Narrative:

I began a preflight of the aircraft starting at the cabin door on the left side of the aircraft and proceeded around the nose, right side, tail, and left side and ending at the cabin door. When I began the inspection, the first officer was on a 6 ft ladder cleaning the right side cockpit windows. When I completed the inspection, he was in the cockpit. I closed the cabin door and took the captain's seat. The checklist was consulted and the #1 then #2 engines were started. Due to noise considerations, run-ups are done at a remote area of the ramp. As I taxied forward to go to the run-up, the right propeller struck the ladder that the first officer had left next to the fuselage on the right side of the aircraft. When I entered the aircraft, I did not ask the first officer if he had secured the ladder, nor, did he tell me at any time through the start up procedure that the ladder was still in a dangerous area. Although the first officer had been on line several months, I should have monitored his actions more closely and should have looked to see that it was no longer near the aircraft before closing the door. I relied too much on the first officer's judgement. More crew dialogue should have happened concerning the ladder. I have learned not to expect that anyone else has done something. I must check for myself.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER ACFT HAS PROP STRIKE ON LADDER ON START OF TAXI TO RUN-UP AREA.

Narrative: I BEGAN A PREFLT OF THE ACFT STARTING AT THE CABIN DOOR ON THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT AND PROCEEDED AROUND THE NOSE, R SIDE, TAIL, AND L SIDE AND ENDING AT THE CABIN DOOR. WHEN I BEGAN THE INSPECTION, THE FO WAS ON A 6 FT LADDER CLEANING THE R SIDE COCKPIT WINDOWS. WHEN I COMPLETED THE INSPECTION, HE WAS IN THE COCKPIT. I CLOSED THE CABIN DOOR AND TOOK THE CAPT'S SEAT. THE CHKLIST WAS CONSULTED AND THE #1 THEN #2 ENGS WERE STARTED. DUE TO NOISE CONSIDERATIONS, RUN-UPS ARE DONE AT A REMOTE AREA OF THE RAMP. AS I TAXIED FORWARD TO GO TO THE RUN-UP, THE R PROP STRUCK THE LADDER THAT THE FO HAD LEFT NEXT TO THE FUSELAGE ON THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT. WHEN I ENTERED THE ACFT, I DID NOT ASK THE FO IF HE HAD SECURED THE LADDER, NOR, DID HE TELL ME AT ANY TIME THROUGH THE START UP PROC THAT THE LADDER WAS STILL IN A DANGEROUS AREA. ALTHOUGH THE FO HAD BEEN ON LINE SEVERAL MONTHS, I SHOULD HAVE MONITORED HIS ACTIONS MORE CLOSELY AND SHOULD HAVE LOOKED TO SEE THAT IT WAS NO LONGER NEAR THE ACFT BEFORE CLOSING THE DOOR. I RELIED TOO MUCH ON THE FO'S JUDGEMENT. MORE CREW DIALOGUE SHOULD HAVE HAPPENED CONCERNING THE LADDER. I HAVE LEARNED NOT TO EXPECT THAT ANYONE ELSE HAS DONE SOMETHING. I MUST CHK FOR MYSELF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.