Narrative:

I was called over to air carrier to placard a right engine reverser unlock warning lite. Never having deactivated a 717's reverser I called their maintenance coordinator and asked to have the procedures faxed. Received a facsimile cover sheet and 3 pages from air carrier MEL manual for the 717. When finished with the deactivation called back air carrier maintenance to make sure I was completing the proper signoff in the logbook and get a maintenance control number for the placard. The coordinator never mentioned anything about pinning the deflector doors. They were mentioned in the MEL, but the verbal language in the manual threw me off. After lift off the 717's right engine reverser deployed at 1400 AGL. The pilot shut down the rt engine while keeping a airspeed of 200 KTS. The aircraft returned safely. While going over the procedures again with maintenance coordinator, found that the 4TH page of the deactivation was not faxed. Without this page, missed the crucial step of pinning the deflector doors closed. This would not have happen if the MEL would state in the beginning paragraphs of the steps what had to be deactivated along with graphics and explanation. Air carrier XXX keeps these books on the aircraft at all times. Some of the airlines don't, you have to depend on getting information over the facsimile. I work at air carrier XXX airlines and many times we are contracted out to work on other carriers. At ZZZ, I work on 6 carriers besides air carrier XXX which has us working on 3 different kind of aircraft that we don't work on a daily basis. More indepth training would help. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the crew discovered #2 engine thrust reverser unlock light on during a preflight check. The reporter said he was contacted by the air carrier to call the maintenance controller to get procedures for deferring the #2 engine thrust reverser. The reporter stated upon contacting the air carrier maintenance controller was advised to follow the MEL special procedures and render the thrust reverser inoperative. The reporter said a request was made to the maintenance controller to facsimile the procedures as the rtprs experience was limited to a few hours of logbook and serving training on this new airplane. The reporter said the air carrier maintenance controller faxed three sheets of procedures with no page identification as 1 of 3, 2 of 3 and 3 of 3. The reporter said the three page document was accomplished and assumed that the deflector doors were stowed meant they were in the lock position. The reporter said the airplane was dispatched and at 1400 ft the reverser deployed incurring damage to the deflector doors linkage. The reporter stated it was then discovered a 4TH page with the procedure for installing lock pins locking the deflector doors in the forward thrust was never sent by the air carrier maintenance controller. The reporter said that, boeing revised the procedure adding pictures of the lock pins location. The reporter stated the only work experience gained on the 717 was serving oil, hydraulics and tires. The reporter said more training on the contract aircraft we are assigned to work would help but none of the carriers do it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AIR CARRIER AFTER TKOF AT 1400 FT DECLARED AN EMER AND DIVERTED DUE TO #2 ENG THRUST REVERSER DEPLOYED.

Narrative: I WAS CALLED OVER TO ACR TO PLACARD A R ENG REVERSER UNLOCK WARNING LITE. NEVER HAVING DEACTIVATED A 717'S REVERSER I CALLED THEIR MAINT COORDINATOR AND ASKED TO HAVE THE PROCS FAXED. RECEIVED A FAX COVER SHEET AND 3 PAGES FROM ACR MEL MANUAL FOR THE 717. WHEN FINISHED WITH THE DEACTIVATION CALLED BACK ACR MAINT TO MAKE SURE I WAS COMPLETING THE PROPER SIGNOFF IN THE LOGBOOK AND GET A MAINT CTL NUMBER FOR THE PLACARD. THE COORDINATOR NEVER MENTIONED ANYTHING ABOUT PINNING THE DEFLECTOR DOORS. THEY WERE MENTIONED IN THE MEL, BUT THE VERBAL LANGUAGE IN THE MANUAL THREW ME OFF. AFTER LIFT OFF THE 717'S R ENG REVERSER DEPLOYED AT 1400 AGL. THE PLT SHUT DOWN THE RT ENG WHILE KEEPING A AIRSPEED OF 200 KTS. THE ACFT RETURNED SAFELY. WHILE GOING OVER THE PROCS AGAIN WITH MAINT COORDINATOR, FOUND THAT THE 4TH PAGE OF THE DEACTIVATION WAS NOT FAXED. WITHOUT THIS PAGE, MISSED THE CRUCIAL STEP OF PINNING THE DEFLECTOR DOORS CLOSED. THIS WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPEN IF THE MEL WOULD STATE IN THE BEGINNING PARAGRAPHS OF THE STEPS WHAT HAD TO BE DEACTIVATED ALONG WITH GRAPHICS AND EXPLANATION. ACR XXX KEEPS THESE BOOKS ON THE ACFT AT ALL TIMES. SOME OF THE AIRLINES DON'T, YOU HAVE TO DEPEND ON GETTING INFO OVER THE FAX. I WORK AT ACR XXX AIRLINES AND MANY TIMES WE ARE CONTRACTED OUT TO WORK ON OTHER CARRIERS. AT ZZZ, I WORK ON 6 CARRIERS BESIDES ACR XXX WHICH HAS US WORKING ON 3 DIFFERENT KIND OF ACFT THAT WE DON'T WORK ON A DAILY BASIS. MORE INDEPTH TRAINING WOULD HELP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE CREW DISCOVERED #2 ENG THRUST REVERSER UNLOCK LIGHT ON DURING A PREFLT CHK. THE RPTR SAID HE WAS CONTACTED BY THE ACR TO CALL THE MAINT CTLR TO GET PROCS FOR DEFERRING THE #2 ENG THRUST REVERSER. THE RPTR STATED UPON CONTACTING THE ACR MAINT CTLR WAS ADVISED TO FOLLOW THE MEL SPECIAL PROCS AND RENDER THE THRUST REVERSER INOPERATIVE. THE RPTR SAID A REQUEST WAS MADE TO THE MAINT CTLR TO FAX THE PROCS AS THE RTPRS EXPERIENCE WAS LIMITED TO A FEW HRS OF LOGBOOK AND SERVING TRAINING ON THIS NEW AIRPLANE. THE RPTR SAID THE ACR MAINT CTLR FAXED THREE SHEETS OF PROCS WITH NO PAGE IDENTIFICATION AS 1 OF 3, 2 OF 3 AND 3 OF 3. THE RPTR SAID THE THREE PAGE DOCUMENT WAS ACCOMPLISHED AND ASSUMED THAT THE DEFLECTOR DOORS WERE STOWED MEANT THEY WERE IN THE LOCK POS. THE RPTR SAID THE AIRPLANE WAS DISPATCHED AND AT 1400 FT THE REVERSER DEPLOYED INCURRING DAMAGE TO THE DEFLECTOR DOORS LINKAGE. THE RPTR STATED IT WAS THEN DISCOVERED A 4TH PAGE WITH THE PROC FOR INSTALLING LOCK PINS LOCKING THE DEFLECTOR DOORS IN THE FORWARD THRUST WAS NEVER SENT BY THE ACR MAINT CTLR. THE RPTR SAID THAT, BOEING REVISED THE PROC ADDING PICTURES OF THE LOCK PINS LOCATION. THE RPTR STATED THE ONLY WORK EXPERIENCE GAINED ON THE 717 WAS SERVING OIL, HYDRAULICS AND TIRES. THE RPTR SAID MORE TRAINING ON THE CONTRACT ACFT WE ARE ASSIGNED TO WORK WOULD HELP BUT NONE OF THE CARRIERS DO IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.