37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 324331 |
Time | |
Date | 199512 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : fnt |
State Reference | MI |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 39000 msl bound upper : 39000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zob |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | descent other |
Route In Use | enroute : direct |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | cruise other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : radar |
Qualification | controller : radar |
Experience | controller radar : 10 |
ASRS Report | 324331 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : required legal separation non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | other |
Consequence | faa : investigated |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 1500 vertical : 0 |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Operational Error |
Narrative:
Aircraft X at FL390 needed to be at FL310 to comply with LOA with ZAU. Numerous other flts along the route of flight between FL310 and FL390. These other flts are 'in the way' because of various updates in the system (ie: nrp flts, direct, free flow, etc). Additionally, due to reduction and elimination of dynamic and static restrs, sector is very busy and complex. Altitude restrs need to be updated 'in order to keep pace.' the operational error detection program (oedp) supposedly warns and records operational errors. The oedp never warned of possible conflict between aircraft. Separation was lost and corrective action taken, all before the oedp activated. I'm told the warning phase of the oedp is based on actual altitude, not what the data block reflects. If information in the data block shows aircraft in possible conflict, why not warn or alert controller?
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR X DSCNT THROUGH OCCUPIED ALT HAD LTSS FROM ACR Y. SYS ERROR.
Narrative: ACFT X AT FL390 NEEDED TO BE AT FL310 TO COMPLY WITH LOA WITH ZAU. NUMEROUS OTHER FLTS ALONG THE RTE OF FLT BTWN FL310 AND FL390. THESE OTHER FLTS ARE 'IN THE WAY' BECAUSE OF VARIOUS UPDATES IN THE SYS (IE: NRP FLTS, DIRECT, FREE FLOW, ETC). ADDITIONALLY, DUE TO REDUCTION AND ELIMINATION OF DYNAMIC AND STATIC RESTRS, SECTOR IS VERY BUSY AND COMPLEX. ALT RESTRS NEED TO BE UPDATED 'IN ORDER TO KEEP PACE.' THE OPERATIONAL ERROR DETECTION PROGRAM (OEDP) SUPPOSEDLY WARNS AND RECORDS OPERATIONAL ERRORS. THE OEDP NEVER WARNED OF POSSIBLE CONFLICT BTWN ACFT. SEPARATION WAS LOST AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN, ALL BEFORE THE OEDP ACTIVATED. I'M TOLD THE WARNING PHASE OF THE OEDP IS BASED ON ACTUAL ALT, NOT WHAT THE DATA BLOCK REFLECTS. IF INFO IN THE DATA BLOCK SHOWS ACFT IN POSSIBLE CONFLICT, WHY NOT WARN OR ALERT CTLR?
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.