Narrative:

Captain flying, autoplt engaged, heading select mode. His radio tuned to VOR (on field), mine to localizer. Cleared for approach on intercept heading. I ran the approach checklist and informed captain twice that he was still tuned to VOR frequency. (WX was VFR, but haze obscuring runway -- field not in sight.) since I had informed captain that he was tuned to VOR and he responded in the affirmative, I assumed that was what he wanted, for whatever reason. When localizer case break occurred (my side) I called 'localizer alive.' he responded 'roger.' I figured he had decided to fly approach in heading mode. As my localizer started to swing rapidly, I stated that we needed turn now as to avoid runway 9 final approach path, which would result if we overshot. As I was making this pronouncement, approach control emphatically advised us that we had overshot final, and he gave us a corrective heading to rejoin. The captain started to turn back left, but very slowly -- he had 15 degrees bank selected and we needed 30 degrees immediately. I felt like everything was happening in slow motion and started to take control of the aircraft when the captain finally caught up with things, muttered something about 'no wonder it didn't capture, the frequency wasn't set!' this, after I informed him 3 times that he was still tuned to the VOR. I was monitoring TCASII the whole time and didn't see any potential conflicts. Anyway, the captain became more aggressive in his correction and finally acquired the localizer. The airport came into view very shortly after that at about 8 mi. 2 contributing factors: I had flown with this captain many times and knew him to be very competent with high situational awareness. I feel that this caused me to let my guard down -- I was also very reluctant to take the aircraft. I think the WX was another factor. Basically VFR (9 mi) but hazy. I think the captain was thinking he would probably see the field before he would actually capture the localizer. ATC never informed us of any potential conflict. I was extremely frustrated -- with the captain for not making a more aggressive correction when informed of his error (by myself and ATC), and with myself for not being more assertive. Next time, I will not wait as long before bringing to the captain's attention a potential problem, and I will never hesitate to take the aircraft if I am sure we are in a dangerous situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF MLG OVERSHOOTS LOC APCH COURSE. APCH CTLR CATCHES THE ERROR AS DOES THE FO AND DIRECTS THE FLT BACK ON COURSE.

Narrative: CAPT FLYING, AUTOPLT ENGAGED, HDG SELECT MODE. HIS RADIO TUNED TO VOR (ON FIELD), MINE TO LOC. CLRED FOR APCH ON INTERCEPT HDG. I RAN THE APCH CHKLIST AND INFORMED CAPT TWICE THAT HE WAS STILL TUNED TO VOR FREQ. (WX WAS VFR, BUT HAZE OBSCURING RWY -- FIELD NOT IN SIGHT.) SINCE I HAD INFORMED CAPT THAT HE WAS TUNED TO VOR AND HE RESPONDED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, I ASSUMED THAT WAS WHAT HE WANTED, FOR WHATEVER REASON. WHEN LOC CASE BREAK OCCURRED (MY SIDE) I CALLED 'LOC ALIVE.' HE RESPONDED 'ROGER.' I FIGURED HE HAD DECIDED TO FLY APCH IN HDG MODE. AS MY LOC STARTED TO SWING RAPIDLY, I STATED THAT WE NEEDED TURN NOW AS TO AVOID RWY 9 FINAL APCH PATH, WHICH WOULD RESULT IF WE OVERSHOT. AS I WAS MAKING THIS PRONOUNCEMENT, APCH CTL EMPHATICALLY ADVISED US THAT WE HAD OVERSHOT FINAL, AND HE GAVE US A CORRECTIVE HDG TO REJOIN. THE CAPT STARTED TO TURN BACK L, BUT VERY SLOWLY -- HE HAD 15 DEGS BANK SELECTED AND WE NEEDED 30 DEGS IMMEDIATELY. I FELT LIKE EVERYTHING WAS HAPPENING IN SLOW MOTION AND STARTED TO TAKE CTL OF THE ACFT WHEN THE CAPT FINALLY CAUGHT UP WITH THINGS, MUTTERED SOMETHING ABOUT 'NO WONDER IT DIDN'T CAPTURE, THE FREQ WASN'T SET!' THIS, AFTER I INFORMED HIM 3 TIMES THAT HE WAS STILL TUNED TO THE VOR. I WAS MONITORING TCASII THE WHOLE TIME AND DIDN'T SEE ANY POTENTIAL CONFLICTS. ANYWAY, THE CAPT BECAME MORE AGGRESSIVE IN HIS CORRECTION AND FINALLY ACQUIRED THE LOC. THE ARPT CAME INTO VIEW VERY SHORTLY AFTER THAT AT ABOUT 8 MI. 2 CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: I HAD FLOWN WITH THIS CAPT MANY TIMES AND KNEW HIM TO BE VERY COMPETENT WITH HIGH SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. I FEEL THAT THIS CAUSED ME TO LET MY GUARD DOWN -- I WAS ALSO VERY RELUCTANT TO TAKE THE ACFT. I THINK THE WX WAS ANOTHER FACTOR. BASICALLY VFR (9 MI) BUT HAZY. I THINK THE CAPT WAS THINKING HE WOULD PROBABLY SEE THE FIELD BEFORE HE WOULD ACTUALLY CAPTURE THE LOC. ATC NEVER INFORMED US OF ANY POTENTIAL CONFLICT. I WAS EXTREMELY FRUSTRATED -- WITH THE CAPT FOR NOT MAKING A MORE AGGRESSIVE CORRECTION WHEN INFORMED OF HIS ERROR (BY MYSELF AND ATC), AND WITH MYSELF FOR NOT BEING MORE ASSERTIVE. NEXT TIME, I WILL NOT WAIT AS LONG BEFORE BRINGING TO THE CAPT'S ATTN A POTENTIAL PROB, AND I WILL NEVER HESITATE TO TAKE THE ACFT IF I AM SURE WE ARE IN A DANGEROUS SIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.