Narrative:

On feb/xa/01, I was in command of a scheduled cargo flight from taipei, taiwan to sharja, united arab emerates, with a stop in mumbai, india. The company provides 3 different commercial chart flight kits for company personnel to place on board the aircraft for a particular flight. The 3 kits are: 1) north atlantic, 2) pac-rim, and 3) around the world kit. The gate manager is responsible for placing the correct kit on board. As per the company's policies, the crew's responsibility when arriving at the aircraft is for the international relief officer to check the contents of the flight kit to be sure that all of the en route charts and approach plates for departure destination and alternate airports are there for us, and to inform the captain of any missing material. My international relief officer never notified of anything being missing except for the alternate airport approach plates, which we requested from the gate and were made available to us. After takeoff from taipei at the top of climb, I wanted to take out the approach plates for mumbai, india and sharja, united arab emerates to review and place them in the smaller binder provided. To my surprise, the approach plates were not in the big binders. I then asked my international relief officer 'where are the approach plates for mumbai and sharja?' he said he assumed that the approach plates for mumbai and sharja were already in the small binders that the first officer and I had up front, so he did not mention anything on the ground. Between the 3 of us we each had the en route charts required to get us to mumbai, and the approachs for mumbai are in the FMC's database. After careful evaluation of the WX en route and at the destination, and careful evaluation of our situation, we concluded that we would be able to continue the flight to mumbai safely, rather than dump fuel and return to taipai. The WX forecast for mumbai was calling for clear skies and 5-6 kilometers visibility at the time of our arrival. I made the decision to continue and land at mumbai and solve the problem on the ground at mumbai with the company. Upon arrival at mumbai, the ATIS was reporting clear skies 6 kilometers visibility with a VOR approach to runway 32. We activated the approach in the FMC and we briefed it as well as we could. We conducted the VOR approach to runway 32 to a visual, and landed uneventfully. At no time was the safety of the flight ever compromised and we felt that under the circumstances that we were faced with, we made the best decision available to us.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 CREW FLEW APCH AND LANDED WITHOUT HAVING THE ARPT'S APCH CHARTS.

Narrative: ON FEB/XA/01, I WAS IN COMMAND OF A SCHEDULED CARGO FLT FROM TAIPEI, TAIWAN TO SHARJA, UNITED ARAB EMERATES, WITH A STOP IN MUMBAI, INDIA. THE COMPANY PROVIDES 3 DIFFERENT COMMERCIAL CHART FLT KITS FOR COMPANY PERSONNEL TO PLACE ON BOARD THE ACFT FOR A PARTICULAR FLT. THE 3 KITS ARE: 1) NORTH ATLANTIC, 2) PAC-RIM, AND 3) AROUND THE WORLD KIT. THE GATE MGR IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PLACING THE CORRECT KIT ON BOARD. AS PER THE COMPANY'S POLICIES, THE CREW'S RESPONSIBILITY WHEN ARRIVING AT THE ACFT IS FOR THE INTL RELIEF OFFICER TO CHK THE CONTENTS OF THE FLT KIT TO BE SURE THAT ALL OF THE ENRTE CHARTS AND APCH PLATES FOR DEP DEST AND ALTERNATE ARPTS ARE THERE FOR US, AND TO INFORM THE CAPT OF ANY MISSING MATERIAL. MY INTL RELIEF OFFICER NEVER NOTIFIED OF ANYTHING BEING MISSING EXCEPT FOR THE ALTERNATE ARPT APCH PLATES, WHICH WE REQUESTED FROM THE GATE AND WERE MADE AVAILABLE TO US. AFTER TKOF FROM TAIPEI AT THE TOP OF CLB, I WANTED TO TAKE OUT THE APCH PLATES FOR MUMBAI, INDIA AND SHARJA, UNITED ARAB EMERATES TO REVIEW AND PLACE THEM IN THE SMALLER BINDER PROVIDED. TO MY SURPRISE, THE APCH PLATES WERE NOT IN THE BIG BINDERS. I THEN ASKED MY INTL RELIEF OFFICER 'WHERE ARE THE APCH PLATES FOR MUMBAI AND SHARJA?' HE SAID HE ASSUMED THAT THE APCH PLATES FOR MUMBAI AND SHARJA WERE ALREADY IN THE SMALL BINDERS THAT THE FO AND I HAD UP FRONT, SO HE DID NOT MENTION ANYTHING ON THE GND. BETWEEN THE 3 OF US WE EACH HAD THE ENRTE CHARTS REQUIRED TO GET US TO MUMBAI, AND THE APCHS FOR MUMBAI ARE IN THE FMC'S DATABASE. AFTER CAREFUL EVALUATION OF THE WX ENRTE AND AT THE DEST, AND CAREFUL EVALUATION OF OUR SIT, WE CONCLUDED THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTINUE THE FLT TO MUMBAI SAFELY, RATHER THAN DUMP FUEL AND RETURN TO TAIPAI. THE WX FORECAST FOR MUMBAI WAS CALLING FOR CLR SKIES AND 5-6 KILOMETERS VISIBILITY AT THE TIME OF OUR ARR. I MADE THE DECISION TO CONTINUE AND LAND AT MUMBAI AND SOLVE THE PROB ON THE GND AT MUMBAI WITH THE COMPANY. UPON ARR AT MUMBAI, THE ATIS WAS RPTING CLR SKIES 6 KILOMETERS VISIBILITY WITH A VOR APCH TO RWY 32. WE ACTIVATED THE APCH IN THE FMC AND WE BRIEFED IT AS WELL AS WE COULD. WE CONDUCTED THE VOR APCH TO RWY 32 TO A VISUAL, AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. AT NO TIME WAS THE SAFETY OF THE FLT EVER COMPROMISED AND WE FELT THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WE WERE FACED WITH, WE MADE THE BEST DECISION AVAILABLE TO US.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.