Narrative:

On may/sat/96 richmond approach control doubled its existing airspace as it began providing radar service to the charlottesville and shenandoah airports, as well as several other less busy airfields. This service began at XA15 local time. When the evening shift began at XH14 there was no supervisor on duty and no radar or NAVAID technicians scheduled after XK00 local. Prior to taking this new responsibility, the manager at richmond had assured the natca/facility representative that work shifts would start with 9 controllers and a supervisor. It is, of course, impossible to predict certain events such as sick leave, etc, but we had been told that annual leave would not be approved so the resulting shift would begin with less than a supervisor and 9 controllers. On the first day of operation, the day shift, which had a supervisor on duty, called in an overtime to achieve the desired 9 controllers. When the evening shift began, however, a controller was appointed controller-in-charge (controller in charge) reducing the available workforce to 8 controllers. This assignment had been made several weeks in advance. As it turned out there were numerous equipment outages, which caused the need to shift personnel from control position to coordinator or flight data position, reducing efficiency, effectiveness, and creating a potentially hazardous situation. By not providing proper supervision and adequate staffing on this first day of operation and every day of operation is nothing short of irresponsible. No training was provided to the controller in charge for the new equipment or procedures. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter states his main reason for filing this report was the insufficient staffing for the swing shift on the first day of new airspace confign involving the transfer of airspace jurisdiction and associated facilities. Reporter said that he filed a grievance on the staffing. He said that the facility staffing had been increased but, except for a few new people, had not realized the total staffing allowed. Reporter stated he was assigned controller in charge duties for the shift, during which several outages with different equipment occurred. He said that he had not been trained on cenrap procedures equipment as they did incur a brief radar outage. Reporter indicated that during some of the outages, he had to reposition controllers to overcome the problem. In one case, he had to double up the flight data position to handle the activity when the fdep printer failed. Reporter stated there were 2 center controllers in the facility to assist controllers with the airspace control technique and to answer questions about the control procedures to airports within the new airspace.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR STATED THE FACILITY STAFFING FOR CTL OF NEW AIRSPACE FACILITIES WOULD BE 9 CTLRS AND A SUPVR. RPTR HAD CIC DUTIES AND 8 CTLRS ON SWING SHIFT OF DAY NEW AIRSPACE PROCS WERE IN EFFECT.

Narrative: ON MAY/SAT/96 RICHMOND APCH CTL DOUBLED ITS EXISTING AIRSPACE AS IT BEGAN PROVIDING RADAR SVC TO THE CHARLOTTESVILLE AND SHENANDOAH ARPTS, AS WELL AS SEVERAL OTHER LESS BUSY AIRFIELDS. THIS SVC BEGAN AT XA15 LCL TIME. WHEN THE EVENING SHIFT BEGAN AT XH14 THERE WAS NO SUPVR ON DUTY AND NO RADAR OR NAVAID TECHNICIANS SCHEDULED AFTER XK00 LCL. PRIOR TO TAKING THIS NEW RESPONSIBILITY, THE MGR AT RICHMOND HAD ASSURED THE NATCA/FACILITY REPRESENTATIVE THAT WORK SHIFTS WOULD START WITH 9 CTLRS AND A SUPVR. IT IS, OF COURSE, IMPOSSIBLE TO PREDICT CERTAIN EVENTS SUCH AS SICK LEAVE, ETC, BUT WE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT ANNUAL LEAVE WOULD NOT BE APPROVED SO THE RESULTING SHIFT WOULD BEGIN WITH LESS THAN A SUPVR AND 9 CTLRS. ON THE FIRST DAY OF OP, THE DAY SHIFT, WHICH HAD A SUPVR ON DUTY, CALLED IN AN OVERTIME TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED 9 CTLRS. WHEN THE EVENING SHIFT BEGAN, HOWEVER, A CTLR WAS APPOINTED CTLR-IN-CHARGE (CIC) REDUCING THE AVAILABLE WORKFORCE TO 8 CTLRS. THIS ASSIGNMENT HAD BEEN MADE SEVERAL WKS IN ADVANCE. AS IT TURNED OUT THERE WERE NUMEROUS EQUIP OUTAGES, WHICH CAUSED THE NEED TO SHIFT PERSONNEL FROM CTL POS TO COORDINATOR OR FLT DATA POS, REDUCING EFFICIENCY, EFFECTIVENESS, AND CREATING A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS SIT. BY NOT PROVIDING PROPER SUPERVISION AND ADEQUATE STAFFING ON THIS FIRST DAY OF OP AND EVERY DAY OF OP IS NOTHING SHORT OF IRRESPONSIBLE. NO TRAINING WAS PROVIDED TO THE CIC FOR THE NEW EQUIP OR PROCS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES HIS MAIN REASON FOR FILING THIS RPT WAS THE INSUFFICIENT STAFFING FOR THE SWING SHIFT ON THE FIRST DAY OF NEW AIRSPACE CONFIGN INVOLVING THE TRANSFER OF AIRSPACE JURISDICTION AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES. RPTR SAID THAT HE FILED A GRIEVANCE ON THE STAFFING. HE SAID THAT THE FACILITY STAFFING HAD BEEN INCREASED BUT, EXCEPT FOR A FEW NEW PEOPLE, HAD NOT REALIZED THE TOTAL STAFFING ALLOWED. RPTR STATED HE WAS ASSIGNED CIC DUTIES FOR THE SHIFT, DURING WHICH SEVERAL OUTAGES WITH DIFFERENT EQUIP OCCURRED. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN TRAINED ON CENRAP PROCS EQUIP AS THEY DID INCUR A BRIEF RADAR OUTAGE. RPTR INDICATED THAT DURING SOME OF THE OUTAGES, HE HAD TO REPOSITION CTLRS TO OVERCOME THE PROB. IN ONE CASE, HE HAD TO DOUBLE UP THE FLT DATA POS TO HANDLE THE ACTIVITY WHEN THE FDEP PRINTER FAILED. RPTR STATED THERE WERE 2 CTR CTLRS IN THE FACILITY TO ASSIST CTLRS WITH THE AIRSPACE CTL TECHNIQUE AND TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CTL PROCS TO ARPTS WITHIN THE NEW AIRSPACE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.