Narrative:

The event occurred en route syd-lax. Primary and secondary first officer's (relief pilots) were in the seats with captain (me) and flying copilot on break -- approximately 1 - 1 1/2 hours into break. Upon my early return, the relief pilot flying told me of the clearance deviation: received a clearance from oak oceanic control via data link to climb to FL370 and maintain. FL350 was optimum altitude and it was decided to reject the clearance due to performance. Requested via free text block FL350-FL370. Next received request from oak asking when climb to FL370 could be made. Sent back time of XA35Z which was still 1/2 hour before optimum altitude of FL370. At XA11Z received clearance to cross 'santa' fix at and maintain FL370, report reaching and if not able, expect FL330. Santa approximately 210 mi ahead at approximately time the crew decided our optimum altitude would be FL370 -- clearance accepted. An immediate climb to FL360 was initiated to be on top of cloud cover (full moon). The crew was climbing at optimum altitude and the relief pilots told me they just forgot about the clearance. At XA49Z data link asked to confirm at FL370. Santa was crossed at XA36Z at FL360. The mistake was realized and aircraft was immediately climbed to FL370. At XA51Z sent message level FL370. No other messages received from oak and no traffic conflict occurred. The copilot said he would file NASA report. The 2 relief pilots and I discussed the entire situation. Conclusion: the relief crew were both on the back side of the clock and also the layover was 28 hours. Both had awakened early and were unable to get much rest on their break. Also, they were used to the practiced procedure in the south pacific of step-climbing at 100-200 ft intervals to stay at optimum altitude. So, a little fatigue and a clearance in the future led to the deviation. As a captain relatively new to the south pacific operation (second solo flight) I learned from this situation to brief exactly this type of clearance. It seems that any clearance to a new altitude at a particular fix is the one most missed. I have been doing some thinking about how to help prevent this problem and feel that better use of the FMC might help. I will brief that if this type of clearance is received, the altitude should be set in the altitude window, the optimum flight altitude (if to be flown) put in the FMC cruise page and the step-climb put in the efgs page. Thus, prior to the fix even if not in VNAV, the FMC would alert the crew. If in VNAV, it would climb to the altitude. (I think -- will have to do more research on this, but feel something needs to be done to remind the crew of the clearance.) I will re-stress communication among the crew and adherence to SOP. This has happened to other crews and probably will happen again. I hope this experience will prevent it from happening to my future crews and other crews with whom these crew members work.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747 CREW DID NOT MAKE XING ALT.

Narrative: THE EVENT OCCURRED ENRTE SYD-LAX. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY FO'S (RELIEF PLTS) WERE IN THE SEATS WITH CAPT (ME) AND FLYING COPLT ON BREAK -- APPROX 1 - 1 1/2 HRS INTO BREAK. UPON MY EARLY RETURN, THE RELIEF PLT FLYING TOLD ME OF THE CLRNC DEV: RECEIVED A CLRNC FROM OAK OCEANIC CTL VIA DATA LINK TO CLB TO FL370 AND MAINTAIN. FL350 WAS OPTIMUM ALT AND IT WAS DECIDED TO REJECT THE CLRNC DUE TO PERFORMANCE. REQUESTED VIA FREE TEXT BLOCK FL350-FL370. NEXT RECEIVED REQUEST FROM OAK ASKING WHEN CLB TO FL370 COULD BE MADE. SENT BACK TIME OF XA35Z WHICH WAS STILL 1/2 HR BEFORE OPTIMUM ALT OF FL370. AT XA11Z RECEIVED CLRNC TO CROSS 'SANTA' FIX AT AND MAINTAIN FL370, RPT REACHING AND IF NOT ABLE, EXPECT FL330. SANTA APPROX 210 MI AHEAD AT APPROX TIME THE CREW DECIDED OUR OPTIMUM ALT WOULD BE FL370 -- CLRNC ACCEPTED. AN IMMEDIATE CLB TO FL360 WAS INITIATED TO BE ON TOP OF CLOUD COVER (FULL MOON). THE CREW WAS CLBING AT OPTIMUM ALT AND THE RELIEF PLTS TOLD ME THEY JUST FORGOT ABOUT THE CLRNC. AT XA49Z DATA LINK ASKED TO CONFIRM AT FL370. SANTA WAS CROSSED AT XA36Z AT FL360. THE MISTAKE WAS REALIZED AND ACFT WAS IMMEDIATELY CLBED TO FL370. AT XA51Z SENT MESSAGE LEVEL FL370. NO OTHER MESSAGES RECEIVED FROM OAK AND NO TFC CONFLICT OCCURRED. THE COPLT SAID HE WOULD FILE NASA RPT. THE 2 RELIEF PLTS AND I DISCUSSED THE ENTIRE SIT. CONCLUSION: THE RELIEF CREW WERE BOTH ON THE BACK SIDE OF THE CLOCK AND ALSO THE LAYOVER WAS 28 HRS. BOTH HAD AWAKENED EARLY AND WERE UNABLE TO GET MUCH REST ON THEIR BREAK. ALSO, THEY WERE USED TO THE PRACTICED PROC IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC OF STEP-CLBING AT 100-200 FT INTERVALS TO STAY AT OPTIMUM ALT. SO, A LITTLE FATIGUE AND A CLRNC IN THE FUTURE LED TO THE DEV. AS A CAPT RELATIVELY NEW TO THE SOUTH PACIFIC OP (SECOND SOLO FLT) I LEARNED FROM THIS SIT TO BRIEF EXACTLY THIS TYPE OF CLRNC. IT SEEMS THAT ANY CLRNC TO A NEW ALT AT A PARTICULAR FIX IS THE ONE MOST MISSED. I HAVE BEEN DOING SOME THINKING ABOUT HOW TO HELP PREVENT THIS PROB AND FEEL THAT BETTER USE OF THE FMC MIGHT HELP. I WILL BRIEF THAT IF THIS TYPE OF CLRNC IS RECEIVED, THE ALT SHOULD BE SET IN THE ALT WINDOW, THE OPTIMUM FLT ALT (IF TO BE FLOWN) PUT IN THE FMC CRUISE PAGE AND THE STEP-CLB PUT IN THE EFGS PAGE. THUS, PRIOR TO THE FIX EVEN IF NOT IN VNAV, THE FMC WOULD ALERT THE CREW. IF IN VNAV, IT WOULD CLB TO THE ALT. (I THINK -- WILL HAVE TO DO MORE RESEARCH ON THIS, BUT FEEL SOMETHING NEEDS TO BE DONE TO REMIND THE CREW OF THE CLRNC.) I WILL RE-STRESS COM AMONG THE CREW AND ADHERENCE TO SOP. THIS HAS HAPPENED TO OTHER CREWS AND PROBABLY WILL HAPPEN AGAIN. I HOPE THIS EXPERIENCE WILL PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING TO MY FUTURE CREWS AND OTHER CREWS WITH WHOM THESE CREW MEMBERS WORK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.