Narrative:

Over morgantown VOR on westminster 3 arrival to bwi I was given a clearance to 'cross L1210 at 25000 ft and mumsy at 15000 ft.' I read back 'cross L1210 at 25000 ft and mumsy at 11000 ft.' the controller restated clearance to cross mumsy at 15000 ft. The corrected clearance was misinterpreted by me as a new clearance canceling the L1210 restr. I reported leaving 27000 ft and crossed L1210 at about 24000 ft. The controller pointed out the error, there was no apparent traffic conflict. The descent was started earlier than normal for mumsy for several reasons, an unusually strong tailwind gave a ground speed of almost 600 KTS and the preceding aircraft was given a speed restr in the descent so I anticipated the same. Also icing conditions were anticipated prior to mumsy which requires power well above idle thrust in the MD80. Another contributing factor was that the first officer was receiving ATIS and communicating with company so I was 'solo' handling this clearance. Equipment/procedures to prevent recurrence: ATIS printer in cockpit and a procedure for flight attendants to communicate required services (wheelchairs, etc) before pushback and for pilots to call them in well before descent. This could prevent 'solo' handling of radios in critical phase of flight (descent).

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC FAILS TO MAKE XING RESTR.

Narrative: OVER MORGANTOWN VOR ON WESTMINSTER 3 ARR TO BWI I WAS GIVEN A CLRNC TO 'CROSS L1210 AT 25000 FT AND MUMSY AT 15000 FT.' I READ BACK 'CROSS L1210 AT 25000 FT AND MUMSY AT 11000 FT.' THE CTLR RESTATED CLRNC TO CROSS MUMSY AT 15000 FT. THE CORRECTED CLRNC WAS MISINTERPRETED BY ME AS A NEW CLRNC CANCELING THE L1210 RESTR. I RPTED LEAVING 27000 FT AND CROSSED L1210 AT ABOUT 24000 FT. THE CTLR POINTED OUT THE ERROR, THERE WAS NO APPARENT TFC CONFLICT. THE DSCNT WAS STARTED EARLIER THAN NORMAL FOR MUMSY FOR SEVERAL REASONS, AN UNUSUALLY STRONG TAILWIND GAVE A GROUND SPD OF ALMOST 600 KTS AND THE PRECEDING ACFT WAS GIVEN A SPD RESTR IN THE DSCNT SO I ANTICIPATED THE SAME. ALSO ICING CONDITIONS WERE ANTICIPATED PRIOR TO MUMSY WHICH REQUIRES PWR WELL ABOVE IDLE THRUST IN THE MD80. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THAT THE FO WAS RECEIVING ATIS AND COMMUNICATING WITH COMPANY SO I WAS 'SOLO' HANDLING THIS CLRNC. EQUIP/PROCS TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: ATIS PRINTER IN COCKPIT AND A PROC FOR FLT ATTENDANTS TO COMMUNICATE REQUIRED SVCS (WHEELCHAIRS, ETC) BEFORE PUSHBACK AND FOR PLTS TO CALL THEM IN WELL BEFORE DSCNT. THIS COULD PREVENT 'SOLO' HANDLING OF RADIOS IN CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT (DSCNT).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.