Narrative:

This problem arose due to a missed communication with ground control. Contributing factors would include being pressed for time and rushing through the procedures, including the PF doing the after engine start procedures while the PNF climbs in his seat and calls for taxi after having helped load the airplane freight. It was discovered by the ground controller and no corrective action was necessary. Human factors: complacency, due to memorization of the entire route procedure. Time consideration due to the route being flown having a time critical schedule and 'tight' deadlines to meet. Pilots not backing up their response to ground control with each other to confirm 'holding short' clearance. Captain called ground and requested taxi clearance and added we would like to taxi via taxiway M, taxiway D to runway 23L. I was doing the taxiing and also completing the after starting engines procedures. Ground responded with taxi clearance to runway 23L and what I thought was 'hold for the jetstream taxiing on taxiway M, taxi to runway 23L, taxiway M, taxiway J.' I don't recall hearing the 'hold short of runway 32.' I proceeded to taxi the airplane on the assigned txwys but failed to hold short of runway 32. Before crossing, I did look both directions on the runway and observed an aircraft that looked like it was taxiing into position on runway 32. While we were crossing runway 32, ground asked 'identify, is that you crossing runway 32?' captain replied it was, and the ground controller responded we were supposed to hold short of runway 32 and instructed as to continue our taxi to runway 23L. He also mentioned there was an airplane cleared for takeoff on runway 32. We proceeded on our flight to cmh and were instructed to give the tower a call at cmh when we got in by cmh ground. Captain made the phone call and was told to call ind tower, which he did. Ind tower informed him that because we crossed an active runway and it involved another aircraft, the local FSDO would be notified, and the other aircraft involved had been cleared for takeoff but was just beginning its takeoff roll. The following morning captain called ind tower again and listened to a recording of our taxi clearance and readback. I am informed that the controller did tell us to hold short of the runway and captain did respond back to hold short of runway 32 with the rest of his readback. When the incident happened, I did not hear the 'hold short' portion of the clearance possibly due to a distraction. Supplemental information from acn 399578: in this case ground control gave us a clearance, I responded correctly to that clearance, but in my mind I heard something altogether different. Human error and perhaps complacency played a role in this incident. In my opinion, this particular incident did not pose any immediate risk to life or property. The aircraft that was cleared for takeoff had maybe only moved 10 ft, therefore could not have been going faster than taxi speed, and he was still almost 1 mi away when he stopped. Even if the aircraft taking off had continued his takeoff we would have been well clear of runway before he could have been to our intersection. But, if events had been slightly different such as the timing of when we crossed the runway, or the tower not catching our mistake the results could have been tragic disaster.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF LR35 TAXIES ACROSS RWY WHEN INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT. ACFT JUST STARTING TKOF ROLL HAS TKOF CLRNC CANCELED.

Narrative: THIS PROB AROSE DUE TO A MISSED COM WITH GND CTL. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WOULD INCLUDE BEING PRESSED FOR TIME AND RUSHING THROUGH THE PROCS, INCLUDING THE PF DOING THE AFTER ENG START PROCS WHILE THE PNF CLBS IN HIS SEAT AND CALLS FOR TAXI AFTER HAVING HELPED LOAD THE AIRPLANE FREIGHT. IT WAS DISCOVERED BY THE GND CTLR AND NO CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS NECESSARY. HUMAN FACTORS: COMPLACENCY, DUE TO MEMORIZATION OF THE ENTIRE RTE PROC. TIME CONSIDERATION DUE TO THE RTE BEING FLOWN HAVING A TIME CRITICAL SCHEDULE AND 'TIGHT' DEADLINES TO MEET. PLTS NOT BACKING UP THEIR RESPONSE TO GND CTL WITH EACH OTHER TO CONFIRM 'HOLDING SHORT' CLRNC. CAPT CALLED GND AND REQUESTED TAXI CLRNC AND ADDED WE WOULD LIKE TO TAXI VIA TXWY M, TXWY D TO RWY 23L. I WAS DOING THE TAXIING AND ALSO COMPLETING THE AFTER STARTING ENGS PROCS. GND RESPONDED WITH TAXI CLRNC TO RWY 23L AND WHAT I THOUGHT WAS 'HOLD FOR THE JETSTREAM TAXIING ON TXWY M, TAXI TO RWY 23L, TXWY M, TXWY J.' I DON'T RECALL HEARING THE 'HOLD SHORT OF RWY 32.' I PROCEEDED TO TAXI THE AIRPLANE ON THE ASSIGNED TXWYS BUT FAILED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 32. BEFORE XING, I DID LOOK BOTH DIRECTIONS ON THE RWY AND OBSERVED AN ACFT THAT LOOKED LIKE IT WAS TAXIING INTO POS ON RWY 32. WHILE WE WERE XING RWY 32, GND ASKED 'IDENT, IS THAT YOU XING RWY 32?' CAPT REPLIED IT WAS, AND THE GND CTLR RESPONDED WE WERE SUPPOSED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 32 AND INSTRUCTED AS TO CONTINUE OUR TAXI TO RWY 23L. HE ALSO MENTIONED THERE WAS AN AIRPLANE CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 32. WE PROCEEDED ON OUR FLT TO CMH AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO GIVE THE TWR A CALL AT CMH WHEN WE GOT IN BY CMH GND. CAPT MADE THE PHONE CALL AND WAS TOLD TO CALL IND TWR, WHICH HE DID. IND TWR INFORMED HIM THAT BECAUSE WE CROSSED AN ACTIVE RWY AND IT INVOLVED ANOTHER ACFT, THE LCL FSDO WOULD BE NOTIFIED, AND THE OTHER ACFT INVOLVED HAD BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF BUT WAS JUST BEGINNING ITS TKOF ROLL. THE FOLLOWING MORNING CAPT CALLED IND TWR AGAIN AND LISTENED TO A RECORDING OF OUR TAXI CLRNC AND READBACK. I AM INFORMED THAT THE CTLR DID TELL US TO HOLD SHORT OF THE RWY AND CAPT DID RESPOND BACK TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 32 WITH THE REST OF HIS READBACK. WHEN THE INCIDENT HAPPENED, I DID NOT HEAR THE 'HOLD SHORT' PORTION OF THE CLRNC POSSIBLY DUE TO A DISTR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 399578: IN THIS CASE GND CTL GAVE US A CLRNC, I RESPONDED CORRECTLY TO THAT CLRNC, BUT IN MY MIND I HEARD SOMETHING ALTOGETHER DIFFERENT. HUMAN ERROR AND PERHAPS COMPLACENCY PLAYED A ROLE IN THIS INCIDENT. IN MY OPINION, THIS PARTICULAR INCIDENT DID NOT POSE ANY IMMEDIATE RISK TO LIFE OR PROPERTY. THE ACFT THAT WAS CLRED FOR TKOF HAD MAYBE ONLY MOVED 10 FT, THEREFORE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN GOING FASTER THAN TAXI SPD, AND HE WAS STILL ALMOST 1 MI AWAY WHEN HE STOPPED. EVEN IF THE ACFT TAKING OFF HAD CONTINUED HIS TKOF WE WOULD HAVE BEEN WELL CLR OF RWY BEFORE HE COULD HAVE BEEN TO OUR INTXN. BUT, IF EVENTS HAD BEEN SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT SUCH AS THE TIMING OF WHEN WE CROSSED THE RWY, OR THE TWR NOT CATCHING OUR MISTAKE THE RESULTS COULD HAVE BEEN TRAGIC DISASTER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.