Narrative:

How the problem arose: misunderstanding of taxi clearance. My aircraft was cleared to taxi to runway 17 from FBO at ilm, with the additional instruction to hold short of taxiway a. I taxied from my position on taxiway east, across runway 35/17 to hold in an area where an approaching C172 could enter the ramp at FBO via txwys a and east. The controller misunderstood where I was on the airport. I understood that I needed to taxi forward to clear taxiway east for the inbound C172, as I was effectively blocking the entrance to FBO. The ground controller, however, thought that my airplane was at a different FBO on the airport, and was not aware that the instructions given to my aircraft would place us on a runway (runway 35/17). I visually cleared the runway before crossing it, so hopefully this misunderstanding did not cause another aircraft to change its takeoff or landing activities. How it was discovered: as I taxied forward on taxiway east from FBO, I was instructed to move to the side so as not to block the taxiway, and was informed that there was some confusion about the location of my aircraft when the original taxi instructions were given. When the room for the opposite direction traffic (C172) was arranged and that conflict solved, I was instructed to continue my taxi. The original ground controller was replaced (supervisor) and I realized that a runway incursion event may have transpired. Contributing factors: limited ramp space at FBO for maneuvering an airplane the size of a king air (ground personnel parked my aircraft on taxiway east). Nonstandard markings. I do not remember seeing the double red stripe separating the ramp from the taxiway east. The original ground controller's misunderstanding of my position on the airport when taxi instruction was given. Corrective actions: when the conflict was discovered by the ground controller, I was quickly given easy-to-understand instructions to maneuver my airplane to place where taxiway a becomes wide enough for 2 opposite direction aircraft to pass each other. Perceptions/judgements/decisions: I perceived that because of the size of my airplane and its location on the airport, that it would be difficult for aircraft approaching the FBO ramp. I felt that expediting the taxi instructions would solve any conflict. My experience at busy airports has taught me that these conflicts are not uncommon. With hindsight, I feel that my aircraft should not have proceeded, either by my action or the controller's (hold your position). Judgements and decisions by myself and the ground controller solved any conflicts known by me. Human performance factors: my flight was at the end of a long duty day and was planned to proceed into an area of troubled WX. (I did end up making an unscheduled stop at cae after attempts to clarify the WX with flight watch were unsuccessful.) I was distraction by the severity of the WX ahead. I have no information on the human performance factors of the original ground controller. What can be done to prevent a recurrence: 1) the ramp area should be more readily defined at the junction of taxiway east. 2) a sign should be placed at the exit of the ramp that says inbound aircraft utilizing taxiway a would cause a problem to exiting aircraft. This would be extremely useful whenever the control tower is inoperative. 3) ground control should make visual contact, if possible, with aircraft requesting taxi instructions before those instructions are given. 4) flashing yellow caution lights should be installed where taxiway east ends.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA PLT HAD RWY INCURSION.

Narrative: HOW THE PROB AROSE: MISUNDERSTANDING OF TAXI CLRNC. MY ACFT WAS CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 17 FROM FBO AT ILM, WITH THE ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTION TO HOLD SHORT OF TXWY A. I TAXIED FROM MY POS ON TXWY E, ACROSS RWY 35/17 TO HOLD IN AN AREA WHERE AN APCHING C172 COULD ENTER THE RAMP AT FBO VIA TXWYS A AND E. THE CTLR MISUNDERSTOOD WHERE I WAS ON THE ARPT. I UNDERSTOOD THAT I NEEDED TO TAXI FORWARD TO CLR TXWY E FOR THE INBOUND C172, AS I WAS EFFECTIVELY BLOCKING THE ENTRANCE TO FBO. THE GND CTLR, HOWEVER, THOUGHT THAT MY AIRPLANE WAS AT A DIFFERENT FBO ON THE ARPT, AND WAS NOT AWARE THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO MY ACFT WOULD PLACE US ON A RWY (RWY 35/17). I VISUALLY CLRED THE RWY BEFORE XING IT, SO HOPEFULLY THIS MISUNDERSTANDING DID NOT CAUSE ANOTHER ACFT TO CHANGE ITS TKOF OR LNDG ACTIVITIES. HOW IT WAS DISCOVERED: AS I TAXIED FORWARD ON TXWY E FROM FBO, I WAS INSTRUCTED TO MOVE TO THE SIDE SO AS NOT TO BLOCK THE TXWY, AND WAS INFORMED THAT THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION ABOUT THE LOCATION OF MY ACFT WHEN THE ORIGINAL TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN. WHEN THE ROOM FOR THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION TFC (C172) WAS ARRANGED AND THAT CONFLICT SOLVED, I WAS INSTRUCTED TO CONTINUE MY TAXI. THE ORIGINAL GND CTLR WAS REPLACED (SUPVR) AND I REALIZED THAT A RWY INCURSION EVENT MAY HAVE TRANSPIRED. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: LIMITED RAMP SPACE AT FBO FOR MANEUVERING AN AIRPLANE THE SIZE OF A KING AIR (GND PERSONNEL PARKED MY ACFT ON TXWY E). NONSTANDARD MARKINGS. I DO NOT REMEMBER SEEING THE DOUBLE RED STRIPE SEPARATING THE RAMP FROM THE TXWY E. THE ORIGINAL GND CTLR'S MISUNDERSTANDING OF MY POS ON THE ARPT WHEN TAXI INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: WHEN THE CONFLICT WAS DISCOVERED BY THE GND CTLR, I WAS QUICKLY GIVEN EASY-TO-UNDERSTAND INSTRUCTIONS TO MANEUVER MY AIRPLANE TO PLACE WHERE TXWY A BECOMES WIDE ENOUGH FOR 2 OPPOSITE DIRECTION ACFT TO PASS EACH OTHER. PERCEPTIONS/JUDGEMENTS/DECISIONS: I PERCEIVED THAT BECAUSE OF THE SIZE OF MY AIRPLANE AND ITS LOCATION ON THE ARPT, THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR ACFT APCHING THE FBO RAMP. I FELT THAT EXPEDITING THE TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WOULD SOLVE ANY CONFLICT. MY EXPERIENCE AT BUSY ARPTS HAS TAUGHT ME THAT THESE CONFLICTS ARE NOT UNCOMMON. WITH HINDSIGHT, I FEEL THAT MY ACFT SHOULD NOT HAVE PROCEEDED, EITHER BY MY ACTION OR THE CTLR'S (HOLD YOUR POS). JUDGEMENTS AND DECISIONS BY MYSELF AND THE GND CTLR SOLVED ANY CONFLICTS KNOWN BY ME. HUMAN PERFORMANCE FACTORS: MY FLT WAS AT THE END OF A LONG DUTY DAY AND WAS PLANNED TO PROCEED INTO AN AREA OF TROUBLED WX. (I DID END UP MAKING AN UNSCHEDULED STOP AT CAE AFTER ATTEMPTS TO CLARIFY THE WX WITH FLT WATCH WERE UNSUCCESSFUL.) I WAS DISTR BY THE SEVERITY OF THE WX AHEAD. I HAVE NO INFO ON THE HUMAN PERFORMANCE FACTORS OF THE ORIGINAL GND CTLR. WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE: 1) THE RAMP AREA SHOULD BE MORE READILY DEFINED AT THE JUNCTION OF TXWY E. 2) A SIGN SHOULD BE PLACED AT THE EXIT OF THE RAMP THAT SAYS INBOUND ACFT UTILIZING TXWY A WOULD CAUSE A PROB TO EXITING ACFT. THIS WOULD BE EXTREMELY USEFUL WHENEVER THE CTL TWR IS INOP. 3) GND CTL SHOULD MAKE VISUAL CONTACT, IF POSSIBLE, WITH ACFT REQUESTING TAXI INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE THOSE INSTRUCTIONS ARE GIVEN. 4) FLASHING YELLOW CAUTION LIGHTS SHOULD BE INSTALLED WHERE TXWY E ENDS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.