Narrative:

We were en route to ord at FL230 from dtw. Received clearance to descend and cross pullman at and maintain FL200. Captain's leg. Captain's first trip on line after IOE captain engaged VNAV and began descent. Very shortly after, we heard traffic in front of us given holding instructions. We knew that we would also be given similar instructions. I began to prepare the FMS to build a hold at the fix (story, I think, pullman 4 arrival to ord). Also obtained new ATIS. Before I accomplished these tasks I told the captain that I would be off radio frequency and also would prepare FMS for holding. After accomplishing these tasks, I informed the captain that I was done, and was back with him 'in the loop,' so to speak. As I told him this, I looked at the MCP, altimeter, and ehsi, and saw that we were over pullman at FL210. I pointed this out to the captain and asked what happened. He said they had given us a slower speed while I was 'out of the loop' and, I believe, holding at the fix (story?). The MCP showed the vertical speed window open at -1000 FPM (I think). The captain had opened the vertical speed window and dialed in a rate of descent which would slow the aircraft down. However, in doing so, this took the FMS out of the VNAV mode which was programmed to cross pullman at FL200. Center said nothing about our altitude at pullman at that time, or for the remainder of the flight. We continued to ord uneventfully. I believe this error was caused by my failure to monitor adequately the actions of the captain -- since I had more time in type. I believe I should have watched more intently. Also, the captain's low time -- first trip as a captain, first trip on line after IOE -- probably contributed, due to his lack of familiarity/experience with the FMS.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 FAILS TO MAKE XING RESTR DURING DSCNT IN ZAU AIRSPACE DUE TO IMPROPER FMS USE BY FLC.

Narrative: WE WERE ENRTE TO ORD AT FL230 FROM DTW. RECEIVED CLRNC TO DSND AND CROSS PULLMAN AT AND MAINTAIN FL200. CAPT'S LEG. CAPT'S FIRST TRIP ON LINE AFTER IOE CAPT ENGAGED VNAV AND BEGAN DSCNT. VERY SHORTLY AFTER, WE HEARD TFC IN FRONT OF US GIVEN HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS. WE KNEW THAT WE WOULD ALSO BE GIVEN SIMILAR INSTRUCTIONS. I BEGAN TO PREPARE THE FMS TO BUILD A HOLD AT THE FIX (STORY, I THINK, PULLMAN 4 ARR TO ORD). ALSO OBTAINED NEW ATIS. BEFORE I ACCOMPLISHED THESE TASKS I TOLD THE CAPT THAT I WOULD BE OFF RADIO FREQ AND ALSO WOULD PREPARE FMS FOR HOLDING. AFTER ACCOMPLISHING THESE TASKS, I INFORMED THE CAPT THAT I WAS DONE, AND WAS BACK WITH HIM 'IN THE LOOP,' SO TO SPEAK. AS I TOLD HIM THIS, I LOOKED AT THE MCP, ALTIMETER, AND EHSI, AND SAW THAT WE WERE OVER PULLMAN AT FL210. I POINTED THIS OUT TO THE CAPT AND ASKED WHAT HAPPENED. HE SAID THEY HAD GIVEN US A SLOWER SPD WHILE I WAS 'OUT OF THE LOOP' AND, I BELIEVE, HOLDING AT THE FIX (STORY?). THE MCP SHOWED THE VERT SPD WINDOW OPEN AT -1000 FPM (I THINK). THE CAPT HAD OPENED THE VERT SPD WINDOW AND DIALED IN A RATE OF DSCNT WHICH WOULD SLOW THE ACFT DOWN. HOWEVER, IN DOING SO, THIS TOOK THE FMS OUT OF THE VNAV MODE WHICH WAS PROGRAMMED TO CROSS PULLMAN AT FL200. CTR SAID NOTHING ABOUT OUR ALT AT PULLMAN AT THAT TIME, OR FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. WE CONTINUED TO ORD UNEVENTFULLY. I BELIEVE THIS ERROR WAS CAUSED BY MY FAILURE TO MONITOR ADEQUATELY THE ACTIONS OF THE CAPT -- SINCE I HAD MORE TIME IN TYPE. I BELIEVE I SHOULD HAVE WATCHED MORE INTENTLY. ALSO, THE CAPT'S LOW TIME -- FIRST TRIP AS A CAPT, FIRST TRIP ON LINE AFTER IOE -- PROBABLY CONTRIBUTED, DUE TO HIS LACK OF FAMILIARITY/EXPERIENCE WITH THE FMS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.