Narrative:

We readied the aircraft for a routine departure for a flight from dtw to las with 260 passenger. The aircraft had the APU on MEL, was covered with frost, and WX was below takeoff minimums. Backgnd: we had flown this aircraft into dtw the previous afternoon with no problems. The aircraft overnighted in dtw. The APU had been put on the MEL overnight by maintenance. During the night, on the ground in dtw, it had 'filled the cabin with smoke,' and had to be 'svced with 8 quarts of oil.' we called dispatch to obtain a takeoff alternate -- msp was selected. The aircraft was deiced and the #2 engine started at the gate. We pushed back at XA00 and started engines #1 and #3. The WX had intermittently improved to takeoff minimums on runway 21R. We taxied to runway 21R and took off at XA20 with RVR 700/600/600. Shortly after takeoff, several flight attendants called the cockpit to report 'smoke or haze in the entire cabin and all lavatory smoke detectors activated.' at the same time we smelled a very strong (chemical) odor of engine oil and/or deicing fluid and observed a fine mist or haze in the cockpit and cabin. We immediately donned oxygen masks and the first officer started the appropriate checklists starting with 'air conditioning smoke.' we leveled off at 12000 ft departing dtw on our planned departure route heading wbound. We ruled out a cargo fire because this aircraft is equipped with: cargo fire, smoke and heat detection. The following cockpit warning lights are installed, of which none activated: 4 cargo smoke detectors, a heat detector, and a 'cargo fire' light on the flight engineer cargo fire/smoke detection panel, plus 'cargo fire' summary and 'master warning' lights on the pilot's overhead panel and glareshield. Also, there was no smell of fire or burning! We kept track of the nearest airports and considered declaring an emergency, but found that not to be a good and appropriate course of action. Instead, we stayed on our planned (west departure) route which was already programmed into the navigation computers, using standard procedures and profiles. This allowed us to concentrate our efforts, knowledge and ability to work the problem, while heading towards our takeoff alternate. While in level flight (at 12000 ft), and at the same time when so had the #2 pneumatic supply/pack disabled, the cabin had cleared up. With the cabin 'smoke' free, the so made a personal inspection of the cabin while the captain and I stayed on oxygen. We started to climb (at maximum cruise power). During this climb, and after the so had returned from the cabin, we discussed our options. We jointly elected to proceed to the nearest suitable airport. At this point, chicago was fairly close, and if the WX was above minimums, it seemed rather foolish not to land the aircraft there -- ord reported RVR 6000. We decided to make a precautionary landing at ord. So contacted dispatch for coordination, we dumped about 5000 pounds of fuel and proceeded to land at ord. Flight attendants and passenger were kept up-to-date regularly as to our situation, options and intentions. Please note that each and every passenger got back on the same airplane in ord and flew with us to las later that day. All crew members, dispatch, ATC, ord ground crew and mechanics, all did an exceptional job. This potentially disastrous situation was defused with great skill and knowledge and handled with the utmost professionalism by all involved. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the first officer stated that the dtw station was manned by contract maintenance personnel and that the maintenance procedures are limited in scope. Reporter felt that there was some anomaly that was not dealt with or reported to the crew. At ord the ground crew found that the 'sock' (a cloth filter) that is in the air conditioning line was oil soaked. They believed that the APU had been oversvced and oil seeped into the #2 air conditioning system. They took out that sock and replaced it with a clean one, ran the engines and system and signed it off as ok. Reporter said this was the third incident he had heard of regarding the production of smoke in the DC10.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC10 EXPERIENCES SMOKE IN THE CABIN AND COCKPIT SHORTLY AFTER TKOF FROM DTW. THE APU HAD BEEN MEL'ED AT DTW, MI.

Narrative: WE READIED THE ACFT FOR A ROUTINE DEP FOR A FLT FROM DTW TO LAS WITH 260 PAX. THE ACFT HAD THE APU ON MEL, WAS COVERED WITH FROST, AND WX WAS BELOW TKOF MINIMUMS. BACKGND: WE HAD FLOWN THIS ACFT INTO DTW THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON WITH NO PROBS. THE ACFT OVERNIGHTED IN DTW. THE APU HAD BEEN PUT ON THE MEL OVERNIGHT BY MAINT. DURING THE NIGHT, ON THE GND IN DTW, IT HAD 'FILLED THE CABIN WITH SMOKE,' AND HAD TO BE 'SVCED WITH 8 QUARTS OF OIL.' WE CALLED DISPATCH TO OBTAIN A TKOF ALTERNATE -- MSP WAS SELECTED. THE ACFT WAS DEICED AND THE #2 ENG STARTED AT THE GATE. WE PUSHED BACK AT XA00 AND STARTED ENGS #1 AND #3. THE WX HAD INTERMITTENTLY IMPROVED TO TKOF MINIMUMS ON RWY 21R. WE TAXIED TO RWY 21R AND TOOK OFF AT XA20 WITH RVR 700/600/600. SHORTLY AFTER TKOF, SEVERAL FLT ATTENDANTS CALLED THE COCKPIT TO RPT 'SMOKE OR HAZE IN THE ENTIRE CABIN AND ALL LAVATORY SMOKE DETECTORS ACTIVATED.' AT THE SAME TIME WE SMELLED A VERY STRONG (CHEMICAL) ODOR OF ENG OIL AND/OR DEICING FLUID AND OBSERVED A FINE MIST OR HAZE IN THE COCKPIT AND CABIN. WE IMMEDIATELY DONNED OXYGEN MASKS AND THE FO STARTED THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS STARTING WITH 'AIR CONDITIONING SMOKE.' WE LEVELED OFF AT 12000 FT DEPARTING DTW ON OUR PLANNED DEP RTE HDG WBOUND. WE RULED OUT A CARGO FIRE BECAUSE THIS ACFT IS EQUIPPED WITH: CARGO FIRE, SMOKE AND HEAT DETECTION. THE FOLLOWING COCKPIT WARNING LIGHTS ARE INSTALLED, OF WHICH NONE ACTIVATED: 4 CARGO SMOKE DETECTORS, A HEAT DETECTOR, AND A 'CARGO FIRE' LIGHT ON THE FE CARGO FIRE/SMOKE DETECTION PANEL, PLUS 'CARGO FIRE' SUMMARY AND 'MASTER WARNING' LIGHTS ON THE PLT'S OVERHEAD PANEL AND GLARESHIELD. ALSO, THERE WAS NO SMELL OF FIRE OR BURNING! WE KEPT TRACK OF THE NEAREST ARPTS AND CONSIDERED DECLARING AN EMER, BUT FOUND THAT NOT TO BE A GOOD AND APPROPRIATE COURSE OF ACTION. INSTEAD, WE STAYED ON OUR PLANNED (W DEP) RTE WHICH WAS ALREADY PROGRAMMED INTO THE NAV COMPUTERS, USING STANDARD PROCS AND PROFILES. THIS ALLOWED US TO CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS, KNOWLEDGE AND ABILITY TO WORK THE PROB, WHILE HDG TOWARDS OUR TKOF ALTERNATE. WHILE IN LEVEL FLT (AT 12000 FT), AND AT THE SAME TIME WHEN SO HAD THE #2 PNEUMATIC SUPPLY/PACK DISABLED, THE CABIN HAD CLRED UP. WITH THE CABIN 'SMOKE' FREE, THE SO MADE A PERSONAL INSPECTION OF THE CABIN WHILE THE CAPT AND I STAYED ON OXYGEN. WE STARTED TO CLB (AT MAX CRUISE PWR). DURING THIS CLB, AND AFTER THE SO HAD RETURNED FROM THE CABIN, WE DISCUSSED OUR OPTIONS. WE JOINTLY ELECTED TO PROCEED TO THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. AT THIS POINT, CHICAGO WAS FAIRLY CLOSE, AND IF THE WX WAS ABOVE MINIMUMS, IT SEEMED RATHER FOOLISH NOT TO LAND THE ACFT THERE -- ORD RPTED RVR 6000. WE DECIDED TO MAKE A PRECAUTIONARY LNDG AT ORD. SO CONTACTED DISPATCH FOR COORD, WE DUMPED ABOUT 5000 LBS OF FUEL AND PROCEEDED TO LAND AT ORD. FLT ATTENDANTS AND PAX WERE KEPT UP-TO-DATE REGULARLY AS TO OUR SIT, OPTIONS AND INTENTIONS. PLEASE NOTE THAT EACH AND EVERY PAX GOT BACK ON THE SAME AIRPLANE IN ORD AND FLEW WITH US TO LAS LATER THAT DAY. ALL CREW MEMBERS, DISPATCH, ATC, ORD GND CREW AND MECHS, ALL DID AN EXCEPTIONAL JOB. THIS POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS SIT WAS DEFUSED WITH GREAT SKILL AND KNOWLEDGE AND HANDLED WITH THE UTMOST PROFESSIONALISM BY ALL INVOLVED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FO STATED THAT THE DTW STATION WAS MANNED BY CONTRACT MAINT PERSONNEL AND THAT THE MAINT PROCS ARE LIMITED IN SCOPE. RPTR FELT THAT THERE WAS SOME ANOMALY THAT WAS NOT DEALT WITH OR RPTED TO THE CREW. AT ORD THE GND CREW FOUND THAT THE 'SOCK' (A CLOTH FILTER) THAT IS IN THE AIR CONDITIONING LINE WAS OIL SOAKED. THEY BELIEVED THAT THE APU HAD BEEN OVERSVCED AND OIL SEEPED INTO THE #2 AIR CONDITIONING SYS. THEY TOOK OUT THAT SOCK AND REPLACED IT WITH A CLEAN ONE, RAN THE ENGS AND SYS AND SIGNED IT OFF AS OK. RPTR SAID THIS WAS THE THIRD INCIDENT HE HAD HEARD OF REGARDING THE PRODUCTION OF SMOKE IN THE DC10.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.