Narrative:

I am sending this report in an effort to address a safety concern with MEL xx-Y. I believe this issue to be one of immediate concern. I was dispatched from XXX this morning with ship xyz. This aircraft should not have been dispatched through ZZZ. The stabilizer trim indicator was placarded inoperative by MEL xx-Y. In accordance with MEL xx-Y, the stabilizer trim position must be visually verified prior to taxi by ground personnel or a cockpit crew member. I spent 20 mins coordinating with a helpful station personnel dispatcher and air carrier technician for consultation. With an early load closeout in hand, my first officer and I relayed back and forth on walkie talkies to arrive at 2.8 units nose up. Considering the thickness of the black stripes, it is difficult at best to determine an exact 2.8 units nose up versus 2.7 - 2.9 or worse. Second concern. What qualifies ramp personnel -- contract at that -- to determine the difference between say 2.0 units nose up versus 2.0 units nose down? Even with predep on-the-job training provided, the potential still exists for error. A shift change, ground delay, or ramp personnel just passing the buck could be a recipe for disaster. One can only imagine a delayed rotation during takeoff with 2.0 units nose down versus 2.0 units nose up -- especially from ZZZ. Personally, this should be a no-go item, or at least a black border item, with several limitations. At the very least, cockpit crew member verification only.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A FOKKER 100 WAS DISPATCHED WITH A DEFERRED COCKPIT STABILIZER TRIM INDICATOR PER THE MEL BUT THE CREW EXPRESSES CONCERN ON DEPENDENCE OF LCL CONTRACT RAMP PERSONNEL TO ADVISE OF STABILIZER POS PRIOR TO DEP.

Narrative: I AM SENDING THIS RPT IN AN EFFORT TO ADDRESS A SAFETY CONCERN WITH MEL XX-Y. I BELIEVE THIS ISSUE TO BE ONE OF IMMEDIATE CONCERN. I WAS DISPATCHED FROM XXX THIS MORNING WITH SHIP XYZ. THIS ACFT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISPATCHED THROUGH ZZZ. THE STABILIZER TRIM INDICATOR WAS PLACARDED INOP BY MEL XX-Y. IN ACCORDANCE WITH MEL XX-Y, THE STABILIZER TRIM POS MUST BE VISUALLY VERIFIED PRIOR TO TAXI BY GND PERSONNEL OR A COCKPIT CREW MEMBER. I SPENT 20 MINS COORDINATING WITH A HELPFUL STATION PERSONNEL DISPATCHER AND ACR TECHNICIAN FOR CONSULTATION. WITH AN EARLY LOAD CLOSEOUT IN HAND, MY FO AND I RELAYED BACK AND FORTH ON WALKIE TALKIES TO ARRIVE AT 2.8 UNITS NOSE UP. CONSIDERING THE THICKNESS OF THE BLACK STRIPES, IT IS DIFFICULT AT BEST TO DETERMINE AN EXACT 2.8 UNITS NOSE UP VERSUS 2.7 - 2.9 OR WORSE. SECOND CONCERN. WHAT QUALIFIES RAMP PERSONNEL -- CONTRACT AT THAT -- TO DETERMINE THE DIFFERENCE BTWN SAY 2.0 UNITS NOSE UP VERSUS 2.0 UNITS NOSE DOWN? EVEN WITH PREDEP ON-THE-JOB TRAINING PROVIDED, THE POTENTIAL STILL EXISTS FOR ERROR. A SHIFT CHANGE, GND DELAY, OR RAMP PERSONNEL JUST PASSING THE BUCK COULD BE A RECIPE FOR DISASTER. ONE CAN ONLY IMAGINE A DELAYED ROTATION DURING TKOF WITH 2.0 UNITS NOSE DOWN VERSUS 2.0 UNITS NOSE UP -- ESPECIALLY FROM ZZZ. PERSONALLY, THIS SHOULD BE A NO-GO ITEM, OR AT LEAST A BLACK BORDER ITEM, WITH SEVERAL LIMITATIONS. AT THE VERY LEAST, COCKPIT CREW MEMBER VERIFICATION ONLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.