Narrative:

Air carrier X 1234 called ground for taxi on 121.8. The west ground controller did not use established procedures and assumed that this aircraft was a west departure and issued taxi instructions in the ground east controller's area of jurisdiction. He then started looking for the strip for this aircraft. He saw a strip for air carrier X 234 and assumed this to be the correct strip. He then started issuing instructions to air carrier X 234. The pilot of air carrier X 1234 acknowledged air carrier X 234 once. The ground controller then gave the strip to the local west controller. The local west controller picked up the strip for air carrier X 234. The local controller taxied air carrier X 234 into position, cleared air carrier X 234 for takeoff and switched air carrier X 234 to departure (never noticing that he was responding air carrier X 1234). The local controller at no time knew that this aircraft was not air carrier X 234, a west departure, until a tag was seen 2 northwest of the clt airport. Air carrier X 1234 called departure east and departure east said radar contact (but he had no strip). The departure east controller assumed the aircraft would be on a heading into his airspace. This had not occurred because the tower was assuming the aircraft was air carrier X 234, a wbound aircraft. The departure controller's attention was on other traffic to the east of clt. By the time he noticed the plane was not turning, less than standard separation was imminent. He turned the aircraft but never told him to maintain visual and less than standard separation occurred between this aircraft and a DH8 being worked by departure west. Supplemental information from acn 402090: the departure control did not turn the aircraft for 11 mi and he got less than standard separation from a commuter that was being worked by another sector. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter called and asked if departure control was notified by the tower when the air carrier X 1234 tag was noticed 2 mi northwest of the airport. Controllers in the tower assumed the departure controller knew. Also asked reporter if east and west departures were combined since the air carrier X 1234 was an east departure released as a west departure. The reporter said departures were not combined but that the local controller is responsible to turn the east departure before switching to departure control, when the aircraft going east is in the west area.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FACILITY HAS 2 GND CTLS, 2 LCL CTLS, AND 2 DEP CTLS. ACR 1234 CALLS ON INCORRECT GND FREQ. CTLR RESPONDS AND ISSUES TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO ACR 234. FROM THEN ON EACH TIME GND AND LCL CTL CALLED ACR 234, ACR 1234 ANSWERED. THE REAL ACR 234 WAS STILL AT THE GATE AND HAD NOT YET CALLED CLRNC DELIVERY. AN OPERROR OCCURRED WHEN THE DEP CTLR FAILED TO NOTICE ACR 1234 TURN INTO TFC SHORTLY AFTER TKOF.

Narrative: ACR X 1234 CALLED GND FOR TAXI ON 121.8. THE W GND CTLR DID NOT USE ESTABLISHED PROCS AND ASSUMED THAT THIS ACFT WAS A W DEP AND ISSUED TAXI INSTRUCTIONS IN THE GND E CTLR'S AREA OF JURISDICTION. HE THEN STARTED LOOKING FOR THE STRIP FOR THIS ACFT. HE SAW A STRIP FOR ACR X 234 AND ASSUMED THIS TO BE THE CORRECT STRIP. HE THEN STARTED ISSUING INSTRUCTIONS TO ACR X 234. THE PLT OF ACR X 1234 ACKNOWLEDGED ACR X 234 ONCE. THE GND CTLR THEN GAVE THE STRIP TO THE LCL W CTLR. THE LCL W CTLR PICKED UP THE STRIP FOR ACR X 234. THE LCL CTLR TAXIED ACR X 234 INTO POS, CLRED ACR X 234 FOR TKOF AND SWITCHED ACR X 234 TO DEP (NEVER NOTICING THAT HE WAS RESPONDING ACR X 1234). THE LCL CTLR AT NO TIME KNEW THAT THIS ACFT WAS NOT ACR X 234, A W DEP, UNTIL A TAG WAS SEEN 2 NW OF THE CLT ARPT. ACR X 1234 CALLED DEP E AND DEP E SAID RADAR CONTACT (BUT HE HAD NO STRIP). THE DEP E CTLR ASSUMED THE ACFT WOULD BE ON A HEADING INTO HIS AIRSPACE. THIS HAD NOT OCCURRED BECAUSE THE TWR WAS ASSUMING THE ACFT WAS ACR X 234, A WBOUND ACFT. THE DEP CTLR'S ATTN WAS ON OTHER TFC TO THE E OF CLT. BY THE TIME HE NOTICED THE PLANE WAS NOT TURNING, LTSS WAS IMMINENT. HE TURNED THE ACFT BUT NEVER TOLD HIM TO MAINTAIN VISUAL AND LTSS OCCURRED BTWN THIS ACFT AND A DH8 BEING WORKED BY DEP W. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 402090: THE DEP CTL DID NOT TURN THE ACFT FOR 11 MI AND HE GOT LTSS FROM A COMMUTER THAT WAS BEING WORKED BY ANOTHER SECTOR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR CALLED AND ASKED IF DEP CTL WAS NOTIFIED BY THE TWR WHEN THE ACR X 1234 TAG WAS NOTICED 2 MI NW OF THE ARPT. CTLRS IN THE TWR ASSUMED THE DEP CTLR KNEW. ALSO ASKED RPTR IF E AND W DEPS WERE COMBINED SINCE THE ACR X 1234 WAS AN E DEP RELEASED AS A W DEP. THE RPTR SAID DEPS WERE NOT COMBINED BUT THAT THE LCL CTLR IS RESPONSIBLE TO TURN THE E DEP BEFORE SWITCHING TO DEP CTL, WHEN THE ACFT GOING E IS IN THE W AREA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.