Narrative:

The #1 engine was started at gate, lga. The APU was inoperative. After receiving clearance to push from ground control the pushback began. I was monitoring ground control and company operations on my headset. The captain was coordinating the pushback with the ground crew with use of the interphone and his headset. After we had pushed back approximately 50 yards the captain gave the command to start 2 or the #2 engine. I did as he said. At about the time the engine was started and I had released the start valve, the aircraft began to move forward, and it slightly increased speed. At this point we felt a jerk to the nosegear area. I looked at the captain and noticed a ground crew person with crossed wands run into view from the rear. The captain noticed this at the same time and shut down the engines. He called for the after landing and parking checklist. I did as he requested. I operated under direction of the captain and in accordance with the airline's operations manual. The aircraft had moved forward causing the tug to strike the aircraft on the lower left forward fuselage. A hole in the aircraft resulted. I believe what really caused the problem was a faulty interphone or microphone/transmitter system on the part of the ground crew. Contributing, was the failure of the ground crew to give correct, timely, and appropriate information to the captain. Furthermore, if maintenance and/or operations knew that the APU was inoperative and that a gate start was required, the aircraft should have been placed on a gate that allowed the start of both engines at the gate. If the ground crew would have told the captain to set the parking brake, and made sure the direction was understood and accomplished the entire situation would have been avoided.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING PUSHBACK ACFT AND TUG STRIKE EACH OTHER. ACFT DAMAGED.

Narrative: THE #1 ENG WAS STARTED AT GATE, LGA. THE APU WAS INOP. AFTER RECEIVING CLRNC TO PUSH FROM GND CTL THE PUSHBACK BEGAN. I WAS MONITORING GND CTL AND COMPANY OPS ON MY HEADSET. THE CAPT WAS COORDINATING THE PUSHBACK WITH THE GND CREW WITH USE OF THE INTERPHONE AND HIS HEADSET. AFTER WE HAD PUSHED BACK APPROX 50 YARDS THE CAPT GAVE THE COMMAND TO START 2 OR THE #2 ENG. I DID AS HE SAID. AT ABOUT THE TIME THE ENG WAS STARTED AND I HAD RELEASED THE START VALVE, THE ACFT BEGAN TO MOVE FORWARD, AND IT SLIGHTLY INCREASED SPD. AT THIS POINT WE FELT A JERK TO THE NOSEGEAR AREA. I LOOKED AT THE CAPT AND NOTICED A GND CREW PERSON WITH CROSSED WANDS RUN INTO VIEW FROM THE REAR. THE CAPT NOTICED THIS AT THE SAME TIME AND SHUT DOWN THE ENGS. HE CALLED FOR THE AFTER LNDG AND PARKING CHKLIST. I DID AS HE REQUESTED. I OPERATED UNDER DIRECTION OF THE CAPT AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AIRLINE'S OPS MANUAL. THE ACFT HAD MOVED FORWARD CAUSING THE TUG TO STRIKE THE ACFT ON THE LOWER L FORWARD FUSELAGE. A HOLE IN THE ACFT RESULTED. I BELIEVE WHAT REALLY CAUSED THE PROB WAS A FAULTY INTERPHONE OR MICROPHONE/XMITTER SYS ON THE PART OF THE GND CREW. CONTRIBUTING, WAS THE FAILURE OF THE GND CREW TO GIVE CORRECT, TIMELY, AND APPROPRIATE INFO TO THE CAPT. FURTHERMORE, IF MAINT AND/OR OPS KNEW THAT THE APU WAS INOP AND THAT A GATE START WAS REQUIRED, THE ACFT SHOULD HAVE BEEN PLACED ON A GATE THAT ALLOWED THE START OF BOTH ENGS AT THE GATE. IF THE GND CREW WOULD HAVE TOLD THE CAPT TO SET THE PARKING BRAKE, AND MADE SURE THE DIRECTION WAS UNDERSTOOD AND ACCOMPLISHED THE ENTIRE SIT WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.