Narrative:

Our aircraft was cleared for an ILS approach runway 5 by TRACON and subsequently landing by local controller. On rollout, controller asked if we were able to hold short of an intersecting runway. This request came as we were decelerating through about 70 KIAS. Captain used moderate braking to hold short of intersecting runway while advising first officer to answer in the affirmative. At this point, first officer looked to his right and saw a PA31 on very short final to the intersecting runway. Neither pilot saw this aircraft prior to this time. The PA31 crossed the intersection in his landing flare less than 15 seconds after we stopped short of it. Our landing clearance did not include a lahso clearance. After deplaning passenger, captain contacted the control tower by telephone to discuss the incident. The supervisor there stated that controllers now had a directive not to issue lahso clrncs and that they now request landing aircraft to hold short after touchdown. He said that the local controller would have issued a go around to the PA31 if we had not been able to stop before the intersection. There is no question that the local controller had a better view of the developing situation than we did. I firmly believe that controllers should have wide judgemental latitude to separate aircraft and move traffic efficiently. I also believe that an ATC procedure of requesting an aircraft still at speed on the landing rollout to hold short of an intersection has a high potential for disaster.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG ACR CREW IS REQUESTED TO HOLD SHORT OF A XING RWY.

Narrative: OUR ACFT WAS CLRED FOR AN ILS APCH RWY 5 BY TRACON AND SUBSEQUENTLY LNDG BY LCL CTLR. ON ROLLOUT, CTLR ASKED IF WE WERE ABLE TO HOLD SHORT OF AN INTERSECTING RWY. THIS REQUEST CAME AS WE WERE DECELERATING THROUGH ABOUT 70 KIAS. CAPT USED MODERATE BRAKING TO HOLD SHORT OF INTERSECTING RWY WHILE ADVISING FO TO ANSWER IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. AT THIS POINT, FO LOOKED TO HIS R AND SAW A PA31 ON VERY SHORT FINAL TO THE INTERSECTING RWY. NEITHER PLT SAW THIS ACFT PRIOR TO THIS TIME. THE PA31 CROSSED THE INTXN IN HIS LNDG FLARE LESS THAN 15 SECONDS AFTER WE STOPPED SHORT OF IT. OUR LNDG CLRNC DID NOT INCLUDE A LAHSO CLRNC. AFTER DEPLANING PAX, CAPT CONTACTED THE CTL TWR BY TELEPHONE TO DISCUSS THE INCIDENT. THE SUPVR THERE STATED THAT CTLRS NOW HAD A DIRECTIVE NOT TO ISSUE LAHSO CLRNCS AND THAT THEY NOW REQUEST LNDG ACFT TO HOLD SHORT AFTER TOUCHDOWN. HE SAID THAT THE LCL CTLR WOULD HAVE ISSUED A GAR TO THE PA31 IF WE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO STOP BEFORE THE INTXN. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE LCL CTLR HAD A BETTER VIEW OF THE DEVELOPING SIT THAN WE DID. I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT CTLRS SHOULD HAVE WIDE JUDGEMENTAL LATITUDE TO SEPARATE ACFT AND MOVE TFC EFFICIENTLY. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT AN ATC PROC OF REQUESTING AN ACFT STILL AT SPD ON THE LNDG ROLLOUT TO HOLD SHORT OF AN INTXN HAS A HIGH POTENTIAL FOR DISASTER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.