Narrative:

The first officer was flying the aircraft. We were cleared to land on runway 17C and hold short of taxiway B. We acknowledged both. The first officer made a long landing touching down about 2700 ft down the runway. He was slow to lower the nose and did not apply more than 1.3 EPR reverse thrust. I reminded him of our hold short clearance and took over the aircraft. We were too fast to turn off at the M6 high speed but were almost stopped at taxiway B. As the tower frequency was too congested to make a call, we did not advise them of our turning off at taxiway B. We made the right turn and held short of runway 17R. Neither tower nor ground made a comment to us about this and there was no traffic anywhere near taxiway B and runway 17C. In our defense, I would like to point out that the hold short lights were not turned on for runway 17C at this time. Had they been, we would have made the last high speed. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: callback to dfw procedures specialist office to learn why they have lahso lines/lights on 4 runways. The FAA procedures person informed analyst that the lahso were for keeping taxiway rtes open to either side of the airport. That, due to the amount of traffic movement at dfw they needed to move aircraft more efficiently or they would have major traffic backup and increased congestion. The specialist didn't know which txwys were used for movement east and west but offered to xfer the analyst to the tower. That information was not essential enough to take their time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80S ACFT INSTRUCTED TO LAND AND HOLD SHORT (LAHSO) OF TXWY B. PF FO LANDED LONG AND WAS UNABLE TO HOLD SHORT, THOUGH THE FLC DID TAXI OFF AT TXWY B. THEY WERE UNABLE TO CONTACT TWR TO ADVISE DUE TO FREQ CONGESTION.

Narrative: THE FO WAS FLYING THE ACFT. WE WERE CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 17C AND HOLD SHORT OF TXWY B. WE ACKNOWLEDGED BOTH. THE FO MADE A LONG LNDG TOUCHING DOWN ABOUT 2700 FT DOWN THE RWY. HE WAS SLOW TO LOWER THE NOSE AND DID NOT APPLY MORE THAN 1.3 EPR REVERSE THRUST. I REMINDED HIM OF OUR HOLD SHORT CLRNC AND TOOK OVER THE ACFT. WE WERE TOO FAST TO TURN OFF AT THE M6 HIGH SPD BUT WERE ALMOST STOPPED AT TXWY B. AS THE TWR FREQ WAS TOO CONGESTED TO MAKE A CALL, WE DID NOT ADVISE THEM OF OUR TURNING OFF AT TXWY B. WE MADE THE R TURN AND HELD SHORT OF RWY 17R. NEITHER TWR NOR GND MADE A COMMENT TO US ABOUT THIS AND THERE WAS NO TFC ANYWHERE NEAR TXWY B AND RWY 17C. IN OUR DEFENSE, I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT THE HOLD SHORT LIGHTS WERE NOT TURNED ON FOR RWY 17C AT THIS TIME. HAD THEY BEEN, WE WOULD HAVE MADE THE LAST HIGH SPD. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CALLBACK TO DFW PROCS SPECIALIST OFFICE TO LEARN WHY THEY HAVE LAHSO LINES/LIGHTS ON 4 RWYS. THE FAA PROCS PERSON INFORMED ANALYST THAT THE LAHSO WERE FOR KEEPING TXWY RTES OPEN TO EITHER SIDE OF THE ARPT. THAT, DUE TO THE AMOUNT OF TFC MOVEMENT AT DFW THEY NEEDED TO MOVE ACFT MORE EFFICIENTLY OR THEY WOULD HAVE MAJOR TFC BACKUP AND INCREASED CONGESTION. THE SPECIALIST DIDN'T KNOW WHICH TXWYS WERE USED FOR MOVEMENT E AND W BUT OFFERED TO XFER THE ANALYST TO THE TWR. THAT INFO WAS NOT ESSENTIAL ENOUGH TO TAKE THEIR TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.