Narrative:

While en route to the aurora municipal airport (karr) on an IFR flight, I overshot the final approach course for VOR 33 into aurora. Limited visibilities existed in the area, which necessitated the use of the approach, although no real ceiling existed. Approximately 5 mi from the joliet VOR (jot), I was instructed by chicago approach to maintain 3000 ft until established and was cleared for the VOR 33 approach into aurora. I read the clearance back, located the approach plate for VOR 33 and began to prepare for the approach. However, by the time I completed the preparation for the approach, I was approximately 4 mi past the joliet VOR. I immediately began my descent from my last assigned altitude of 4000 ft MSL to the initial approach altitude of 3000 ft MSL and turned back toward the final approach course of 330 degrees from the jot VOR. Shortly after beginning my descent and turn to the approach course, I was contacted by chicago approach about my location on the approach course and altitude. I acknowledged my overshoot of the approach course and notified them that I was turning back to intercept the approach course and descending to 3000 ft MSL. At that time, I was assigned a 010 degree heading to intercept the approach course and was again cleared for the VOR 33 approach into aurora. Upon intercepting the localizer course, I continued my descent per the published approach procedure and was passed to the aurora tower. The approach terminated with a visual circling approach to runway 15 for a full-stop landing. Contributing factors in this event were inadequate preparation time and relatively low time in type. In a twin-engine aircraft, operating single-pilot, things happen very quickly. I did not react and prepare for the approach quickly enough to begin the assigned approach before the overshoot. Additionally, I was not allowed adequate time to prepare for the approach. At my 180 KT ground speed, I had approximately 2 mins to prepare for the approach. These 2 main causes lead to the overshoot of the final approach course. Fortunately, there was no immediate danger and the approach terminated without incident, but the possibility for immediate danger existed. Normally, ATC allows adequate time to prepare when a pilot should expect a particular instrument approach procedure. However, in this situation, I was not given enough time for several reasons. First, in normal instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), pilots expect to execute instrument approach procedures. As such, they are mentally and physically prepared for the approach, often before they are told to expect a particular approach. In this situation, WX was marginal visual conditions, so I expected radar vectors to obtain a visual contact with the airport and execute a visual approach into aurora. This may have been a bad assumption on my part, and better preparedness would have avoided the situation. When I was cleared for the VOR 33 approach, I needed time to slow the aircraft, find the approach procedure chart, configure the aircraft, descend, set up the radios, and intercept the approach course. All this needed to happen within about 2 mins. The solution for this problem may lie with earlier notification of the type of approach to be expected, even when in visual meteorological conditions. Additionally, more training and more time in type will allow me to react in a timelier manner to sudden changes in flight plan, such as this situation. The combination will avoid sits like this and create a safer flying environment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C90 TRACON CTLR CATCHES GA PLT OFF THE VOR COURSE ON APCH TO ARR, IL. POS IS QUESTIONED AND INTERCEPT HEADING ISSUED.

Narrative: WHILE ENRTE TO THE AURORA MUNICIPAL ARPT (KARR) ON AN IFR FLT, I OVERSHOT THE FINAL APCH COURSE FOR VOR 33 INTO AURORA. LIMITED VISIBILITIES EXISTED IN THE AREA, WHICH NECESSITATED THE USE OF THE APCH, ALTHOUGH NO REAL CEILING EXISTED. APPROX 5 MI FROM THE JOLIET VOR (JOT), I WAS INSTRUCTED BY CHICAGO APCH TO MAINTAIN 3000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED AND WAS CLRED FOR THE VOR 33 APCH INTO AURORA. I READ THE CLRNC BACK, LOCATED THE APCH PLATE FOR VOR 33 AND BEGAN TO PREPARE FOR THE APCH. HOWEVER, BY THE TIME I COMPLETED THE PREPARATION FOR THE APCH, I WAS APPROX 4 MI PAST THE JOLIET VOR. I IMMEDIATELY BEGAN MY DSCNT FROM MY LAST ASSIGNED ALT OF 4000 FT MSL TO THE INITIAL APCH ALT OF 3000 FT MSL AND TURNED BACK TOWARD THE FINAL APCH COURSE OF 330 DEGS FROM THE JOT VOR. SHORTLY AFTER BEGINNING MY DSCNT AND TURN TO THE APCH COURSE, I WAS CONTACTED BY CHICAGO APCH ABOUT MY LOCATION ON THE APCH COURSE AND ALT. I ACKNOWLEDGED MY OVERSHOOT OF THE APCH COURSE AND NOTIFIED THEM THAT I WAS TURNING BACK TO INTERCEPT THE APCH COURSE AND DSNDING TO 3000 FT MSL. AT THAT TIME, I WAS ASSIGNED A 010 DEG HDG TO INTERCEPT THE APCH COURSE AND WAS AGAIN CLRED FOR THE VOR 33 APCH INTO AURORA. UPON INTERCEPTING THE LOC COURSE, I CONTINUED MY DSCNT PER THE PUBLISHED APCH PROC AND WAS PASSED TO THE AURORA TWR. THE APCH TERMINATED WITH A VISUAL CIRCLING APCH TO RWY 15 FOR A FULL-STOP LNDG. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN THIS EVENT WERE INADEQUATE PREPARATION TIME AND RELATIVELY LOW TIME IN TYPE. IN A TWIN-ENG ACFT, OPERATING SINGLE-PLT, THINGS HAPPEN VERY QUICKLY. I DID NOT REACT AND PREPARE FOR THE APCH QUICKLY ENOUGH TO BEGIN THE ASSIGNED APCH BEFORE THE OVERSHOOT. ADDITIONALLY, I WAS NOT ALLOWED ADEQUATE TIME TO PREPARE FOR THE APCH. AT MY 180 KT GND SPD, I HAD APPROX 2 MINS TO PREPARE FOR THE APCH. THESE 2 MAIN CAUSES LEAD TO THE OVERSHOOT OF THE FINAL APCH COURSE. FORTUNATELY, THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE DANGER AND THE APCH TERMINATED WITHOUT INCIDENT, BUT THE POSSIBILITY FOR IMMEDIATE DANGER EXISTED. NORMALLY, ATC ALLOWS ADEQUATE TIME TO PREPARE WHEN A PLT SHOULD EXPECT A PARTICULAR INST APCH PROC. HOWEVER, IN THIS SIT, I WAS NOT GIVEN ENOUGH TIME FOR SEVERAL REASONS. FIRST, IN NORMAL INST METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS (IMC), PLTS EXPECT TO EXECUTE INST APCH PROCS. AS SUCH, THEY ARE MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY PREPARED FOR THE APCH, OFTEN BEFORE THEY ARE TOLD TO EXPECT A PARTICULAR APCH. IN THIS SIT, WX WAS MARGINAL VISUAL CONDITIONS, SO I EXPECTED RADAR VECTORS TO OBTAIN A VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE ARPT AND EXECUTE A VISUAL APCH INTO AURORA. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN A BAD ASSUMPTION ON MY PART, AND BETTER PREPAREDNESS WOULD HAVE AVOIDED THE SIT. WHEN I WAS CLRED FOR THE VOR 33 APCH, I NEEDED TIME TO SLOW THE ACFT, FIND THE APCH PROC CHART, CONFIGURE THE ACFT, DSND, SET UP THE RADIOS, AND INTERCEPT THE APCH COURSE. ALL THIS NEEDED TO HAPPEN WITHIN ABOUT 2 MINS. THE SOLUTION FOR THIS PROB MAY LIE WITH EARLIER NOTIFICATION OF THE TYPE OF APCH TO BE EXPECTED, EVEN WHEN IN VISUAL METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS. ADDITIONALLY, MORE TRAINING AND MORE TIME IN TYPE WILL ALLOW ME TO REACT IN A TIMELIER MANNER TO SUDDEN CHANGES IN FLT PLAN, SUCH AS THIS SIT. THE COMBINATION WILL AVOID SITS LIKE THIS AND CREATE A SAFER FLYING ENVIRONMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.