for standby/emergency use. Following my response, I was informed by the crew that I had no right to question their actions, or any written procedure that they were referencing, and that I was to situation down and shut up. My final response to this fiasco was an apology, and to inform them that I was being transported against my will. I promptly sat down, fastened my seat belt, closed my eyes and remained silent until arriving at my destination. I was virtual cargo. This entire episode occupied approximately 90 seconds of the crews' time. The flight departed the gate 14 mins early. No delay was suffered during any regime of flight. At no time were my intentions anything other than the safe and expeditious transportation of this aircraft to its destination. My concern was escalated to actual fear when I was unable to effectively communicate my safety concerns to any of these 3 'qualified' crew members. To the best of my knowledge, CRM represents cockpit resource management, not totalitarianism. This cockpit was a medley of mayhem and confusion, devoid of safety and lacking communication.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MEL REQUIREMENTS AND FLC RELATED PROCS IN A B727 CHALLENGED BY JUMPSEAT RIDER.

Narrative: ON OCT/XX/95, I BOARDED MY FLT AT XA00 LCL, FOR A SCHEDULED DEP OF XA40. I INTRODUCED MYSELF TO THE CREW, AND INFORMED THEM THAT THE PURPOSE OF MY TRAVEL WAS TO ATTEND MY 6 MONTH RECURRENT GND SCHOOL. I WAS NOT ACQUAINTED WITH EITHER THE CAPT OR FO, NOR THE NEWLY HIRED SO. AFTER PRESENTING MY COMPLETED JUMPSEAT DOCUMENTATION, I PROMPTLY OCCUPIED THE REAR JUMPSEAT ON THIS B727 ACFT. THE SO INQUIRED AS TO MY FAMILIARITY WITH ACFT, AND AS I CONFIRMED THAT I HAD INDEED BEEN ON BOARD A B727, THIS WAS THE EXTENT OF MY BRIEFING BY ANY CREW MEMBER ON THIS FLT. WHILE AWAITING OUR DEP TIME AND LOAD COMPLETE PAPERS, I QUERIED THE CAPT AS TO WHERE HE WAS FROM. THE PLT OCCUPYING THE R SEAT PROMPTLY REPLIED, WHICH ONE, WE ARE BOTH CAPTS! YOU ARE IN GOOD HANDS.' ONE OF THEM RESIDED ON THE E COAST, THE OTHER ON THE W. THEY INFORMED ME THAT THIS WAS THEIR LAST FLT OF THE DAY, AND WOULD BOTH BE GOING INTO DAYS OFF UPON ITS COMPLETION. THIS WAS OUR ONLY CONVERSATION PRIOR TO THE FORTHCOMING 'CONFLICT.' AS WE TAXIED OUT TO THE ACTIVE RWY, THE SO PRESSURIZED THE ACFT. THE GASPER FAN WAS ON, AND THE CABIN DISTRIBUTION LEVER WAS IN THE FULL OVERHEAD POS, MAKING THE COCKPIT EXTREMELY NOISY (ESPECIALLY IN THE AFT JUMPSEAT LOCATION). THE ACFT WAS STOPPED APPROX 500 FT PRIOR TO THE HOLD SHORT LINE OF THE ACTIVE DEP RWY. THE TOTAL DISTANCE FROM WHERE WE WERE PARKED TO THE BRAKES SET POS WAS LESS THAN 2/10 OF A MI. THE CAPT SEATED IN THE L SEAT WAS FACING FORWARD AND WAS DELIVERING IN A LOW TONE TO THE OTHER 2 CREW MEMBERS WHAT SOUNDED LIKE A CRENORMAL BRIEFING. THE BITS AND PIECES THAT I COULD HEAR SOUNDED FAMILIAR, INDICATING A NORMAL BRIEFING AND A ROUTINE/NORMAL TKOF AND FLT. THEN, HE LEANED HIS HEAD BACK TOWARDS THE OVERHEAD PANEL, AND I THOUGHT I HEARD HIM TELL THE FE TO TURN OFF THE HYD PWR TO THE RUDDERS AFTER FLAP RETRACTION. HE FURTHER ILLUSTRATED BY STATING 'IT'S THESE 3 SWITCHES.' THEY WERE MUMBLING AND CLUMSILY DISCUSSING THE PROC, WITH NO CLR REF OR PROC UNDERSTOOD BY ALL. I REACTED BY STATING THAT 'NO, YOU DON'T WANT TO DO THAT.' THEY ALL 3 PROMPTLY TURNED TO STARE AT ME, AS IF NOTICING MY PRESENCE FOR THE FIRST TIME. I CONTINUED, 'BY DOING THIS, YOU WILL UNPOWER THE RUDDERS FOR FLT.' THEY RESPONDED BY INFORMING ME THAT THIS ACFT HAD BEEN OPERATED IN THIS MANNER FOR SEVERAL PRECEDING FLTS, AND THAT THIS WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROVED COMPANY PROCS. I RESPONDED THAT 'NO FOOL IN THEIR RIGHT MIND WOULD INTENTIONALLY INITIATE AN EMER SIT,' AND FURTHER INQUIRED AS TO THE TYPE OF FLT THAT WAS BEING CONDUCTED (IE, FERRY FLT, TEST FLT, MAINT, ETC). I INQUIRED OF THE CAPT LOCATED IN THE R SEAT AS TO HIS PRESENT PLT STATUS, WAS HE A MGMNT PLT? AS I DID NOT RECEIVE A RESPONSE AS TO THE TYPE OF FLT BEING CONDUCTED, I AGAIN QUESTIONED THEM ON THIS. THE ONLY CREW MEMBER THAT I HAD DIRECT EYE CONTACT WITH WAS THE CAPT LOCATED IN THE R SEAT. I NOTICED THAT HE WAS BECOMING ANGRY, AS THE BLOOD VESSELS WERE RAISED ON THE SIDE OF HIS NECK. I WAS TOLD TO SIT DOWN AND SHUT UP! FOLLOWING THIS DIRECTIVE, I INFORMED THEM THAT I WOULD APPRECIATE BEING ALLOWED TO EXIT THE ACFT. AS THIS SIT WAS ESCALATING AND TOTALLY INCOMPREHENSIBLE TO ME, I FELT THAT IT WAS NOT WORTH THE POTENTIAL COST TO REACH MY DEST. I WAS THEN INFORMED THAT THE CAPT IN THE R SEAT WAS PERFORMING IOE FOR THE NEWLY UPGRADED 'CAPT' IN THE L SEAT, AND THAT I OBVIOUSLY WAS INCAPABLE OF COMPREHENDING WHAT WAS GOING ON. I RESPONDED TO THIS STATEMENT BY INFORMING THE IOE CAPT THAT I INDEED WAS FAMILIAR WITH THIS TYPE OF TRAINING, AS I MYSELF HAD BEEN A CHK AIRMAN ON THE B727 10 YRS PRIOR. BY THIS TIME THE FE HAD LOCATED THE APPROPRIATE MEL REF FOR CREW REVIEW, TO WHICH HE DIRECTED MY ATTN. IT BRIEFLY STATED THAT NORMAL PWR TO THE LOWER RUDDER WAS TO BE REPLACED WITH STANDBY HYDS. THEY THEN ASKED ME WHETHER OR NOT THIS COMPANY APPROVED PROC MET WITH MY SATISFACTION? I RESPONDED TO THIS QUESTION BY AFFIRMING THAT I DID INDEED SEE THAT THERE WAS A COMPANY PROC FOR THIS ACTION, BUT WAS UNSURE AS TO WHETHEROR NOT IT WAS COMPLETELY UNDERSTOOD OR BEING ENACTED BY ANY OF THE CREW. I ADDITIONALLY ADDED THAT I FELT THAT THIS PROC WAS IN DIRECT OPPOSITION TO THE MANUFACTURER'S OPERATING MANUAL. IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO COMPREHEND THEIR ACTIONS, AS THE BOEING PROC IS LESS RESTRICTIVE, AND NORMALLY UTILIZED FOR TEST FLT OPS (IE, NOT INTENDED FOR NORMAL FAR PART 121 OPS). I HAVE PERFORMED MANY OF THESE SUCH TEST FLTS WITH BOEING COMPANY PERSONNEL, AND FEEL CONFIDENT THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE AN APPROVED PROC FOR NORMAL/EXTENDED USE. A STANDBY SYS SHOULD BE JUST THAT, FOR STANDBY/EMER USE. FOLLOWING MY RESPONSE, I WAS INFORMED BY THE CREW THAT I HAD NO RIGHT TO QUESTION THEIR ACTIONS, OR ANY WRITTEN PROC THAT THEY WERE REFING, AND THAT I WAS TO SIT DOWN AND SHUT UP. MY FINAL RESPONSE TO THIS FIASCO WAS AN APOLOGY, AND TO INFORM THEM THAT I WAS BEING TRANSPORTED AGAINST MY WILL. I PROMPTLY SAT DOWN, FASTENED MY SEAT BELT, CLOSED MY EYES AND REMAINED SILENT UNTIL ARRIVING AT MY DEST. I WAS VIRTUAL CARGO. THIS ENTIRE EPISODE OCCUPIED APPROX 90 SECONDS OF THE CREWS' TIME. THE FLT DEPARTED THE GATE 14 MINS EARLY. NO DELAY WAS SUFFERED DURING ANY REGIME OF FLT. AT NO TIME WERE MY INTENTIONS ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE SAFE AND EXPEDITIOUS TRANSPORTATION OF THIS ACFT TO ITS DEST. MY CONCERN WAS ESCALATED TO ACTUAL FEAR WHEN I WAS UNABLE TO EFFECTIVELY COMMUNICATE MY SAFETY CONCERNS TO ANY OF THESE 3 'QUALIFIED' CREW MEMBERS. TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, CRM REPRESENTS COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT, NOT TOTALITARIANISM. THIS COCKPIT WAS A MEDLEY OF MAYHEM AND CONFUSION, DEVOID OF SAFETY AND LACKING COM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.