Narrative:

We had just completed a touch-and-go to runway 21 when we noticed head-on traffic making an approach to runway 3. Tower told us to turn to a southwest heading, which we did. Tower then made a comment that led the crew (captain, copilot, and flight engineer) to believe that the DC9 head-on traffic was going to enter a downwind for runway 21. This would have meant that we were again on a collision course with the DC9. I took control of the airplane and made an abrupt left turn crossing the runway centerline and entering a downwind for runway 27. We soon discovered that the DC9 was landing on runway 3 after all. The tower controller was extremely upset and said he was going to pull the tapes. A postflt debrief validated that all 3 crew members (captain, copilot, and flight engineer) had the impression that tower was telling us that the DC9 was entering a downwind for runway 21. I talked to the tower chief the following day and the following points were brought out. 1) it is not a real good idea to have opposing traffic simultaneously making approachs to the same runway (runway 21/3). 2) if an aircraft has to take evasive action it should be the aircraft that is in stable flight at a safe altitude. Not an aircraft at 100 ft, at night, over a blacked out ocean. The DC9 should have been spun (360 degrees). 3) the controller meant to tell us to enter a downwind for runway 3. His instructions were not understandable to the crew in a critical phase of flight. 4) the controller should not have responded in a threatening manner. 5) there were students in the tower and on the aircraft. This added to the stress and confusion. No further action was to be taken by either party. I did tell the tower chief that I was going to file this report.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: POTENTIAL CONFLICT CREATED BY MIL FLC DEV FROM CLRNC AT A MIL FACILITY IN A NIGHT OP.

Narrative: WE HAD JUST COMPLETED A TOUCH-AND-GO TO RWY 21 WHEN WE NOTICED HEAD-ON TFC MAKING AN APCH TO RWY 3. TWR TOLD US TO TURN TO A SW HDG, WHICH WE DID. TWR THEN MADE A COMMENT THAT LED THE CREW (CAPT, COPLT, AND FE) TO BELIEVE THAT THE DC9 HEAD-ON TFC WAS GOING TO ENTER A DOWNWIND FOR RWY 21. THIS WOULD HAVE MEANT THAT WE WERE AGAIN ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH THE DC9. I TOOK CTL OF THE AIRPLANE AND MADE AN ABRUPT L TURN XING THE RWY CTRLINE AND ENTERING A DOWNWIND FOR RWY 27. WE SOON DISCOVERED THAT THE DC9 WAS LNDG ON RWY 3 AFTER ALL. THE TWR CTLR WAS EXTREMELY UPSET AND SAID HE WAS GOING TO PULL THE TAPES. A POSTFLT DEBRIEF VALIDATED THAT ALL 3 CREW MEMBERS (CAPT, COPLT, AND FE) HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT TWR WAS TELLING US THAT THE DC9 WAS ENTERING A DOWNWIND FOR RWY 21. I TALKED TO THE TWR CHIEF THE FOLLOWING DAY AND THE FOLLOWING POINTS WERE BROUGHT OUT. 1) IT IS NOT A REAL GOOD IDEA TO HAVE OPPOSING TFC SIMULTANEOUSLY MAKING APCHS TO THE SAME RWY (RWY 21/3). 2) IF AN ACFT HAS TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION IT SHOULD BE THE ACFT THAT IS IN STABLE FLT AT A SAFE ALT. NOT AN ACFT AT 100 FT, AT NIGHT, OVER A BLACKED OUT OCEAN. THE DC9 SHOULD HAVE BEEN SPUN (360 DEGS). 3) THE CTLR MEANT TO TELL US TO ENTER A DOWNWIND FOR RWY 3. HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT UNDERSTANDABLE TO THE CREW IN A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. 4) THE CTLR SHOULD NOT HAVE RESPONDED IN A THREATENING MANNER. 5) THERE WERE STUDENTS IN THE TWR AND ON THE ACFT. THIS ADDED TO THE STRESS AND CONFUSION. NO FURTHER ACTION WAS TO BE TAKEN BY EITHER PARTY. I DID TELL THE TWR CHIEF THAT I WAS GOING TO FILE THIS RPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.