Narrative:

The flight in question was a return flight from a trip from sjc, ca, to white sulphur springs (7s6), montana, on may/xa/00. After WX information was gathered before departure, it was apparent that because of adverse winds, a fuel stop might be required if winds aloft were any worse then predicted. The first leg of the flight was from white sulphur springs to bozeman (bzn) where we routinely refuel for the flight home. I filed for my standard routing: bzn direct sjc. The flight was routine, with a little occasional light chop at FL180. Approaching mustang VOR (reno) we were vectored present position direct to sacramento (sac), direct sunol, direct sjc. I asked for direct sunol, but the controller said that was not possible because sjc was landing to the south and it would mess up the bay area arrival flow. No problem. It still looked like we would arrive with adequate reserves. At the next controller handoff, still east of sac, I asked for, and received, direct sunol. Just prior to arrival there, I was given direct altam, direct sunol. Not much of a deviation from the previous routing. Approaching sunol, I was given vectors which took me south of the airport more than 12 mi. At this point, the needles on my left fuel gauge, both now down in the yellow arc 'reserve' area, started to jump around dramatically. We were then vectored back to the north toward the airport. The needles on both gauges were then bouncing around pretty wildly. At this point, my fuel computer said I had about 40 gals left, which would be plenty. Which to believe? As we neared the airport, I asked for lower and was given 3500 ft. We remained in IMC. I asked the controller what his intentions were for my sequencing, and was told that I should expect another 10 mi north of the airport before turning to join the localizer. At that point, I remembered a story in the ASRS flier, or maybe it was one of those stories in an aviation magazine, about a guy that did an off field landing because he was too late in declaring an emergency. So I did. I was then told that I should expect another 5 mi before they could turn me into the field. This sounded pretty ridiculous to me, given that I was within a mi of the airport, but at that moment we broke out into a rather large hole that had opened up to my left and I terminated my IFR clearance, was given great handling by the sjc airport controller and landed uneventfully. I asked for the fuel truck and added 205 gals to 236 gal tanks, which implied that I had 31 gals remaining, of which 27 gals would be usable. This was close to the fuel computer indication. I guess this was also sufficient for IFR reserves, but not for my flight planning purposes. Personal lessons? A) in 500-600 hours in this make and model, I had never flown it to these low fuel levels and had no idea of the erratic behavior of the gauges at low levels. Nor did I know how to correlate the fuel computer to the gauges. B) in my flight planning, I had become used to the 'direct' routing and even when approachs were IFR, had previously received vectors for a more direct route to the localizer. These assumptions led me to plan for inadequate reserves. C) on the other hand, I am pretty happy that I didn't let my ego get in the way of declaring an emergency. I have no idea what the FAA will say about the whole affair, but I feel like I did the right thing in those circumstances.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF A BEECH DUKE, BE60, DECLARED AN EMER DUE TO LOW FUEL AT THE END OF AN IFR XCOUNTRY FLT. SUCCESSFULLY LANDED WITH LEGAL MINIMUMS.

Narrative: THE FLT IN QUESTION WAS A RETURN FLT FROM A TRIP FROM SJC, CA, TO WHITE SULPHUR SPRINGS (7S6), MONTANA, ON MAY/XA/00. AFTER WX INFO WAS GATHERED BEFORE DEP, IT WAS APPARENT THAT BECAUSE OF ADVERSE WINDS, A FUEL STOP MIGHT BE REQUIRED IF WINDS ALOFT WERE ANY WORSE THEN PREDICTED. THE FIRST LEG OF THE FLT WAS FROM WHITE SULPHUR SPRINGS TO BOZEMAN (BZN) WHERE WE ROUTINELY REFUEL FOR THE FLT HOME. I FILED FOR MY STANDARD ROUTING: BZN DIRECT SJC. THE FLT WAS ROUTINE, WITH A LITTLE OCCASIONAL LIGHT CHOP AT FL180. APCHING MUSTANG VOR (RENO) WE WERE VECTORED PRESENT POS DIRECT TO SACRAMENTO (SAC), DIRECT SUNOL, DIRECT SJC. I ASKED FOR DIRECT SUNOL, BUT THE CTLR SAID THAT WAS NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE SJC WAS LNDG TO THE S AND IT WOULD MESS UP THE BAY AREA ARR FLOW. NO PROB. IT STILL LOOKED LIKE WE WOULD ARRIVE WITH ADEQUATE RESERVES. AT THE NEXT CTLR HDOF, STILL E OF SAC, I ASKED FOR, AND RECEIVED, DIRECT SUNOL. JUST PRIOR TO ARR THERE, I WAS GIVEN DIRECT ALTAM, DIRECT SUNOL. NOT MUCH OF A DEV FROM THE PREVIOUS ROUTING. APCHING SUNOL, I WAS GIVEN VECTORS WHICH TOOK ME S OF THE ARPT MORE THAN 12 MI. AT THIS POINT, THE NEEDLES ON MY L FUEL GAUGE, BOTH NOW DOWN IN THE YELLOW ARC 'RESERVE' AREA, STARTED TO JUMP AROUND DRAMATICALLY. WE WERE THEN VECTORED BACK TO THE N TOWARD THE ARPT. THE NEEDLES ON BOTH GAUGES WERE THEN BOUNCING AROUND PRETTY WILDLY. AT THIS POINT, MY FUEL COMPUTER SAID I HAD ABOUT 40 GALS LEFT, WHICH WOULD BE PLENTY. WHICH TO BELIEVE? AS WE NEARED THE ARPT, I ASKED FOR LOWER AND WAS GIVEN 3500 FT. WE REMAINED IN IMC. I ASKED THE CTLR WHAT HIS INTENTIONS WERE FOR MY SEQUENCING, AND WAS TOLD THAT I SHOULD EXPECT ANOTHER 10 MI N OF THE ARPT BEFORE TURNING TO JOIN THE LOC. AT THAT POINT, I REMEMBERED A STORY IN THE ASRS FLIER, OR MAYBE IT WAS ONE OF THOSE STORIES IN AN AVIATION MAGAZINE, ABOUT A GUY THAT DID AN OFF FIELD LNDG BECAUSE HE WAS TOO LATE IN DECLARING AN EMER. SO I DID. I WAS THEN TOLD THAT I SHOULD EXPECT ANOTHER 5 MI BEFORE THEY COULD TURN ME INTO THE FIELD. THIS SOUNDED PRETTY RIDICULOUS TO ME, GIVEN THAT I WAS WITHIN A MI OF THE ARPT, BUT AT THAT MOMENT WE BROKE OUT INTO A RATHER LARGE HOLE THAT HAD OPENED UP TO MY L AND I TERMINATED MY IFR CLRNC, WAS GIVEN GREAT HANDLING BY THE SJC ARPT CTLR AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. I ASKED FOR THE FUEL TRUCK AND ADDED 205 GALS TO 236 GAL TANKS, WHICH IMPLIED THAT I HAD 31 GALS REMAINING, OF WHICH 27 GALS WOULD BE USABLE. THIS WAS CLOSE TO THE FUEL COMPUTER INDICATION. I GUESS THIS WAS ALSO SUFFICIENT FOR IFR RESERVES, BUT NOT FOR MY FLT PLANNING PURPOSES. PERSONAL LESSONS? A) IN 500-600 HRS IN THIS MAKE AND MODEL, I HAD NEVER FLOWN IT TO THESE LOW FUEL LEVELS AND HAD NO IDEA OF THE ERRATIC BEHAVIOR OF THE GAUGES AT LOW LEVELS. NOR DID I KNOW HOW TO CORRELATE THE FUEL COMPUTER TO THE GAUGES. B) IN MY FLT PLANNING, I HAD BECOME USED TO THE 'DIRECT' ROUTING AND EVEN WHEN APCHS WERE IFR, HAD PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED VECTORS FOR A MORE DIRECT RTE TO THE LOC. THESE ASSUMPTIONS LED ME TO PLAN FOR INADEQUATE RESERVES. C) ON THE OTHER HAND, I AM PRETTY HAPPY THAT I DIDN'T LET MY EGO GET IN THE WAY OF DECLARING AN EMER. I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THE FAA WILL SAY ABOUT THE WHOLE AFFAIR, BUT I FEEL LIKE I DID THE RIGHT THING IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.