Narrative:

Object lodged in captain window frame. During predep checks in the cockpit, the captain noticed that there was an emergency procedures checklist stuck in the left side of the sliding clearview window. 1/2 of the checklist was protruding out the window and the other half was inside the cockpit. It could have easily been overlooked since the jetbridge curtain was lowered to the fuselage and the possibility that it could have broken off and created a FOD hazard or damaged the seal of the window were real threats. We brought the same aircraft in the night before and both the captain and I know with certainty that the checklist was not in the window when we left the cockpit at the completion of the inbound flight. The manager on duty was notified of the problem and also brought up a good point -- you don't know what else was done to the aircraft. If someone was careless enough or worse -- willingly doing this to the aircraft, it puts us all at risk. Every now and then I find an aircraft after an overnight that has been played with where switches like the yaw damper or CADC are in 'off' or improper position and coke cans and other clues that someone had been hanging out in the cockpit of aircraft we brought in the night before are present. I am not sure how tough it would be to increase accountability for access to the cockpit on overnights, but I think it is a problem no matter how small that may turn around and bite us one day.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80 CREW FOUND EVIDENCE OF DELIBERATE COCKPIT TAMPERING.

Narrative: OBJECT LODGED IN CAPT WINDOW FRAME. DURING PREDEP CHKS IN THE COCKPIT, THE CAPT NOTICED THAT THERE WAS AN EMER PROCS CHKLIST STUCK IN THE L SIDE OF THE SLIDING CLEARVIEW WINDOW. 1/2 OF THE CHKLIST WAS PROTRUDING OUT THE WINDOW AND THE OTHER HALF WAS INSIDE THE COCKPIT. IT COULD HAVE EASILY BEEN OVERLOOKED SINCE THE JETBRIDGE CURTAIN WAS LOWERED TO THE FUSELAGE AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT IT COULD HAVE BROKEN OFF AND CREATED A FOD HAZARD OR DAMAGED THE SEAL OF THE WINDOW WERE REAL THREATS. WE BROUGHT THE SAME ACFT IN THE NIGHT BEFORE AND BOTH THE CAPT AND I KNOW WITH CERTAINTY THAT THE CHKLIST WAS NOT IN THE WINDOW WHEN WE LEFT THE COCKPIT AT THE COMPLETION OF THE INBOUND FLT. THE MGR ON DUTY WAS NOTIFIED OF THE PROB AND ALSO BROUGHT UP A GOOD POINT -- YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT ELSE WAS DONE TO THE ACFT. IF SOMEONE WAS CARELESS ENOUGH OR WORSE -- WILLINGLY DOING THIS TO THE ACFT, IT PUTS US ALL AT RISK. EVERY NOW AND THEN I FIND AN ACFT AFTER AN OVERNIGHT THAT HAS BEEN PLAYED WITH WHERE SWITCHES LIKE THE YAW DAMPER OR CADC ARE IN 'OFF' OR IMPROPER POS AND COKE CANS AND OTHER CLUES THAT SOMEONE HAD BEEN HANGING OUT IN THE COCKPIT OF ACFT WE BROUGHT IN THE NIGHT BEFORE ARE PRESENT. I AM NOT SURE HOW TOUGH IT WOULD BE TO INCREASE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ACCESS TO THE COCKPIT ON OVERNIGHTS, BUT I THINK IT IS A PROB NO MATTER HOW SMALL THAT MAY TURN AROUND AND BITE US ONE DAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.