Narrative:

Flight pbi-lga mar/mon/97. WX in northeast had slowed approachs in ny area and we were put in holding at ott on minks 1 arrival into lga. Subsequently cleared to continue to lga. Given radar vector to final on runway 4 lga, and cleared for approach. WX continued to worsen and as we were on GS for landing, RVR went below 4000 ft and we had to execute missed approach. Asked for approach to runway 4R in ewr (and subsequently missed when visibility went below minimums). Controller told us to proceed direct to fallz intersection, but did not know how to spell it when we inquired. Also did not give us bearing/distance from a NAVAID. Instead, radar vectors were given with plans to put us in holding. However, at this time fuel was becoming a concern after holding and 2 missed approachs. Radar vectors were requested to runway 4 at jfk. Controllers informed us that we were #14 with a 20 mi final. Minimum fuel was declared and controllers said that would not increase our landing position (we would still be #14 for landing) and we would have to declare something more critical. Captain said 'whatever it takes' and we gave fuel and souls on board when asked. Approach then worked us in at a higher priority and a successful landing was made at jfk. Throughout all the missed approachs, vectoring, and briefing approachs, efforts were made to coordinate intentions to company dispatch unsuccessfully. To improve sits such as described in the future: 1) in deteriorating WX conditions when missed approachs are initiated, controllers should be made aware that the workload on the crew is extremely heavy, as it is with the controllers. Clearance to an unfamiliar fix in an area like the northeast can be very difficult to find. Controllers should not clear aircraft to a fix they cannot spell and they should know the bearing/distance from a known NAVAID if they intend to clear an aircraft to a fix. 2) when a flight declares minimum fuel they should be given priority handling. Supplemental information from acn 362522: the first officer and I felt that arrival fuel at bdl would be light so we requested ewr -- a quick approach to ewr -- approach controller when contacted and told we were trying to get the ATIS -- do you have it? Replied, 'I'm not going to give that to you, you will have to get it.' we were ready to begin vectors for the approach. He was no help with the workload. Approach did not think 55 mins was a problem with 20 airplanes. We noted a great similarity with a foreign air crash.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 FLC MAKES APCHS TO LGA AND EWR BEFORE GOING TO JFK. HAS A DIFFICULT TIME GETTING ANY EXTRA ASSISTANCE FROM N90 IN NY REGARDING SPELLING OF INTXN NAME AND ATIS INFO AT EWR. DIVERT TO JFK, LONG IN TRAIL AT JFK, DECLARE A FUEL EMER. ALL THE WHILE, NO LUCK IN CONTACTING ACR DISPATCH.

Narrative: FLT PBI-LGA MAR/MON/97. WX IN NE HAD SLOWED APCHS IN NY AREA AND WE WERE PUT IN HOLDING AT OTT ON MINKS 1 ARR INTO LGA. SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED TO CONTINUE TO LGA. GIVEN RADAR VECTOR TO FINAL ON RWY 4 LGA, AND CLRED FOR APCH. WX CONTINUED TO WORSEN AND AS WE WERE ON GS FOR LNDG, RVR WENT BELOW 4000 FT AND WE HAD TO EXECUTE MISSED APCH. ASKED FOR APCH TO RWY 4R IN EWR (AND SUBSEQUENTLY MISSED WHEN VISIBILITY WENT BELOW MINIMUMS). CTLR TOLD US TO PROCEED DIRECT TO FALLZ INTXN, BUT DID NOT KNOW HOW TO SPELL IT WHEN WE INQUIRED. ALSO DID NOT GIVE US BEARING/DISTANCE FROM A NAVAID. INSTEAD, RADAR VECTORS WERE GIVEN WITH PLANS TO PUT US IN HOLDING. HOWEVER, AT THIS TIME FUEL WAS BECOMING A CONCERN AFTER HOLDING AND 2 MISSED APCHS. RADAR VECTORS WERE REQUESTED TO RWY 4 AT JFK. CTLRS INFORMED US THAT WE WERE #14 WITH A 20 MI FINAL. MINIMUM FUEL WAS DECLARED AND CTLRS SAID THAT WOULD NOT INCREASE OUR LNDG POS (WE WOULD STILL BE #14 FOR LNDG) AND WE WOULD HAVE TO DECLARE SOMETHING MORE CRITICAL. CAPT SAID 'WHATEVER IT TAKES' AND WE GAVE FUEL AND SOULS ON BOARD WHEN ASKED. APCH THEN WORKED US IN AT A HIGHER PRIORITY AND A SUCCESSFUL LNDG WAS MADE AT JFK. THROUGHOUT ALL THE MISSED APCHS, VECTORING, AND BRIEFING APCHS, EFFORTS WERE MADE TO COORDINATE INTENTIONS TO COMPANY DISPATCH UNSUCCESSFULLY. TO IMPROVE SITS SUCH AS DESCRIBED IN THE FUTURE: 1) IN DETERIORATING WX CONDITIONS WHEN MISSED APCHS ARE INITIATED, CTLRS SHOULD BE MADE AWARE THAT THE WORKLOAD ON THE CREW IS EXTREMELY HVY, AS IT IS WITH THE CTLRS. CLRNC TO AN UNFAMILIAR FIX IN AN AREA LIKE THE NE CAN BE VERY DIFFICULT TO FIND. CTLRS SHOULD NOT CLR ACFT TO A FIX THEY CANNOT SPELL AND THEY SHOULD KNOW THE BEARING/DISTANCE FROM A KNOWN NAVAID IF THEY INTEND TO CLR AN ACFT TO A FIX. 2) WHEN A FLT DECLARES MINIMUM FUEL THEY SHOULD BE GIVEN PRIORITY HANDLING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 362522: THE FO AND I FELT THAT ARR FUEL AT BDL WOULD BE LIGHT SO WE REQUESTED EWR -- A QUICK APCH TO EWR -- APCH CTLR WHEN CONTACTED AND TOLD WE WERE TRYING TO GET THE ATIS -- DO YOU HAVE IT? REPLIED, 'I'M NOT GOING TO GIVE THAT TO YOU, YOU WILL HAVE TO GET IT.' WE WERE READY TO BEGIN VECTORS FOR THE APCH. HE WAS NO HELP WITH THE WORKLOAD. APCH DID NOT THINK 55 MINS WAS A PROB WITH 20 AIRPLANES. WE NOTED A GREAT SIMILARITY WITH A FOREIGN AIR CRASH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.