Narrative:

At approximately XA50 local time in dsm, I was doing a walkaround preflight of our aircraft. I noted that the right propeller resisted rotation. It required a bit more effort to turn and felt 'tight.' there were no noted sounds coming from the engine when hand turning the propeller, only a resistance that was not usual to my experience. After notifying the captain of the 'tightness,' he went to inspect it himself. The on-site maintenance person at dsm (a company person) was also present and said to the captain that he too had noticed this about the propeller during his walkaround prior to our arrival at the aircraft. The captain agreed that there was some unusual resistance and the maintenance person assured that this was a usual feature of new engines. He also emphatically recalled descriptions of new engines that 'sounded like they were going to grind themselves up.' we all agreed that a run-up was necessary to ensure that the engine was ok. We ran the engine up with no abnormal indications noted. The propeller was feathered and unfeathered several times, and we were satisfied that the engine was operating normally. After it was shut down, the maintenance person went outside to inspect the engine oil (for the propeller gear box), was checked and found normal. He found what he thought was an unusual amount of fuel under the nacelle, on the ground, and asked us if we were having 'any fuel issue with this aircraft.' we said no, and that sometimes these engines purge some fuel at shutdown if the epa canister is full. The maintenance person was not satisfied with this explanation and wanted to run the engine again to see where the fuel was coming from. We eventually agreed to run it again, believing it was the full epa canister, but having faith in the experience in the technician and his concern, we didn't want to take any chances. Thus, engine run #2 was performed and all indications again were normal inside the cockpit. The engine again discharged some fuel. The maintenance person had not drained the canister prior to this run-up, and therefore was unable to determine if the fuel was coming from there or another source. He then wanted to empty it, and run the engine a third time. We were a bit frustrated at this time, but he was quite sure that he noted 'mist' of fuel coming from somewhere other than the canister port. It was then brought to his attention that a third run-up would require 1 25 min rest before beginning due to a starter duty limitation. He said to just run it anyway, but the captain said in no case would he do this. Thus, due to the maintenance person's serious concern regarding the 'fuel situation' we had to unload the passenger and rerte them to their destinations due to the delay while waiting for the 25 mins to pass. After the third run-up, it was mutually decided by all parties that the fuel situation was due to the epa canister being full, and draining it has solved our problem. The captain then filled out the appropriate maintenance logbook entries in our maintenance manual and the maintenance person signed off each of the write-ups as ok. We then received 1 passenger that chose to take the delayed flight bound for msp. We departed for msp and experienced a normal takeoff, climb and level off. We began our cruise portion of the flight at 17000 ft MSL in VMC. I was PF using the autoplt, we had just ended a deviation around some scattered rain and were established on victor 13 to mcw VOR approximately 20 mi south, when a loud bang was heard and yaw felt from the right. The right propeller was very loud. A scan of the instruments showed these indications: torque 0, itt 942+, itt overtemp light on and off intermittently, propeller RPM 1400-1500+, right ignition light was on, no engine fire, and eventually the right engine oil light illuminated. All of these instruments mentioned concerned the right engine. As PF, I called for the memory items of a failed engine. The captain was concern with a propeller overspd situation that may destroy the propeller blades, and completed a memory item checklist that would satisfy both a safe engine failure procedure and a propeller overspd situation. The engine was shut down without event. We then began the emergency procedures required by the checklist. I was immediately able to find the mcw runway environment just beyond a low scattered layer of clouds below our altitude. Throughout our preparation for landing, the captain continued the checklist and I concentrated on flying the aircraft and keeping the mcw airport within reasonable distance while circling near the VOR. It was necessary for him to concentrate on company communications once we had the aircraft safely en route to mcw, and I then assumed communications with ATC while flying. It worked well because I could keep on top of the flying and local traffic and conditions and respond as necessary as the PNF concentrated on the required items necessary for our situation. At all times I was told what he was doing or about to do. The communication that took place between the 2 of us worked very well, and we were working together throughout the situation. Neither of us did anything before consulting the other, all decisions were agreed upon, yet the captain did a great job of maintaining authority/authorized. The captain was now prepared to return his full concentration to flying as the only thing remaining to accomplish before landing was a single engine before landing checklist. At this time he was able to fully brief me on what we needed to consider for a safe landing. We discussed all things we could remember. He then told me he would like to assume control of the aircraft to land it. I had no objections. I was confident that I could do it without incident, however, he had just been through a proficiency check in the simulators (more recent single engine experience), was PIC, and now wasn't the time for an argument. The landing was normal except for the single engine situation. The crash fire rescue equipment team was alert and always ready it seemed. The captain allowed the aircraft to roll to the end of the runway, always under control, and exited there. He asked me to tell the crash fire rescue equipment to follow us to the ramp as all was well and he was having no difficulties with aircraft control during taxi. I canceled IFR with ATC. We exited the aircraft to inspect the engine. There was oil coating the engine nacelle and running freely from the propeller hub. It seemed to be dripping from any openings on the underside also. We went inside operations there and the captain made phone calls to dispatch and maintenance. Later it was noticed that the right inboard tire had deflated, probably due to asymmetrical braking. Both the engine and tire were entered into the maintenance log or maintenance manual. All of the issues this event brought to light, the actual flying portion and teamwork factors were the least of my concern. Maintenance, duty time, rest, lack of information involving propeller maintenance, and decisions made by our dsm maintenance representative concern me more. I think the best, and most important thing he did after the engine failed was to say, 'ok, we need to just stop and take a deep breath.' this was the reason things went as smoothly as they did. It allowed us a moment to realize that this wasn't anything we couldn't handle. Maintenance is also a concern for me. I believe the man in dsm made a very strong case to us allowing us to believe that this was 'normal,' and I question whether someone else would have said otherwise. His concern with the 'fuel issue' seems to be odd, because the epa canister often is full and fuel gets ported at shutdown. On one hand, he was safety conscious and didn't want us to go until the fuel issue was resolved, but tended to disregard the propeller issue. Unfortunately, he did not express concern for the propeller and disregard the fuel issue because this proved to be what really should have been done. We talked at length about what the captain and I could have done differently regarding this maintenance person's ideas and strongly believe we did what we should have done in light of the information we had and the procedures we knew to follow. This maintenance person was very convincing and we respected his experience and concern for safety. Upon talking with the maintenance person on our next visit to dsm a few days later, he was still very convincing and a bit defensive. Not surprising to either I or the captain. Again, rest or lack thereof, maintenance, and information, I feel were issues that could have been improved to aid us. Cockpit management, teamwork, training, and following procedures were the things that made the day a success.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN SF340 FLC LOSES #2 ENG IN CRUISE AND DIVERTS TO MCW, IA.

Narrative: AT APPROX XA50 LCL TIME IN DSM, I WAS DOING A WALKAROUND PREFLT OF OUR ACFT. I NOTED THAT THE R PROP RESISTED ROTATION. IT REQUIRED A BIT MORE EFFORT TO TURN AND FELT 'TIGHT.' THERE WERE NO NOTED SOUNDS COMING FROM THE ENG WHEN HAND TURNING THE PROP, ONLY A RESISTANCE THAT WAS NOT USUAL TO MY EXPERIENCE. AFTER NOTIFYING THE CAPT OF THE 'TIGHTNESS,' HE WENT TO INSPECT IT HIMSELF. THE ON-SITE MAINT PERSON AT DSM (A COMPANY PERSON) WAS ALSO PRESENT AND SAID TO THE CAPT THAT HE TOO HAD NOTICED THIS ABOUT THE PROP DURING HIS WALKAROUND PRIOR TO OUR ARR AT THE ACFT. THE CAPT AGREED THAT THERE WAS SOME UNUSUAL RESISTANCE AND THE MAINT PERSON ASSURED THAT THIS WAS A USUAL FEATURE OF NEW ENGS. HE ALSO EMPHATICALLY RECALLED DESCRIPTIONS OF NEW ENGS THAT 'SOUNDED LIKE THEY WERE GOING TO GRIND THEMSELVES UP.' WE ALL AGREED THAT A RUN-UP WAS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE ENG WAS OK. WE RAN THE ENG UP WITH NO ABNORMAL INDICATIONS NOTED. THE PROP WAS FEATHERED AND UNFEATHERED SEVERAL TIMES, AND WE WERE SATISFIED THAT THE ENG WAS OPERATING NORMALLY. AFTER IT WAS SHUT DOWN, THE MAINT PERSON WENT OUTSIDE TO INSPECT THE ENG OIL (FOR THE PROP GEAR BOX), WAS CHKED AND FOUND NORMAL. HE FOUND WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS AN UNUSUAL AMOUNT OF FUEL UNDER THE NACELLE, ON THE GND, AND ASKED US IF WE WERE HAVING 'ANY FUEL ISSUE WITH THIS ACFT.' WE SAID NO, AND THAT SOMETIMES THESE ENGS PURGE SOME FUEL AT SHUTDOWN IF THE EPA CANISTER IS FULL. THE MAINT PERSON WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH THIS EXPLANATION AND WANTED TO RUN THE ENG AGAIN TO SEE WHERE THE FUEL WAS COMING FROM. WE EVENTUALLY AGREED TO RUN IT AGAIN, BELIEVING IT WAS THE FULL EPA CANISTER, BUT HAVING FAITH IN THE EXPERIENCE IN THE TECHNICIAN AND HIS CONCERN, WE DIDN'T WANT TO TAKE ANY CHANCES. THUS, ENG RUN #2 WAS PERFORMED AND ALL INDICATIONS AGAIN WERE NORMAL INSIDE THE COCKPIT. THE ENG AGAIN DISCHARGED SOME FUEL. THE MAINT PERSON HAD NOT DRAINED THE CANISTER PRIOR TO THIS RUN-UP, AND THEREFORE WAS UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF THE FUEL WAS COMING FROM THERE OR ANOTHER SOURCE. HE THEN WANTED TO EMPTY IT, AND RUN THE ENG A THIRD TIME. WE WERE A BIT FRUSTRATED AT THIS TIME, BUT HE WAS QUITE SURE THAT HE NOTED 'MIST' OF FUEL COMING FROM SOMEWHERE OTHER THAN THE CANISTER PORT. IT WAS THEN BROUGHT TO HIS ATTN THAT A THIRD RUN-UP WOULD REQUIRE 1 25 MIN REST BEFORE BEGINNING DUE TO A STARTER DUTY LIMITATION. HE SAID TO JUST RUN IT ANYWAY, BUT THE CAPT SAID IN NO CASE WOULD HE DO THIS. THUS, DUE TO THE MAINT PERSON'S SERIOUS CONCERN REGARDING THE 'FUEL SIT' WE HAD TO UNLOAD THE PAX AND RERTE THEM TO THEIR DESTS DUE TO THE DELAY WHILE WAITING FOR THE 25 MINS TO PASS. AFTER THE THIRD RUN-UP, IT WAS MUTUALLY DECIDED BY ALL PARTIES THAT THE FUEL SIT WAS DUE TO THE EPA CANISTER BEING FULL, AND DRAINING IT HAS SOLVED OUR PROB. THE CAPT THEN FILLED OUT THE APPROPRIATE MAINT LOGBOOK ENTRIES IN OUR MAINT MANUAL AND THE MAINT PERSON SIGNED OFF EACH OF THE WRITE-UPS AS OK. WE THEN RECEIVED 1 PAX THAT CHOSE TO TAKE THE DELAYED FLT BOUND FOR MSP. WE DEPARTED FOR MSP AND EXPERIENCED A NORMAL TKOF, CLB AND LEVEL OFF. WE BEGAN OUR CRUISE PORTION OF THE FLT AT 17000 FT MSL IN VMC. I WAS PF USING THE AUTOPLT, WE HAD JUST ENDED A DEV AROUND SOME SCATTERED RAIN AND WERE ESTABLISHED ON VICTOR 13 TO MCW VOR APPROX 20 MI S, WHEN A LOUD BANG WAS HEARD AND YAW FELT FROM THE R. THE R PROP WAS VERY LOUD. A SCAN OF THE INSTS SHOWED THESE INDICATIONS: TORQUE 0, ITT 942+, ITT OVERTEMP LIGHT ON AND OFF INTERMITTENTLY, PROP RPM 1400-1500+, R IGNITION LIGHT WAS ON, NO ENG FIRE, AND EVENTUALLY THE R ENG OIL LIGHT ILLUMINATED. ALL OF THESE INSTS MENTIONED CONCERNED THE R ENG. AS PF, I CALLED FOR THE MEMORY ITEMS OF A FAILED ENG. THE CAPT WAS CONCERN WITH A PROP OVERSPD SIT THAT MAY DESTROY THE PROP BLADES, AND COMPLETED A MEMORY ITEM CHKLIST THAT WOULD SATISFY BOTH A SAFE ENG FAILURE PROC AND A PROP OVERSPD SIT. THE ENG WAS SHUT DOWN WITHOUT EVENT. WE THEN BEGAN THE EMER PROCS REQUIRED BY THE CHKLIST. I WAS IMMEDIATELY ABLE TO FIND THE MCW RWY ENVIRONMENT JUST BEYOND A LOW SCATTERED LAYER OF CLOUDS BELOW OUR ALT. THROUGHOUT OUR PREPARATION FOR LNDG, THE CAPT CONTINUED THE CHKLIST AND I CONCENTRATED ON FLYING THE ACFT AND KEEPING THE MCW ARPT WITHIN REASONABLE DISTANCE WHILE CIRCLING NEAR THE VOR. IT WAS NECESSARY FOR HIM TO CONCENTRATE ON COMPANY COMS ONCE WE HAD THE ACFT SAFELY ENRTE TO MCW, AND I THEN ASSUMED COMS WITH ATC WHILE FLYING. IT WORKED WELL BECAUSE I COULD KEEP ON TOP OF THE FLYING AND LCL TFC AND CONDITIONS AND RESPOND AS NECESSARY AS THE PNF CONCENTRATED ON THE REQUIRED ITEMS NECESSARY FOR OUR SIT. AT ALL TIMES I WAS TOLD WHAT HE WAS DOING OR ABOUT TO DO. THE COM THAT TOOK PLACE BTWN THE 2 OF US WORKED VERY WELL, AND WE WERE WORKING TOGETHER THROUGHOUT THE SIT. NEITHER OF US DID ANYTHING BEFORE CONSULTING THE OTHER, ALL DECISIONS WERE AGREED UPON, YET THE CAPT DID A GREAT JOB OF MAINTAINING AUTH. THE CAPT WAS NOW PREPARED TO RETURN HIS FULL CONCENTRATION TO FLYING AS THE ONLY THING REMAINING TO ACCOMPLISH BEFORE LNDG WAS A SINGLE ENG BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST. AT THIS TIME HE WAS ABLE TO FULLY BRIEF ME ON WHAT WE NEEDED TO CONSIDER FOR A SAFE LNDG. WE DISCUSSED ALL THINGS WE COULD REMEMBER. HE THEN TOLD ME HE WOULD LIKE TO ASSUME CTL OF THE ACFT TO LAND IT. I HAD NO OBJECTIONS. I WAS CONFIDENT THAT I COULD DO IT WITHOUT INCIDENT, HOWEVER, HE HAD JUST BEEN THROUGH A PROFICIENCY CHK IN THE SIMULATORS (MORE RECENT SINGLE ENG EXPERIENCE), WAS PIC, AND NOW WASN'T THE TIME FOR AN ARGUMENT. THE LNDG WAS NORMAL EXCEPT FOR THE SINGLE ENG SIT. THE CFR TEAM WAS ALERT AND ALWAYS READY IT SEEMED. THE CAPT ALLOWED THE ACFT TO ROLL TO THE END OF THE RWY, ALWAYS UNDER CTL, AND EXITED THERE. HE ASKED ME TO TELL THE CFR TO FOLLOW US TO THE RAMP AS ALL WAS WELL AND HE WAS HAVING NO DIFFICULTIES WITH ACFT CTL DURING TAXI. I CANCELED IFR WITH ATC. WE EXITED THE ACFT TO INSPECT THE ENG. THERE WAS OIL COATING THE ENG NACELLE AND RUNNING FREELY FROM THE PROP HUB. IT SEEMED TO BE DRIPPING FROM ANY OPENINGS ON THE UNDERSIDE ALSO. WE WENT INSIDE OPS THERE AND THE CAPT MADE PHONE CALLS TO DISPATCH AND MAINT. LATER IT WAS NOTICED THAT THE R INBOARD TIRE HAD DEFLATED, PROBABLY DUE TO ASYMMETRICAL BRAKING. BOTH THE ENG AND TIRE WERE ENTERED INTO THE MAINT LOG OR MAINT MANUAL. ALL OF THE ISSUES THIS EVENT BROUGHT TO LIGHT, THE ACTUAL FLYING PORTION AND TEAMWORK FACTORS WERE THE LEAST OF MY CONCERN. MAINT, DUTY TIME, REST, LACK OF INFO INVOLVING PROP MAINT, AND DECISIONS MADE BY OUR DSM MAINT REPRESENTATIVE CONCERN ME MORE. I THINK THE BEST, AND MOST IMPORTANT THING HE DID AFTER THE ENG FAILED WAS TO SAY, 'OK, WE NEED TO JUST STOP AND TAKE A DEEP BREATH.' THIS WAS THE REASON THINGS WENT AS SMOOTHLY AS THEY DID. IT ALLOWED US A MOMENT TO REALIZE THAT THIS WASN'T ANYTHING WE COULDN'T HANDLE. MAINT IS ALSO A CONCERN FOR ME. I BELIEVE THE MAN IN DSM MADE A VERY STRONG CASE TO US ALLOWING US TO BELIEVE THAT THIS WAS 'NORMAL,' AND I QUESTION WHETHER SOMEONE ELSE WOULD HAVE SAID OTHERWISE. HIS CONCERN WITH THE 'FUEL ISSUE' SEEMS TO BE ODD, BECAUSE THE EPA CANISTER OFTEN IS FULL AND FUEL GETS PORTED AT SHUTDOWN. ON ONE HAND, HE WAS SAFETY CONSCIOUS AND DIDN'T WANT US TO GO UNTIL THE FUEL ISSUE WAS RESOLVED, BUT TENDED TO DISREGARD THE PROP ISSUE. UNFORTUNATELY, HE DID NOT EXPRESS CONCERN FOR THE PROP AND DISREGARD THE FUEL ISSUE BECAUSE THIS PROVED TO BE WHAT REALLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE. WE TALKED AT LENGTH ABOUT WHAT THE CAPT AND I COULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY REGARDING THIS MAINT PERSON'S IDEAS AND STRONGLY BELIEVE WE DID WHAT WE SHOULD HAVE DONE IN LIGHT OF THE INFO WE HAD AND THE PROCS WE KNEW TO FOLLOW. THIS MAINT PERSON WAS VERY CONVINCING AND WE RESPECTED HIS EXPERIENCE AND CONCERN FOR SAFETY. UPON TALKING WITH THE MAINT PERSON ON OUR NEXT VISIT TO DSM A FEW DAYS LATER, HE WAS STILL VERY CONVINCING AND A BIT DEFENSIVE. NOT SURPRISING TO EITHER I OR THE CAPT. AGAIN, REST OR LACK THEREOF, MAINT, AND INFO, I FEEL WERE ISSUES THAT COULD HAVE BEEN IMPROVED TO AID US. COCKPIT MGMNT, TEAMWORK, TRAINING, AND FOLLOWING PROCS WERE THE THINGS THAT MADE THE DAY A SUCCESS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.